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My dissertation proposes a definition of the family that captures the qualitative aspects of familial 
relationships – a collection of features that set apart ideal families from deficient families – that 
best serve family members and the state. Most importantly, the qualitative features that define ideal 
families are the features that actually define the family qua family: groups that do not have these 
features do not count as families. Why draw such a categorical distinction between families and 
non-families? I argue that the benefits conferred upon families by the state demand that families 
be the kinds of groups that actually use those benefits to benefit each family member through 
caring activities. This means that the family is a unique kind of social group with a particular 
purpose: to provide care in intimate settings toward the mutual well being of all family members. 
Families work toward this goal by meeting the needs of all family members.  
 
I propose that we think of needs as being either primary or secondary in nature; a distinction that 
reflects the ways that needs arise. This new taxonomy of needs also requires an alternative view 
of caring activities. I propose that we think of the caring activities that meet these needs as being 
either direct (or indirect) primary caring activities (where caring for another is definitive of the 
activity), or as secondary caring activities (where taking care of is definitive of the activity).  
 
Primary needs involve those things that persons cannot live without regardless of social, economic, 
or political context. Primary needs, when they cannot be met independently, must be met by others 
through primary caring activities: activities that involve direct or indirect physical and emotional 
care for the dependent. Those who respond to our primary needs must have substantial knowledge 
not just about us, but about what kinds of caring activities will best meet the needs that we have. 
Consequently, I argue that family members are the most effective primary caregivers and have an 
obligation to perform primary caring activities for one another.  
 
Secondary needs are those things that persons require to secure the resources necessary to meet 
their primary needs and are highly circumstantial – that is, all persons do not have them equally, 
and they may change (for better or worse) depending upon external forces. Because the state has 
a unique role in creating and regulating secondary needs, especially those that may impede a 
family’s ability to provide primary care, the state has an obligation to take care of many secondary 
needs for citizens, including the provision of social insurance, subsidized childcare and eldercare, 
and a livable minimum wage.  
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The way we define the family has profound effects on the political and social practices within an 
organized state. When the term family is applied to a group of persons, it picks out those persons 
as having a particular kind of relationship to one another that may ground claims for special 
privileges that are otherwise absent in non-familial relationships. For instance, those who are 
recognized as being members of the same family are typically eligible for certain benefits including 
reduced taxation, inheritance transfers, visitation and decision rights in hospitals and prisons, 
shared healthcare plans, and immigration eligibility by the state. I call these benefits social 
benefits. Social benefits are benefits that appertain to the relationships between individuals because 
they affect the functioning of those relationships. As such, social benefits only have meaning when 
applied to relationships – most integrally, familial relationships – and cannot be applied to 
individuals apart from their relationships.1 In addition to social benefits, those who are recognized 
as being members of families are also granted a level of recognition and respect by peers (and, 
relatedly, reduced stigma), as well as increased career potential. So, attempts to provide a definition 
of the family that are in any way exclusionary (i.e. are not inclusive of the many different 
arrangements that family forms may take) disadvantage those individuals who are not able to create 
or maintain families, in that they are prevented from obtaining these benefits.  
																																																						
1 For instance, one cannot have visitation rights in a hospital or prison if there is no known relation to visit.  
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However, at the same time, it seems problematic to think that all kinds of familial 
arrangements should be entitled to receive social benefits, especially when there is a chance that 
these benefits will be used inappropriately. Families that have abusive members – those who 
neglect, verbally abuse, physically abuse, emotionally/psychologically abuse, oppress, or control 
other family members – do not form the kinds of arrangements wherein we would trust all family 
members to use social benefits within the right moral framework.2 The benefits that were just 
discussed – reduced taxation, inheritance transfers, visitation and decision rights in hospitals, and 
so on – may in fact have negative consequences in these deficient arrangements. For instance, an 
abusive family member who is able to make medical decisions for another family member – either 
because the family member needing medical assistance is a minor or unable to consent to a 
procedure / treatment regimen themselves – may not be the right choice for such a task. We would 
be right to worry that much needed care might be withheld, or that long-term treatment regimens 
would not be adhered to (or worse, that medical treatment would not even be sought in the first 
place). Likewise, for a family member suffering from dementia or other forms of diminished 
capacity, it seems problematic for inheritance proceedings to ignore negligent treatment of the 
ailing family member by privileging biological relatedness or pre-established legal ties to the ailing 
family member over the quality of the relationship shared with them. Those biological relations 
who would claim entitlement to an inheritance might work to accelerate the decline of the ailing 
family member, or neglect their most basic care (cf. Gordon 2009). As such, the benefits that may 
help family members in more exemplary arrangements may indeed harm family members in these 
deficient arrangements. 
																																																						
2 In Chapter Three I will argue that the Ethics of Care is the best moral framework to ground familial 
relationships.  
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 Additionally, concerns arise over the kinds of rights that certain family members have over 
other members – rights that are determined by the definition of family. With children in particular, 
how should custody be determined in families that are splitting up? Do unwed biological fathers 
have rights to terminate adoption proceedings initiated by the birth mother?3 This raises the 
question of whether biology should be the dominant way to carve out familial relationships, or if 
biology is just one among many features that certain persons share with one another (such as a 
belief system, a parenting philosophy, or claims to certain property), none of which alone produce 
the level of familial bonding that we take to justify political protections and social benefits? 
To be sure, it is no easy task to define a family. Yet, because states recognize certain kinds 
of groups as being families (rejecting other kinds of groups from this same category), and confer 
social benefits upon them, it is crucial to ensure that the definition of family being used by the state 
to identify familial groups is the right one. Since the definition of the family is so fundamentally 
tied to the criterion used to pick out familial groups, a definition of the family must be determined 
by identifying the criterion that best captures what it is that families do that other kinds of groups 
do not do. While a definition of the family should be flexible enough to include the many diverse 
groups who consider themselves to be families, it must also be firm enough to avoid potentially 
tethering certain persons to one another in arrangements where harmful behaviors regularly occur. 
That is, a definition of the family must consider the qualitative aspects of familial relationships – 
																																																						
3 Surrogacy cases also present a unique challenge to parental and custodial rights: Does a woman who 
carries a non-biologically related fetus to term bear any right to the child once born, even if her surrogacy 
was commissioned and agreed to by one or more consenting and presumed (even biological) parents-to-be? 
One might argue that the care that is involved in pregnancy (a healthy pregnancy that carries a fetus to term) 
involves great sacrifice from the pregnant woman (altered lifestyle choices, medical and emotional duress, 
etc.) and gives that woman a claim over the child when born (perhaps even stronger than that of the child’s 
biological parents who, aside from commissioning a surrogate, may not have demonstrated the same or a 
similar level of care). For in-depth discussions of these questions, see: Shanley 1999; Narayan 1999; 
Gavigan 1999; and Almond 1999. 
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those features that determine whether a family is functioning well or barely functioning at all. Leo 
Tolstoy wrote, “All happy families are alike; each unhappy family is unhappy in its own way.” 
(Tolstoy 2002, 1). While Tolstoy might have been trying to point to the unique and fascinating 
differences between families who are deficient, he nonetheless captures what I am trying to get at 
here: that there is a core characteristic that exemplary families have that sets them apart from 
deficient families.  
By deficient I do not mean necessarily reprehensible, nor do I mean to paint all degrees of 
deficient families with the same brush. Rather, deficient families exist upon a spectrum where 
behaviors regularly directed by some family members toward others are, to some degree or 
another, questionable at best or abusive/oppressive/neglectful at worst. My use of deficient is 
meant to pick out families with problematic behaviors as we know them to exist contemporarily.4 
By contrast, exemplary families are those families where questionable, abusive, oppressive, or 
neglectful behaviors do not regularly occur (or, ideally, do not occur at all), and family members 
always strive to use social benefits appropriately.5 My use of exemplary is meant to pick out 
families that satisfy the criterion I will propose in this dissertation as defining the family. 
The task of this dissertation, then, is to propose a definition of the family that captures this 
core difference between exemplary families and deficient families by identifying the qualitative 
aspects of familial relationships. But even more so, this definition ought not provide a space for 
deficient families to establish themselves as the peers of exemplary families. So, in proposing a 
definition of the family, I aim to defend the claim that the core feature that defines exemplary 
																																																						
4 Ultimately, I will claim that the core feature that defines exemplary families is the core feature that actually 
defines the family; deficient families, then, will not count as families in the eyes of the state. 
5 Even exemplary families will, inevitably, have their own imperfections. The point of contrast between 
exemplary families and deficient families is that deficient families have imperfections regularly, in that 
questionable, abusive, oppressive, or negligent behaviors occur with regularity. 
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families is the core feature that actually defines the family - that is, groups that do not have this 
core feature should not count as families in the eyes of the state, and ought not be conferred social 
benefits by the state. As such, my account will advance a normative conception of the family and 
its relationship to the state that will have direct bearing on how social benefits are distributed. 
Social benefits are benefits that make it easier for family members to care for one another, 
provide for one another, to see one another regularly, and to encourage all family members to 
grow, develop, and flourish. For instance, a reduced tax burden for families with young children 
enables adult caretakers to more easily purchase such essential items as food and clothing, and to 
maintain stable housing – all of which benefit the young children who cannot provide those things 
for themselves. Likewise, visitation and decision rights in hospitals benefit family members 
requiring medical care by enabling other family members to show emotional support and to help 
determine the best treatment regimen(s) for providing care both immediately and over the long 
term. As such, the social benefits that states confer upon families demand that families be the kinds 
of groups that actually use those benefits appropriately to benefit each family member. If social 
benefits are not used with the purpose of benefitting all family members (potentially even harming 
them instead), then they should no longer be considered benefits, but instead should be thought of 
as instrumental protections for abusive, neglectful, or oppressive behaviors. As such, if a group of 
persons is granted the status of family and given the benefits that go along with it, yet do not use 
those benefits appropriately, then the state should not recognize that group as a family and those 
benefits should not be conferred. The benefits conferred upon families must be directed toward the 
mutual well-being of all family members, and the families who receive these benefits must use 
them appropriately to continue receiving them. In Chapter Three I will argue that the most effective 
and appropriate way to use these benefits is to establish and maintain intimate caring relations 
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between family members. These caring relations comprise the core characteristic of exemplary 
families. 
Does this approach to ontologically categorizing the family seem unnecessarily invasive, 
punitive, or simply impossible to do? One might argue that Wittgenstein’s notion of family 
resemblances is sufficient to capture what we mean by the family, and claim that drawing 
boundaries between exemplary and deficient families is excessive. Such an argument would 
highlight the series of similarities and relationships that exist among families, rather than try to 
look for something that is common to all families (cf. Wittgenstein 2001, §66). While this approach 
might explain our colloquial understanding of the family, it does not provide a clear characteristic 
(or even a set of characteristics) that can be used to determine 1) if social benefits should be 
conferred upon a particular ‘family’, or 2) if social benefits are being used appropriately by a 
‘family’. It is precisely because social benefits are conferred upon families that we need a firm 
definition of just what the family is, else said benefits could be conferred upon just about any group 
of individuals that might try to call themselves a family. 
That being said, qualitatively analyzing each and every family sounds extremely invasive 
on the part of the state, and responding to groups that fail to adhere to certain familial relationship 
standards by withholding their social benefits might seem to be more harmful to those who are in 
abusive situations than leaving the group intact as is.6. Despite these concerns, I contend that it is 
the responsibility of the state to ensure that families have the resources they need to maintain 
healthy and mutually beneficial relationships for all family members. In Chapter Three I discuss 
just how the state fulfills this responsibility, and argue that it is in the state’s best interest to do so.  
																																																						
6 In Chapter Three I argue that individually vulnerable members, such as children, would not lose necessary 
protections or benefits such as stable housing, nutrition, and healthcare. In such cases, institutional 
responses would be required to temporarily protect and provide for those vulnerable family members until 
their familial relationships can be safely restored. 
KANE - DISSERTATION 
	
7	
Prima facie, my account may seem to require a great deal more state involvement within 
the family than liberal or even communitarian accounts would allow. However, in Chapter Four I 
will argue that my account merely shifts the boundaries between the family and the state, a move 
that does not translate into an appreciable increase of state involvement in familial affairs. The 
approach I take behooves us to examine what parameters those boundaries are drawn around and 
then question why those boundaries need to be drawn thusly. In doing so, we come to recognize 
that 1) the boundaries drawn between the family and the state is within the state’s power to control; 
2) the state does in fact control where those boundaries are drawn; and 3) this boundary-drawing 
is not unique to my account, but can be found in any approach that attempts to conceptualize the 
family. In response, my account uses different criteria to draw the boundary between the family 
and the state in an effort to remedy the lack of oversight for familial relationships within existing 
theories. These theories, which I discuss at length in Chapter Four, have consistently informed 
policies that ignore or fail to rectify inter-familial abuse of all kinds, oppression that 
disenfranchises women especially (both inside the family and outside of it), and the systematic 
neglect of familial needs (lack of infrastructure for daycares, eldercare, universal healthcare, and 
so forth).7 As such, I will argue that they do not adequately conceptualize the relationship between 
the family and the state. 
Families may exist without an organized state, but a state cannot exist without the practices 
related to familial life (cf. Engster 2015).8 Families may exist par excellence in the right kind of 
state – one that responds to the needs of families and gives families and family members a chance 
to flourish – but the kinds of qualitative features that define families that I aim to identify do not 
																																																						
7 In Chapter Four, I discuss the Traditionalist View, the Liberal View, and the Abolitionist View, and 
identify the shortcomings within each view as they compare with my own view.  
8 Engster claims that pre-Neolithic era human beings most likely lived in multi-family groups consisting of 
about 25-35 members that emphasized kinship relations. 
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require a state, nor are they defined by a state (even if they are upheld by the actions of a state).9 
When families are defined by a criterion chosen by the state, the definitions are often lacking in 
any real substance, instead trying to determine the best way to organize a group of people based 
around property or biological relationship. For instance, the American legal definition of the family 
is based on interpretations of liberal political philosophical theory – that is, it is meant to be 
inclusive of a diverse number of arrangements and relationships.10 However, interpretations of the 
legal definition and the policies that follow all too often exclude some from eligibility (e.g. 
adoption by LGBTQ parents), fail to protect the most vulnerable (neglect, abuse, and rape of both 
partners and children), and say little about what kinds of benefits family members may bestow 
upon one another (i.e. inheritances, estates) to the detriment of those outside of the family, and so 
on. Thus, the need for a definition of the family that captures the core characteristic of familial 
relationships and identifies the value in these unique relationships is pressing in order to ensure 
that social benefits are conferred appropriately. 
After I have advanced my full account, I will pose a challenge to existing accounts in social 
and political philosophy in Chapter Four, and argue that my own approach better defines what 
makes families so significant, addresses the needs of families, and identifies the most effective 
role for the state to play to ensure that families are taken care of. While aspects of my account may 
																																																						
9 The qualitative features that will define the family on my account theoretically precede, and are 
independent of, the determination of how the family and the state relate to one another. That is, the 
qualitative features that define the family (and define the purpose of the family) have nothing to do with 
the formation of, maintenance of, or cultural production of the state apparatus. 
10 The U.S. Census Bureau defines the family as a group of individuals (2 or more persons) who live together 
who are related either by birth, marriage, or adoption (a family or family household is defined by the United 
States Census Bureau for statistical purposes as "a householder and one or more other people related to the 
householder by birth, marriage, or adoption.”). Webster’s New World Law Dictionary defines the family 
as: “A group of individuals who share ties of blood, marriage, or adoption; a group residing together and 
consisting of parents, children, and other relatives by blood or marriage; a group of individuals residing 
together who have consented to an arrangement similar to ties of blood or marriage.” 
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unsettle liberal theorists in particular, I believe that it offers a substantial challenge to these existing 
theories of the family-state relationship that must be taken seriously. However, before I can move 
on to the arguments that shape my account, I must provide the right theoretical and methodological 
foundations that will serve as the groundwork for my view.  
 In Chapter One, I adopt two methodological starting points for examining the conception 
of the family that are the most promising for identifying its characteristics and meeting basic moral 
principles. First, I start with the assumption that a family is a social group. This is not a very 
controversial assumption; many philosophers have claimed that the family is, in fact, a 
paradigmatic social group (cf. Bratman 1999; cf. Gilbert 1989 and 2006; cf. Tuomela 2007). What 
is controversial is what kind of social group the family is, especially since many philosophers 
define social groups as groups who knowingly consent to their group membership, or voluntarily 
act to continue their group membership. The family presents an interesting challenge to this way 
of thinking about social groups; families are often comprised of members who are thought to be 
incapable of consenting to join or remain in a group (infants, small children, and the infirm), and 
families are not typically structured around one particular joint action (but perhaps a series of joint 
actions over time, forming a practice) (cf. Whitbeck 1984). This means that, in order to truly say 
that the family is a social group, we need to have a good understanding of exactly what that means 
– especially to understand how families compare to other social groups. As such, an ontological 
analysis of social groups is needed to defend the claim that the family is a social group. In Chapter 
Two, I take up this analysis and offer a defense of the family as a particular kind of social group 
that relies upon joint commitment, joint readiness, and cooperative reciprocity. Although the full 
analysis of the family as a social group takes place in Chapter Two, I begin Chapter One with the 
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claim that the family is a social group exhibiting the kind of features that social groups typically 
exhibit.  
Second, I argue that we can only determine what differentiates social groups by identifying 
the primary purpose that guides each of them. This approach is significant because it proposes a 
clear criterion – purpose – to distinguish social groups from one another while also providing a 
way to evaluate the qualitative aspects of relationships within social groups. So, to arrive at a 
conception of the family we must determine what primary purpose guides the family as a social 
group, which will elucidate the trajectory of the group and clarify the relationships among its 
members.  
I propose that we conceptualize the family in the following way: 1) the family is a social 
group created by a joint commitment to the goal of maintaining the well-being of all family 
members and the family unit as a whole, 2) the family is maintained by joint activity that works 
toward the shared goal of mutual well-being, and 3) this joint activity is comprised of the practice 
of active care that family members are obligated to perform for one another by virtue of their joint 
commitment.11 In other words, my account holds that the family is a unique social group with a 
particular primary purpose – to provide care in intimate settings for the mutual flourishing of all 
family members. In Chapter Three, I will clarify what this caring activity is comprised of and why 
care is so important for families. However, it may be the case that colloquial definitions of the 
family allow for other possibilities because families are created and maintained for other reasons. 
I turn now to a discussion about three distinct primary purposes that have been historically and 
philosophically prevalent in conceptualizing the family. After considering these possibilities, I 
																																																						
11 I elaborate upon these claims more thoroughly in Chapter Two, where I address concerns about 
infants/children and joint commitments, group identity, and joint activity that is guided by a specific 
purpose. 
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propose my own view of the primary purpose of the family which I then use to ground the 













































It is challenging to identify a conception of the family that is uncontroversial, uncontested, or 
inclusive of the many diverse groups who understand themselves as such. The family is perhaps 
the most universal kind of affiliation that we have while, at the same time, one of the more diverse. 
Because the concept family seems at once so intimate and familiar to us, yet also so complex and 
contestable, we feel a certain way about how the family ought to be understood, and what the 
family ought to stand for both personally and politically. Consequently, there are many different 
interpretations of what the family should be – its desired member composition, its primary purpose, 
and its cultural significance – and many different examples of what families actually look like 
across the globe. In this chapter I will examine the most paradigmatic conceptions of the family 
that are based upon the supposed primary purpose that the family serves for its members and for 
the state. 
 
1. Two Methodological Devices 
 I adopt two methodological starting points for examining the conception of the family that 
are the most promising for identifying its characteristics and meeting basic moral principles. First, 
I start with the assumption that a family is a social group. This is not a very controversial 
assumption; many philosophers have claimed that the family is, in fact, a paradigmatic social group 
(cf. Bratman 1999; cf. Gilbert 1989 and 2006; cf. Tuomela 2007). What is controversial is what 
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kind of social group the family is, especially since many philosophers define social groups as 
groups who knowingly consent to their group membership, or voluntarily act to continue their 
group membership. The family presents an interesting challenge to this way of thinking about 
social groups; families are often comprised of members who are thought to be incapable of 
consenting to join or remain in a group (infants, small children, and the infirm), and families are 
not typically structured around one particular joint action (but perhaps a series of joint actions over 
time, forming a practice) (Whitbeck 1984, 65).12 This means that, in order to truly say that the 
family is a social group, we need to have a good understanding of exactly what that means – 
especially to understand how families compare to other social groups. As such, an ontological 
analysis of social groups is needed to defend the claim that the family is a social group. In Chapter 
Two, I take up this analysis and offer a defense of the family as a particular kind of social group 
that relies upon joint commitment, joint readiness, and cooperative reciprocity. Although the full 
analysis of the family as a social group will wait until Chapter Two, I begin here with the claim 
that the family is a social group, and exhibits the kind of features that social groups typically 
exhibit.  
Social groups are comprised of members who knowingly share a common feature with one 
another – a belief, a value, a practice, and the like – that differentiates one social group from 
another (cf. Gilbert 1989).13 Social groups are not mere aggregates of individuals that may 
																																																						
12 Whitbeck writes, “By “practice” I mean a coherent form of cooperative activity, or “joint action,” as 
Carol Gould calls it, that not only aims at certain ends but creates certain ways of living and develops certain 
characteristics (virtues) in those who participate and try to achieve the standards of excellence peculiar to 
that practice” (Whitbeck 1984, 65). 
13 Margaret Gilbert’s account of social groups, which I will employ as a framework for my account, 
specifies that those who act together as a group understand themselves to be parties to a commitment of 
some shared belief, value, practice, or the like (Gilbert 2000, 158). In this sense, individuals constitute a 
social group if and only if each of them thinks of themselves and the others as a ‘we’ who share in some 
action, belief, attitude, or some similar attribute (Gilbert 1989, 204). Please see Chapter Two, Section Two 
for a more thorough discussion of the characteristics of social groups.  
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inadvertently share some common feature with one another, such as biological markers (eye color, 
height, genes, diseases), location, and so on (Greenwood, 2014). Like many social groups, a family 
is comprised of a certain number of group members – family members – who knowingly share 
some common feature with one another.14 This leads to my next methodological premise: We can 
only determine what differentiates social groups by identifying the primary purpose that guides 
each of them. Identifying the purpose of a social group brings the shared beliefs, values, practices, 
etc. to the forefront of group identification. This approach is significant because it proposes a clear 
criterion – purpose – to distinguish social groups from mere aggregates of individuals who do not 
knowingly share whatever feature they may have in common. Additionally, because social group 
members knowingly share some common feature(s), they must be committed to continue to share 
the common feature(s) with one another, else the social group would dissolve.15 A commitment to 
continue sharing the common feature(s) need not always involve self-conscious activity that 
expressly manifests the commitment, but can also be embodied in the practices that originate from 
the group purpose. Identifying the purpose of a social group, then, furnishes us with the ability to 
differentiate between social groups and ascertain their trajectory. So, to arrive at a conception of 
the family we must determine what primary purpose guides the family as a social group, which 
will elucidate the trajectory of the group and clarify the relationships among its members.  
																																																						
14 It may be controversial to assume that the family is a social group so defined because on some 
interpretations, a mere biological collection (an inadvertent shared common property) may be used to pick 
out family members. However, there is a level of vagueness that exists using biological connection to pick 
out family members, as I shall argue in Section Four of this chapter. A second point to raise here: it may 
strike some as odd to claim that infants especially can be part of families when they don’t ‘know’ anything. 
I will discuss the membership of infants and children in families in Chapter Two, Section Three.  
15 Consider a social group comprised of stamp collectors. The members knowingly share a similar feature 
(collecting stamps) with one another that stems from the group purpose (to collect stamps), and perhaps 
engage in a practice that originates from the shared feature (they meet regularly to discuss and trade stamps). 
Should the members stop collecting stamps, they would no longer have a reason to engage in the practice 
of discussing and trading stamps, and we would be right to say that the social group of stamp collectors has 
dissolved.  
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I propose that we conceptualize the family in the following way: 1) the family is a social 
group created by a joint commitment to the goal of maintaining the well-being of all family 
members and the family unit as a whole, 2) the family is maintained by joint activity that works 
toward the shared goal of mutual well-being, and 3) this joint activity is comprised of the practice 
of active care that family members are obligated to perform for one another by virtue of their joint 
commitment.16 In other words, my account holds that the family is a unique social group with a 
particular primary purpose – to provide care in intimate settings for the mutual flourishing of all 
family members. In Chapter Three, I will clarify what this caring activity is comprised of and why 
care is so important for families. The important point to note here is that this primary purpose of 
the family is what sets it apart from other social groups: the intimate caring relations found within 
the family are not found in other kinds of social groups. However, it may be the case that colloquial 
definitions of the family allow for other possibilities because families are created and maintained 
for other purposes. In the next section, I will discuss three distinct primary purposes that have been 
historically and philosophically prevalent in conceptualizing the family. Ultimately, I conclude 
that none of the three discussed primary purposes are sufficient for distinguishing the family from 
other social groups; hence, none of them capture the unique primary purpose of the family.  
 
2. The Purpose of the Family 
  Historically, there have been two prevailing reasons that have been given to justify the 
creation and maintenance of families. The first suggests that economic considerations yield family 
commitments: persons come together and form economic unions to protect private property and 
																																																						
16 I elaborate upon these claims more thoroughly in Chapter Two, where I address concerns about 
infants/children and joint commitments, group identity, and joint activity that is guided by a specific 
purpose. 
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ensure that their assets are passed down to particular others (cf. Coontz 2005; cf. Leeuwen, Maas, 
and Miles 2005; cf. Hegel 1991; cf. Engels 1972). The second suggests that doctrines of 
perpetuation and expansion of systematic beliefs influence who we choose to commit to, and shape 
our desires to pass our beliefs and traditions to others (cf. Watson 2007; cf. Fried 1976; cf. Galston 
2002). I will argue that, while both kinds of commitment schemes do lead to the genesis and 
maintenance of social groups, neither approach accurately captures the unique kind of commitment 
that defines familial commitment and hence, neither approach actually characterizes a family. It is 
important to note that I am proposing that we understand the family as being normatively defined 
by its primary purpose, which serves to establish what makes the family a unique social group. 
This means that other colloquial definitions of the family may not always satisfy the normative 
criteria that I will specify and, in turn, may not sufficiently pick out anything unique about the 
family. To avoid potential confusion, we may call these non-normative families de facto families. 
 Economic and political considerations have influenced de facto familial arrangements for 
hundreds of years. In such cases, the boundary between who counts as a family member and who 
does not count as a family member is determined by marriage or child rearing, or legal contracts 
that specify such relationships between individuals. While such economic considerations 
especially may have drastically negative consequences, especially for young females in forced 
marriages17, a large percentage of marriages and partnerships that occurred through the 18th 
century were arranged for strategic reasons (cf. Coontz, 2005). For instance, intermarriage between 
members of royal families (often first cousins) was a means of solidifying political alliances and 
																																																						
17 Forced marriages differ from arranged marriages in that at least one party to the marriage does not consent 
to the arrangement. Typically, forced marriages involve a young female (sometimes as young as five years 
old) forcibly betrothed or married to a male of a wealthier or more prestigious family for the economic 
benefit of the female’s family (i.e. bride price or bridewealth). See: Beswick 2001; Freeman 1995; Fossum 
and Boyd 2010.  
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kinship ties across generations, especially when children were produced from such marriages (cf. 
Leeuwen, Maas, and Miles, 2005).18 Other economic incentives that have influenced the formation 
of families through marriage or contract (adoption and fostering included) involve the ability to 
pass property, wealth, assets, and healthcare coverage to particular others who are members of 
one’s family (i.e. transferring wealth or property to a spouse or child without paying certain taxes, 
or adding previously ineligible persons to one’s healthcare plan). In some cases, forming a family 
with another individual through marriage or contract is an effective means for paying lower taxes 
(such as qualifying for a reduced income tax rate as a married couple, and a further reduction for 
additional dependents) (Anon 2012). These features of families are even understood as part of the 
purpose of creating families by certain philosophers like G. W. F. Hegel, who claimed that the 
family is represented as a legal person that has external reality in property; as such, Hegel argues 
that the family must have property and assets to be recognized by other families and the state 
(Hegel 1991; §169). So, there is much evidence and argument to support the notion that the family 
is primarily created (and sustained for a particular group of individuals) for economic and political 
reasons, with a commitment to protect social class, political alliance, property, and assets.  
 A second consideration that has influenced the creation of de facto families involves the 
desire to promote and continue traditions and values that one holds dear. A doctrine of perpetuation 
and expansion of systematic belief is a strong motivator for creating and maintaining what are 
considered to be larger and more hegemonic de facto familial groups. Often, this family formation 
process involves marriage or some contract-like process as well, or a religious ritual where one is 
newly recognized as bearing a certain relationship to a set of beliefs or traditions. For example, 
“placement marriages” are extremely common among Mormon populations, demonstrating a 
																																																						
18 Frederick Engels writes that for a knight, baron, or prince, marriage is a political act; it is an opportunity 
to increase power through new alliances (Engels and Leacock 1972, 141).  
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strong devotion to faith and a commitment to obtaining salvation for one’s family (cf. Watson, 
2007).  
In less strictly arranged situations, there persists a strong ideological drive to pass one’s 
beliefs down to other family members (particularly children) that heavily influences who one 
chooses as a partner or who one considers to be a stable member of their family. In this respect, 
passing beliefs onto other family members is seen as a crucial component for maintaining families. 
For instance, Thomas Aquinas and John Locke both argued that parents are the best educators for 
their own children, and have a right to exclusively educate them and protect their interests in their 
own ways (cf. Gutmann 1987). More recently, Charles Fried argues that parents have the right to 
freely form the values of their children and direct the development of their life plans (cf. Fried 
1976). Fried claims that the family as an institution is maintained by the right of parents to form 
the values and the life plan of their child, and the right to lavish attention on that child. He claims 
that these are extensions of the basic right not to be interfered with in doing those things for oneself 
(in this sense, Fried deems the child to be an extension of the self/the parent) (152).19 William 
Galston similarly argues that this is a fundamental parental right, claiming that parents have an 
“expressive interest” (via expressive liberty) in raising their children in a manner that is consistent 
with their own beliefs and values (Galston 2002, 94).20  
																																																						
19 In this sense, the argument for passing values – and shaping the values – of one’s progeny relies on two 
premises. The first premise is that biological ties between parents and children specify some paramount 
right over children by their parents, and the second is that there is a special bond between parents and 
children that is based upon the facts of biological reproduction. Society has no right to choose the values of 
a child, but the values must come from somewhere (Fried, 154). The child does not belong to the 
community, but to the mother, and this enlarges the mother’s autonomy to develop autonomy in her 
offspring through the shaping of values that expresses the personality of the mother (parents in general) 
(155).  
20 It is important to note that the enforcement of this right is weaker for Galston, as he maintains only that 
parents raise children in a way that is consistent with their own values instead of imbuing them with their 
values. 
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For both Fried and Galston, there is a special bond between parent and child that is based 
upon the significance of biological reproduction. The biological ties between parent and child grant 
parents a right to shape the values of their children by viewing the child as an extension of the self. 
In contrast, Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift (2014) argue that sharing values with children lies 
at the heart of the parent-child relationship because such interactions contribute to ‘familial 
relationship goods’, and not because some deep biological connection gives parents a paramount 
right over their children.21 Despite the significance or insignificance of biological justification for 
parental rights, it is important to note that all of these accounts hold that there is something 
significant (some meaningful bond or intimate tie) between parents and children that makes it 
permissible to pass values onto one’s children. To this end, one might choose a co-parent that 
shares similar beliefs to impart a consistent message to one’s progeny, or one might consider 
someone else to be their family member only if they continue to share the same values and 
traditions. In such cases, a “family” is created through a commitment to uphold one’s beliefs and/or 
religious faith, and it is maintained through the activity of passing those beliefs, values, and 
traditions to others.  
 These two kinds of approaches – the argument from economic considerations and the 
argument from the perpetuation and expansion of systematic belief – attempt to explain the 
motivating factors behind the formation of families historically and provide reasons why, and 
activities that describe how, families are maintained over time. Both approaches suggest a kind of 
																																																						
21 Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift (2014) argue that value-shaping interactions between parents and 
children (those interactions where parents deliberately try to steer their children to adopt certain values over 
others) that are done with the purpose of benefiting their children are indefensible under that particular 
description, yet they are justified on the different grounds that value sharing and value-shaping contribute 
to a healthy, loving relationship between parent and child (152). Interestingly, a paradox arises in that, by 
sharing values and shaping the values of their children, parents actually do benefit their children (with 
respect to familial relationship goods). 
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conscious commitment that family members make with one another at the outset, and provide other 
structural commitments that seem to guide interactions between established family members in an 
effort to sustain the family.22 As such, both approaches entail specific primary purposes for the 
family: the first suggests that the primary purpose of the family is based upon the commitment to 
preserve the relationship between members of the family to certain properties, assets, positions, 
and the like from one generation to the next; the second suggests that the primary purpose of the 
family is based upon the commitment to promote and pass down values from one generation to the 
next. While both commitment schemes are sufficient for the genesis and maintenance of a social 
group (both involve members who knowingly share some common feature with one another – 
either a relationship to property and/or assets, or a particular doctrine of faith or belief system), 
neither one is sufficient for creating a family because neither commitment scheme is uniquely 
familial – that is, families may certainly share some of these beliefs, relationships, or practices, but 
none of them are sufficient to uniquely pick out what it is that makes a family a family, and not 
just some other social group. 
In the first case, a social group (‘a family’) is formed either with the establishment of 
legally recognized claims on certain property and assets, or through the designation that a 
particular group of individuals stand in a particular relation to a social or political position (i.e. the 
throne of England). Additionally, ‘a family’ may be maintained in this case by upholding these 
legal claims and titles and extending them to future generations. While a commitment to particular 
others who all have some relation to specific property or to a set of assets signifies a cohesive 
group, there is nothing uniquely familial about this commitment.23 Corporations often have board 
																																																						
22 These conscious commitments take the form of legal contracts, political or diplomatic agreements, 
participation in religious ceremonies, and the like. 
23 One may object that the role of the family does differ with respect to economic arrangements, in that it 
serves as the primary model for the acquisition and perpetuation of private property that corporations have 
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members and/or shareholders that stand in particular relations to shared property or assets, yet we 
would not want to call these individuals family members. Similarly, cabinet members may stand 
in particular relations to a specific political position (i.e. the Vice President succeeds the President 
if the President is unable to serve, and so forth) yet we would not want to call these officials family 
members. As such, a commitment to protect shared property and assets or to solidify political 
alliance or social position is not sufficient for characterizing the family because such commitments 
can be made by other non-familial groups as well. While it may be the case that families do protect 
shared property and assets and preserve social position – that is, the family may indeed play a 
specific role in economic life – this cannot be the primary purpose that the family serves, else the 
family would be indistinguishable from other social groups that have the same primary purpose 
for their members. Hence, this proposed primary purpose fails to identify anything unique about 
the family. 
																																																						
subsequently followed. Eleanor Burke Leacock writes that, for Frederick Engels, “The separation of the 
family from the clan and the institution of monogamous marriage were the social expression of developing 
private property; so-called monogamy afforded the means through which property could be individually 
inherited. And private property for some meant no property for others, or the emerging of differing relations 
to production on the part of different social groups.” (Engels and Leacock 1972, 41). Engels claims that, of 
the monogamous family, “It was the first form of the family to be based not on natural but on economic 
conditions - on the victory of private property over primitive, natural communal property.” (Engels and 
Leacock 1972, 128). Quoting Marx, Engels makes the case that the family is a paradigmatic economic 
institution: “The modern family contains in germ not only slavery, but also serfdom, since form the 
beginning it is related to agricultural services. It contains in miniature all the contractions which later extend 
throughout society and its state.” (Engels and Leacock 1972, 121-122). Despite the assertion that the family 
serves this unique role, this is not the entire explanation of the family offered by Engels. Drawing a 
distinction between the proletarian and the bourgeois family, Engels claims that monogamous marriage 
(and hence, family) is consented to for different purposes depending on social/economic class. For the 
proletarian family, sex love between partners (a man and a woman) is a primary motivator for entering a 
monogamous relationship, and a primary sustainer of it. In contrast, for the bourgeois family, the primary 
motivation for entering a monogamous partnership is to secure patriarchal lineage with respect to property: 
a male could be certain of his parentage and could hence pass his property down to his kin (Engels and 
Leacock 1972, 134-138). So, Engels’ account of the family as a model for private property relations only 
applied to a subset of all families, and not to all families. 
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 What about the second case? Is a commitment to uphold one’s beliefs and/or religious faith, 
and to pass those beliefs, values, and traditions down to future generations a sufficient condition 
for creating and maintaining a family? The choice to form a family with individuals that share our 
values and beliefs – in essence, the choice to restrict our possible choices for potential family 
members – is certainly significant, as is the desire to pass dearly held beliefs, values and traditions 
on to those whom we want to continue to share family membership with. We do not choose blindly, 
so there must be something unique about the relationship between shared values and the groups 
we form and maintain – and there is, although it is not uniquely familial. These beliefs, values, and 
traditions can be shared with extremely large social groups such as congregations, communities, 
and nations.24 For such large groups, it is not necessary for each member to know one another 
personally to know that all of the members of a congregation or community share a particular set 
of beliefs, values, and traditions, a desire to pass them onto others, and regularly participate in 
practices that do pass those beliefs, values, and traditions on to others.25 In other words, a 
commitment to uphold beliefs, values, and traditions does not require a close connection between 
group members who share the commitment. This fact runs afoul of the way we think about the 
family and the accounts of the family discussed above – namely, that there is a special bond 
between family members, and this bond is not extended to a large number of people. 
																																																						
24 For instance, the belief in the Holy Trinity (the belief that God is three consubstantial persons: The Father, 
the Son, and the Holy Spirit) is shared among all those who practice Roman Catholicism. This Holy Trinity 
is a fundamental doctrine of the Catholic faith; if a Roman Catholic were to reject this doctrine, they would 
no longer be considered a practicing Catholic (although they may still be considered a practicing Christian), 
for they would not be able to practice (with true sentiment) portions of the Catholic tradition, such as 
affirming the veracity of the Holy Trinity during Mass.  
25 To continue the example in the previous footnote, when one attends Mass as a Roman Catholic, one 
would be right to assume that all other persons attending the Mass shared their belief in the Holy Trinity 
and value the practice of affirming the Holy Trinity during Mass.  
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To return to the discussion involving shared values and familial bonding, Brighouse and 
Swift argue that it is not merely the sharing of beliefs or values that creates or perpetuates the value 
of parent-child interactions. Value-shaping and value-sharing interactions between parents and 
children contribute to a healthy, loving relationship between parent and child only because of the 
level of intimacy and vulnerability involved in such interactions (Brighouse and Swift 2014, 152). 
In many instances, parents who try to shape the values of their children do so because they care 
about their children and sincerely believe that their children will be harmed, or that their quality 
of life will suffer, if they do not come to value the same things.26 Further, parents who share their 
values are sharing intimate facts about themselves – their core beliefs, desires, and the like – that 
they most likely do not share with many others. As children grow and develop their own values 
(provided they are being raised in a healthy, respectful environment), parents may find their values 
challenged or rebuked. In such cases, without some other shared commitment to keep family 
members together, it is not difficult to think that parent and child would grow apart, perhaps 
severing familial ties. This trajectory seems wrong; parents and children do have disagreements 
about fundamental beliefs (for example, a belief versus non-belief in a god, or a belief versus non-
belief in allowing for reproductive choice), yet familial relationships often remain intact. Further, 
such a strong emphasis on value sharing seems to discount the intimacy that created the 
opportunity for such value sharing in the first place.  
Additionally, some of the beliefs held by group members may be harmful to other members 
(such as the belief that abortion is wrong even in cases of rape, incest, and a threat to the mother’s 
life) or may not be in the best interest of all members (such as the belief that certain persons should 
not be allowed to marry based on sexual orientation). These beliefs may oppress certain group 
																																																						
26 For instance, think of a parent who believes that their child will suffer eternal damnation if they do not 
believe in God.  
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members and diminish their quality of life. If the family were to be based on the commitment to 
promote a shared system of values and beliefs, then it would allow for potential oppression and 
domination within familial relationships to exist unchallenged, as family members would not 
rebuke harmful behaviors that adhere to the shared system. This goes against what many consider 
to be the strengths of the family: a higher level of trust, devotion, and solidarity than the 
relationships we find ourselves in outside of the family (cf. Plato 1992; Walzer 1983, 229). It 
further emphasizes the fact that such a conception of the family does not point to a unique 
characteristic of the family; oppression and domination that results from the promotion of a shared 
belief system often happens outside of the family as well. 
Hence, a commitment among persons to uphold and promote shared beliefs, values, and 
traditions does not sufficiently conceptualize a unique characteristic of the family because 1) such 
commitments are made and upheld on much larger scales, 2) the degree of impersonality that 
occurs on a larger scale discounts the intimacy that we associate with the family, and 3) the 
possibility for shared beliefs and behaviors to negatively affect members’ lives is at odds with the 
family being a safe haven from uncaring and harmful behaviors.  
 At this point, we have challenged the acceptability of the argument from economic 
considerations and the argument from the perpetuation and expansion of systematic belief for the 
genesis and maintenance of the family, despite their acceptability for the genesis and maintenance 
of social groups more generally. Before turning to one last methodological objection, I want to 
briefly discuss one more suggested purpose that the family allegedly serves: producing and rearing 
children to become future citizens with particular characteristics desired by the state. This type of 
argument is typically rooted in the importance of the right kind of moral development and the duty 
of parents (or guardians) to instill the right moral sentiments in their children. It might strike one 
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as a similar kind of argument to the significance of passing one’s beliefs down to their children, 
but it is important to note that the goal for value shaping differs for future-citizen production. 
 Several accounts of the family hold that the primary purpose of the family lies with the 
production and rearing of children who possess the right moral sentiments to become concerned, 
cooperative citizens. For some philosophers, the family serves as the primary and most important 
foundation from which moral development toward citizenship occurs, with parents who instill the 
correct beliefs (in God, in love, in cooperation and orienting oneself for tasks that satisfy the group 
rather than just the individual) until their children come of age and are considered independent 
citizens in their own right (cf. Hegel 1991, §173-177; cf. Landes 1982; cf. Locke 1925, 25-26, 
122-127). On these accounts, families are rendered complete with the creation of children, and are 
essentially terminated once the children become independent citizens.  
 Other accounts hold that the right moral sentiments (the correct moral psychology) are 
instilled in children through the right kind of relationship with their parents (cf. Rawls 1971; cf. 
Archard 2010). These accounts hold that a stable and loving environment provides children with 
tendencies to develop empathy toward fellow citizens when they reach adulthood. The purpose of 
raising one’s children on these accounts is not so much the creation of the citizen, but the creation 
of citizens of a certain kind that will lead to an overall just state.  
 Despite the loftier primary purpose of the family on these accounts, the goal for child 
rearing and care should not be oriented toward the production of citizens nor toward the production 
of a certain type of citizen. Such a suggested purpose tasks the family with something dictated 
outside of the family - namely, producing and maintaining certain kinds of citizens who will 
behave in the appropriate way outside of the family.27 In doing so, the family becomes merely one 
																																																						
27 I will discuss this more comprehensively in Chapter Four. 
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among several institutions for civic education, along with schools, the military, and various civil 
service programs and proposals (cf. Hegel 1991, §§294-297; cf. Schwarzenbach 2009, 231-234). 
While it may be the case that families do create occasions for value sharing and value shaping, and 
this may indeed be one purpose that the family serves for its members, it cannot be the primary 
purpose, for it fails to identify anything unique about the family.  
Rather, the primary purpose of the family should originate from the family and for the sake of 
the family; specifically, the primary purpose of the family ought to be something that only pertains 
to the functioning of the family as a social group independent of all other purposes that the family 
might serve in different contexts. The primary purpose of the family may guide the other purposes 
that the family serves (i.e. it may influence how property and assets are distributed, or what kinds 
of beliefs and values are shared), but the primary purpose cannot itself be guided by other purposes.  
Primary purposes that are assigned to the family that either originate outside of the family 
(such as the relationship to property or to citizenship production) or have no unique bearing on the 
identity of the family (such as religious belief) are not satisfactory for defining the family as a 
social group, nor are they necessary for the maintenance of the family over time. As we have seen, 
these other purposes do not point to anything that is unique about the family, and they do not 
provide us with an adequate understanding of why family members remain committed to one 
another as a family over the long term, as opposed to some other kind of social group. Further, 
should these suggested purposes guide the trajectory of the family, negative consequences may 
occur for certain family members who are oppressed by harmful beliefs, or swindled out of their 
assets. We are left with the need for a more adequate conception of the family that is based upon 
a unique primary purpose that the family serves for its members. I will introduce my proposal for 
the primary purpose of the family in section five of this chapter, but I must address one more 





3. Isn't the Family a Biological Group? 
Many accounts of the family emphasize biological relatedness as the main component of 
what determines familial-status among a group of persons (cf. Almond 1999; cf. Finnis 1997; cf. 
Sommers 1989). Our biological connection to particular others is seen as the definitive criterion 
for determining current family members, past family members, and soon-to-be family members. 
Our legal understanding of the family, and the legal proceedings that follow from such an 
understanding, place biological connection as one of the main ways to determine familial groups 
and the corresponding rights that accompany them. Biological relation is indeed important – 
“family” histories of chronic diseases, degenerative illnesses, medical complications, allergies, and 
the like are important (if not essential) pieces of information for those who are struggling to 
identify certain symptoms, to prevent complications associated with medical procedures, or to 
begin precautionary screenings for cancers, dementia-related illnesses, heart conditions, and so on. 
However, biology itself is not a marker for determining familial connection in the qualitative 
sense. That is, biology, as I will argue, is not a determinant or catalyst for how much we care for 
others, or for reciprocal attitudes/affection, or for the possession of similar beliefs, and it is 
certainly not a determinant for whether or not two or more persons should be encouraged to co-
habitat and provide for one another.  
Drawing familial affiliation boundaries primarily from biological relatedness is extremely 
vague. Biological siblings, for instance, share a significant number of genes and phenotypic 
features (they may even share an identical set of genes if they are twins). However, to say that their 
biological similarity is the defining feature of their familial affiliation, bonding, or concern for one 
another is specious. The siblings may look extremely different from one another, or they may by 
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affected by different illnesses, allergies, or predispositions to certain conditions (especially if their 
levels of physical activity differ or they follow different diets). As such, the siblings may not be 
able to donate organs or blood to one another despite their shared genetic material (the same may 
be the case between parents and children, who often have different blood types and suffer from 
different ailments) (cf. Gentry et. al. 2007). Given these variations, we must ask: Which biological 
features are the significant ones for familial affiliation? Eye color? Blood type? Skin Color? A 
shared predisposition to develop cancer? Since 1) these features can vary so much even between 
extremely closely biologically related persons and, 2) further, these features can be shared with 
non-familial persons as well (eye color, skin color, chronic ailment or disability, and so on), it is 
extremely problematic to give so much weight to biological relatedness as the sole criterion for 
determining familial affiliation.  
Even if we were to use biology to determine familial affiliation, when are “relevant” 
biological connections identified and when are they not? Do we stop with grandparents, second 
cousins, or great-great-great-great Uncles? Should we maintain comprehensive records of every 
single person that we share even a minimal amount of genetic material with and consider those 
persons family members? For some, the answer is yes – family lineage is an extremely significant 
mark of one’s identity (cf. Velleman 2005). However, those who do successfully trace their lineage 
throughout history (those who are fortunate enough to have public records on those historical 
relations) are not tracing anything qualitative about their relationships with those genetic historical 
relations – that is, they are not tracing anything intimate between themselves and their relations 
(Brighouse and Swift 2014, 158-160). Instead, they are tracing lines of prestige, lines of ownership 
in relation to specific pieces of property, or perhaps the prevalence of a certain skill, trade, or line 
of work that historical genetic relations all participated in (professional musicians, blacksmithing, 
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membership in the armed forces, and so on). Those kinds of traits, as I have argued above, are not 
sufficient for designating familial status.28 While certain benefits may come through inheritances 
based upon these identity claims and appeals to biology, we might argue that those benefits are not 
deserved, and should not be conferred if no qualitative relationship occurred.29 
Some philosophers, however, do hold that biology is an important component in the 
formation and maintenance of qualitative relationships. As discussed above, Charles Fried (1976) 
and William Galston (2002) both hold that there is a special bond between family members (parent 
and child especially) that is based upon the significance of biological reproduction. These 
philosophers argue that the reason why we develop caring attitudes and affinity toward our family 
members is because we are related biologically to them – that somehow, biology has the power to 
create special bonds between family members. For instance, Fried writes: 
“There is evidence that there are pervasive physiological changes of great subtlety 
associated with pregnancy and birth. Thus --- motherhood is an experience which has 
persistent, biological roots and is not just a voluntary or customary social bond imposed 
upon the contingently prior fact of birth – it is not as if separating the breeding and the 
rearing functions could nevertheless yield an unaltered experience of parenthood. Rather, 




28 Even if more intimate items were being traced, such as understandings and stories passed down through 
generations, we would not want to say that we share any qualitative relationship with those genetic historical 
connections who are featured in the stories. Rather, we would say that those stories serve to deepen intimate 
connections with the closer relations who tell those stories to us. 
29 While this might sound jarring to those who plan to inherit property or wealth from elder family members, 
I am not talking here about the direct transfer of inheritance through first or even second-generation 
relations, such as parents to children or grandparents to children who actively seek to pass their wealth onto 
their progeny. Instead, I am talking about claims made about having direct ties to property, artifacts, wealth, 
or the like that have no direct qualitative connection to the original owner. For instance, a person who seeks 
to inherit the wealth or estate of a late uncle or grandparent that they did not know or were not a part of 
their lives in any meaningful way. Instead, we might think that property or wealth without an intended 
inheritor should go to the public domain rather than to a distant (or even not so distant), un-invested 
biological relative.  
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Similarly, Hegel argues that children complete an incomplete family; spouses attain objective unity 
only through the creation of their children, as children represent the objective expression of their 
parent’s spiritual union (1991, §173; Kane 2014, 16). This view is problematic for several reasons. 
First, it limits (or even downright excludes) the possibility for parents of adoptive children to ever 
form meaningful or lasting bonds with those children, since the “special tie” that would form 
between them would need some sort of underlying biological connection (and in the case of giving 
birth and nursing, it may even preclude fathers from developing as deep a bond with their children 
as the mother does simply through her biological activities). This discounts the intimate 
relationships that adoptive parents (and even fathers) form with their children, especially when 
those parents fight to protect those relationships in custody disputes (cf. Gavigan 1999; cf. Shanley 
1999).30  
Second, it presupposes that biology controls the way that we feel about particular others 
and dictates the level of care/concern/affection that we show to particular others. It is evident that 
biologically related persons need not feel warmly for one another; just take a look at any television 
show, news broadcast, or famous literary work that depicts the myriad ways in which biologically-
defined families despise one another, scheme and bamboozle one another, plot against one another, 
and so forth. Even worse, there is (unfortunately) a multitude of evidence that biology is no 
indicator for how family members treat one another – cases of abuse, rape, oppression, and even 
murder occur on a regular basis between biologically-defined family members, especially between 
parents and their biological children (cf. Slep and O’Leary 2005; cf. Hornor 2005). 
																																																						
30 Relatedly, one could argue that part of the joy in parenting is found in noticing how one’s children look 
like them or seem to share similar dispositions. For parents of adoptive children or mixed-race children, a 
recognition of phenotypical difference often works to deepen bonds between parents and children that arise 
from the social implications of such differences (cf. Haslanger 2005).  
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Recognizing the shortcomings of the biological relatedness argument, my account 
maintains that families ought to be considered social groups precisely because of the importance 
of the qualitative aspects of familial relations and not because of any shared biological features 
between family members. Biology certainly has the ability to ontologically carve out different 
groups of individuals - for instance, biological assessment can identify those who have Type 1 
Diabetes, or those who have Cystic Fibrosis, or (especially in our own society) those who have 
certain skin colors as opposed to others and separate those persons into different groups. However, 
biology is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for demarcating families in the significant 
sense that inspires the social benefits we confer upon them. The benefits that are conferred upon 
families by states are social benefits: recognition of the sociality of the family ought to ground the 
way that these benefits are conferred, and what end(s) they are intended to serve. They are benefits 
that make it easier for family members to care for one another, provide for one another, to see one 
another regularly, and to encourage all family members to grow, develop, and flourish. These kinds 
of benefits are typically extended beyond those to whom we are merely biologically related to 
already; for instance, in the United States, they are often conferred to our spouses, adopted 
children, step children, domestic partners, foster families, and so on. Since these social connections 
are already recognized as significantly shaping familial membership, and the benefits already 
conferred upon families appertain to the relationships between individuals, the family ought to be 
recognized as a social group.31 Because social groups have shared goals and beliefs and the like in 
place, it is important to determine what particular goal(s) family members share with one another 
that make them a family, and not some other social group.  
																																																						
31 Social benefits are benefits that appertain to the relationships between individuals because they affect the 
functioning of those relationships. As such, social benefits only have meaning when applied to relationships 
– most integrally, familial relationships – and cannot be applied to individuals apart from their relationships 
(for instance, one cannot have visitation rights in a hospital or prison if there is no known relation to visit). 




4. Care as Primary Purpose 
We have argued against, in addition to the argument from economic considerations and the 
argument from the perpetuation and expansion of systematic belief, the argument for the 
production and rearing of future citizens and the argument from biological relatedness. We are 
now ready to identify a more adequate conception of the family that is based upon the unique 
primary purpose that the family serves for its members. I propose that we conceive of the family 
normatively, as a social group that is based upon a commitment to interdependent caring relations 
and the fulfillment of mutual wellbeing through those relations.32 The remainder of this chapter 
will sketch out this proposal (to be elaborated upon in subsequent chapters) and suggest that a 
commitment to interdependency and the fulfillment of mutual wellbeing through interdependent 
caring relations is a unique, necessary, and sufficient condition to generate and maintain the family 
and, as such, adequately define it.33  
 All human beings are dependent for many years of their lives, especially when they are 
infants and young children. Care theorists recognize that dependency is a universal feature of the 
first years of our lives, yet they also stress the fact that dependency does not necessarily end with 
childhood. Rather, they argue that dependency is experienced in various forms throughout one’s 
life. Whether it is because we are chronically disabled, injured, have fallen ill, or have aged beyond 
self-sufficiency, human beings find themselves in states of dependency throughout their lives and 
therefore – at best – periodically require care at different times in their lives (though it is worth 
																																																						
32 In Chapter Two, I specify how different family members, most notably, infants, children, and the 
disabled, can commit to one another as family members. 
33 From this point onward, family will refer to the normative conception of the family that I will argue for. 
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noting that persons also want to be cared for in less pressing situations). In light of this fact, I argue 
that the family is the best place for that care to be provided.34  
There already exists an assumption that families should be geared toward some long-term 
goals (see section 3 above), and this account holds a similar assumption.35 Because of the nature 
of care – what it means to be a caring person, what a good caring relationship looks like, and what 
purpose caring activity serves – it is evident that the best scenario for caring relationships is one 
in which care is given and received in the long term. Joan Tronto (1993) argues that care involves 
thought and action – it involves a certain amount of knowledge about those for whom we provide 
care, and necessitates that those who care for us have a similar level of knowledge about us.36 This 
kind of knowledge can only be gained through intimate relationships that are maintained and 
enhanced over time. So, there is something unique about the kind of caring relationships that 
happen between those who are intimately connected over long periods of time. Given these 
characteristics about the nature of care and caring relations, I argue that the primary purpose of the 
family is to create and maintain these caring relations between family members because it is an 
ideal arrangement for persons to care for and receive care from one another. This argument will 
be substantiated in Chapter Three, but its initial sketch provides a primary purpose for the family 
																																																						
34 It is worth noting here that we are never fully self-sufficient; even in times when we can provide for 
ourselves satisfactorily we are still economically interdependent and dependent upon others for developing 
dynamic versions of ourselves (cf. Hegel 1991 §§190-195; cf. Marx 1978, 222-223).  
35 One might object: What about socialization or education? Doesn’t the family help to socialize individuals 
for the work place, and educate them to be moral persons, or to speak a language? Maxine Greene argues 
that more comprehensive education is gained outside of the family, when we are able to engage in dialogue 
with those who challenge our world view (cf. Greene 1988). Similarly, Hegel argues that socialization, 
especially for civil society and the needs of the market, cannot solely occur within the family, but must also 
be gained in civil society where persons are able to overcome the particularity of the family for the 
universality of the market (Hegel 1991 §§190-195). So, the family is not the only, or necessarily the best, 
place for socialization or education. However, in Chapter Three I argue that the family is necessarily the 
best place for caring relations to occur.  
36 In the case of infants and children, a similar level of knowledge about parents/caretakers would be gained 
over time as the infant/child develops.  
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(which in turn defines the family) that does not originate outside of the family, and is for the sake 
of the family. 
So, the family, in the normative sense that I intend to argue for, is a social group created 
and maintained by the goal of nurturing the well-being of all family members and the family unit 
as a whole. When it is recognized that we are all in need of care, and when our desire for caring 
relations makes clear how much we value care in our day to day lives, we seek to form, maintain, 
or enhance caring relations with others who also recognize and value caring relations. Since 
families are not often newly-created, but groups that have expanding and contracting memberships 
over time, families are maintained by joint activity that works toward the shared goal of mutual 
well-being over the long term. If all family members engage in caring relations with one another, 
they all actively and interdependently work toward improving the well-being of each member.37 
Since the establishment of caring relations is the shared value amongst family members, in order 
to keep the family going a commitment to honor that shared value is necessary to keep the family 
going. Hence, I will argue in Chapter Two that family members are obligated to actively care for 
one another by virtue of their joint commitment.  
Although I do not explain the significance of joint commitments as a concept for social 
groups until Chapter Two, it is important to note here that one condition of a joint commitment 
involves a level of voluntary choice – something that is often at odds with an understanding of the 
family and its members. My account does have a component of voluntary choice (which is 
explained thoroughly in Chapter Two), yet it also recognizes that most persons are not able to 
choose, at least initially, their own family relations. We cannot choose the families that we are 
born, adopted, or fostered into. But we can certainly reflect upon and evaluate our familial relations 
																																																						
37 I discuss in greater detail just how family members work interdependently toward to mutual well-being 
of each family member in Chapter Three. 
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as we grow, and one day act to change them. Virginia Held argues that we are not prisoners of our 
upbringings and circumstances; we are both enmeshed in, yet capable of, changing and shaping 
such relations (Held 2006, 48).38 When we do modify or change these existing relations, we often 
do so because we want to have better and more caring relations. So, we replace existing relations 
with other, better relations – we do not choose complete independence or liberal autonomy, 
eschewing all relations that we currently have or that we may hope to build around a shared 
purpose (Held 2006, 49). While we may not be able to choose all our family members at a given 
time, we are able to revise our family relationships and join or create the families that we want, or 
leave the families that we feel are harmful. This does not mean that we go off on our own, 
completely independent, and without need of caring relationships. Rather, we gain the ability to 
choose what kind of relationship we are going to be a part of as we grow: we may choose to stay 
a part of the family that we were born into, or choose to join another family that welcomes us, or 
we may choose to start a new family with others who are similarly situated.39 That being said, it 
may not be possible to completely distance ourselves from persons with whom we have previously 
had caring relations. We may hold some affinity for previous or biological siblings, parents, aunts, 
uncles, and the like – we may still care about them. However, in Chapter Three I argue that if (at 
best) we are not actively caring for these persons any longer, and they are not actively caring for 
us, the family relationship should no longer be recognized by the state, and benefits should no 
																																																						
38 This approach is also proposed by Carol Gould, whose account of “individuals-in-relations,” understands 
individuals as fundamentally interdependent. Gould argues that relations are indeed constitutive of 
individuals, yet not wholly constitutive. What is important is that individuals remain capable of choosing 
and changing their relations, even though these relations form and constitute persons (cf. Gould 1988, 105). 
I discuss Gould’s view more fully in Chapter Two. 
39 We cannot choose our birth parents, but can choose to adopt parental figures as we grow; we can choose 
our spouses or domestic partners; we can choose to abandon an abusive biological family and adopt a close 
group of friends to constitute our new family; we can choose to have biological or adopted children, or we 
can choose not to. In each of these cases, family is not limited to groupings with children. 
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longer be conferred between those persons.40 Hence, the family as a social group should not be 
defined by some inadvertent common feature that is shared by its members, such as a relation to 
property or some shared DNA. Rather, the family is a social group because of the purpose that 
guides the family and elucidates the relationship between its members: the commitment of its 
members to provide active care in intimate settings over the long term. Further, this purpose is 
unique to the family and, as a necessary and sufficient condition, contributes toward a clear 
conception of the family that, when recognized by the state, will help to shape policies that are 
better suited to address the actual needs of families: those social benefits, conferred by the state, 




40 It does not seem possible to completely ‘erase’ relations from our histories; should those relations become 
active one again, they would not begin anew in the same way that a brand-new relation would begin (I am 
indebted to Virginia Held for this distinction). We may say that these relations, then, are either active or 
inactive, or, more colloquially, close or distant / very distant to capture what we mean when our relations 
change so fundamentally. 







Sociality and Collective Intentionality:  





A family is a social group.41 This claim may seem entirely uncontroversial, but it contains far-
reaching assumptions about what constitutes a social group, what conditions must obtain for the 
creation or disintegration of a social group, and who is eligible (or ineligible) to be a member of a 
social group. For instance, to claim that a family is a social group per se is to assume that 1) it has 
some well-defined membership criteria, 2) the required conditions were in place for the group to 
be formed, and 3) the designation family picks out a unique set of individuals. Accordingly, for 
one to be able to claim that a family is a social group in the first place, one must have an 
understanding of what a social group means – if only to understand the commitments espoused 
through such a claim.  
In Chapter One, I claimed that a family is indeed a social group and, as such, should be 
recognized as having a particular primary purpose that originates from the family and for the sake 
of the family; this means that the primary purpose of the family ought to be something that only 
pertains to the functioning of the family as a social group independent of all other purposes that 
																																																						
41 It is important to note that I do not refer to the family as a biological group, as I do not believe that biology 
itself is a marker for determining familial connection in the qualitative sense. For a further discussion of 
this point, please see Chapter One, Section Three. 
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the family might serve in different contexts.42 I discussed the most prominent primary purposes 
ascribed to the family and determined that each one, in one way or another, insufficiently captured 
the unique primary purpose of the family. However, I did not touch upon the more fundamental 
questions that will concern us throughout this chapter: what kind of social groups is the family? 
And just what are social groups, anyway? 
The family presents an interesting challenge to many conceptions of social groups, 
especially because social philosophers typically define social groups as groups of individuals who 
knowingly consent to their group membership (cf. Gilbert 1989 & 2006), or voluntarily act to 
continue their group membership (cf. Bratman 1999; cf. Tuomela 2007). Families are often 
comprised of members who are thought to be incapable of consenting to join or remain in a group 
(infants, small children, and the infirm), so any notions of voluntarism must be vigorously 
examined and defended if they are to apply to all cases of family membership). In this chapter I 
offer a defense of the family as a particular kind of social group where voluntarism is required for 
all members, albeit in degrees in the forms of joint readiness, joint commitment, and cooperative 
reciprocity. I also explicate the significant ways that families differ from other kinds of social 
groups and discuss how these differences affect the kinds of obligations that family members have 
to one another. The aims of this chapter are to elucidate the fundamental reasons why family 
members are obligated to one another and to the family as a whole, and to lay the groundwork for 
the claim that this obligation is to actively care for one another with the shared goal of promoting 
the mutual flourishing of all family members – a claim that will be further defended in Chapter 
Three. An ontological analysis of social groups is needed to satisfy these aims, as we will need to 
																																																						
42 In contrast, purposes that are assigned to the family that either originate outside of the family (such as 
the relationship to property or to citizenship production) or have no unique bearing on the identity of the 
family (such as religious belief) are not satisfactory for defining the family as a social group, nor are they 
necessary for the maintenance of the family over time. 
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identify the right framework to ground this notion of obligation. To begin our analysis, I turn to 
the notion of collective intentionality and its relationship to our understanding of social groups. 
 
1. Collective Intentionality and the Social World 
 Collective intentionality provides a foundation for understanding collective action, or 
acting as a group. Collective intentionality can take various forms, such as shared intentions, 
shared beliefs, collective goals, and the like. While individual intentions shape and motivate the 
actions and goals of an individual person, collective intentions shape and motivate the cooperative 
actions of many individuals who endeavor toward a shared goal. In this respect, collective 
intentionality permeates almost every area of our daily lives: co-workers collaborate with one 
another to achieve company goals, family members work together to care for their children, 
citizens rally together around causes they wish to see addressed by their government, athletes 
coordinate with one another to run effective plays in a game, and so on. In other words, collective 
intentionality plays a crucial role in constituting and explaining the social world. It follows, then, 
that collective intentionality should be able to explain the way we experience the social world by 
capturing what it means to act together with another person, what it means to be a member in a 
social group, and what kinds of obligations we have to others with whom we are engaged in 
collective action. Specifically, appealing to collective intentionality should help us distinguish 
individual activity from collective activity, and set social groups apart from mere aggregates of 
individuals that may inadvertently share some common feature with one another, such as eye color, 
geographic location, or a belief in climate change.43 Further, a refined understanding of collective 
intentionality should help us to differentiate between types of social groups. While the term social 
																																																						
43 John Greenwood (2014, 305) argues that it is insufficient for the members of a population that simply 
shares beliefs, attitudes, or the like to constitute an intrinsic social group. 
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group may indeed be applied to two persons out for a walk, a collection of persons involved with 
maintaining a city park, a family, a congregation, a political community, and the like, it hardly 
seems right to consider all of these social groups to be of the same type. So, an account of collective 
intentionality and, by extension, collective action, ought to be able to say pivotal things about what 
it means to be a member of social group x as distinct from social group y, and so on.  
 In this chapter I argue that the most prominent accounts of collective intentionality and 
collective action – those belonging to Michael Bratman, John Searle, Raimo Tuomela, and 
Margaret Gilbert – fail to adequately distinguish between different types of social groups. These 
views attempt to explain all of our social experiences by virtue of specific criteria that apply in 
supposed ‘paradigmatic’ cases, such as two people taking a walk (Gilbert 1990), dancing a tango 
(Bratman 1999), making a sauce (Searle 2010), or persons volunteering to clean a public park 
(Tuomela 2007). By appealing to such paradigmatic cases, these philosophers necessarily exclude 
a large portion of our social world and the groups that exist therein – families, congregations, 
political communities, and the like – that do not so neatly conform to paradigmatic group 
structures. Although each philosopher claims that their account can be extended beyond these 
cases, I argue that their proposed criteria do not support such a move. 
Why should we care to distinguish between social groups? Margaret Gilbert (2006, 94) 
argues that if an account can be given of the clearest cases of social groups, then there is a basis 
for at least determining the cases that are less clear, even if there is not a basis for making further, 
more exacting distinctions. But this assertion fails to meaningfully track the social world as we 
know it. Specifically, we know that families – despite their not all being of the same number, 
duration, or composition of members – are different than congregations, corporations, and sports 
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teams; if collective intentionality aims to explain the social world, then it should be able to tell us 
why these groups are different.  
In the following section, I propose that the right understanding of collective intentionality 
can bolster the claim that there are different types of social groups. Specifically, I will argue that 
Margaret Gilbert’s account of joint commitment is a promising foundation for differentiating 
between social groups because it emphasizes the importance of obligations and entitlements for 
the creation of social groups and the continued adherence by members to group activity. Section 
three of this chapter will be devoted to providing an account of why a conception of joint 
commitments is ideal for smaller social groups like the family. Despite this sub-conclusion, 
Gilbert’s framework is not sufficient for explaining why we have certain obligations to family 
members, as opposed to neighbors, or congregations. To remedy this shortcoming, in section five 
I introduce Carol Gould’s notion of reciprocity and argue that it is a necessary supplement to 
Gilbert’s theory of joint commitments. This requires some discussion about the understanding of 
agency, and invites comparisons about how we understand social roles; these topics will also be 
addressed in sections three and four, respectively. Before we discuss obligation, reciprocity, and 
agency, it is important to cache out why I will be favoring Gilbert’s account of collective 
intentionality over other equally reputable accounts. Section one will discuss the shortcomings of 
some other prominent accounts of collective intentionality. 
 
2. Collective Intentionality and Social Groups 
Carol Gould (2014, 35 fn.) describes social ontology as a theory of the nature of social 
reality, in terms of its basic entities, relations, and processes, and operates within a framework that 
attempts to capture the experiential nature of social reality. The family is typically argued to be a 
social group, even a paradigmatic social group at that (cf. Gilbert 2006, 94). However, the most 
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prominent accounts of collective intentionality rarely discuss the family, or if they do, it is as one 
social group among many with no uniquely discernable features. If these accounts of collective 
intentionality really do take themselves to be doing social ontology, and social ontology is 
understood in the sense that Gould writes, then they must also be able to explain what makes the 
family a distinct social group (and by extension, what makes congregations, companies, and the 
like distinct social groups as well).44 Exploring some of the main accounts for collective 
intentionality should help us to understand just why these views do not try to distinguish between 
social groups, and further determine if they are actually capable of doing so when taken to task.  
Michael Bratman argues that we should view collective intentionality as extensions of his 
planning theory of action.45 The planning theory takes intentions as “playing the basic roles in 
forms of planning central to our abilities to achieve complex goals across time and interpersonally” 
(Bratman 2006, 2). For individual agents, this means that an agent coordinates her activities over 
time in order to make her long-term plans rationally attainable.46 Likewise, collective intentionality 
for Bratman is also to be understood in individualistic terms – there are no “shared” intentions, 
only individual intentions that coordinate with one another.  
Bratman’s thesis for collective intentionality is as follows: We intend to J iff 1) (a) I intend 
that we J and (b) you intend that we J; 2) I intend that we J in accordance with and because of 
																																																						
44 I will not discuss group agents in this chapter. My intention here is to explain how family members, as 
individual members of a group, are to act toward one another. For one account of group agency, see List & 
Pettit (2011).  
45 I use the phrases “collective intention” and “shared intention” interchangeably. 
46 Bratman holds that human beings are planning agents, meaning that an agent is a planner who is also 
temporally and causally located, and possesses end-neutral, instrumental practical reason (Bratman 1999, 
8). My understanding of agency, derived from Carol Gould, is comprised of a basic and developed sense 
of agency. The basic sense of agency consists in intentionality or choice as a feature of human action that 
does not necessarily need to be developed (to a fully rational capacity) to be considered a form of agency; 
as such, it can be applied to a much larger, more diverse set of agents than other accounts of agency (cf. 
Gould 2014, 39). I will discuss agency more thoroughly in Section Four of this chapter. 
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(1)(a), (1)(b), and meshing sub plans of (1)(a) and (1)(b), and you intend likewise; and 3) (1) and 
(2) are common knowledge between us (Bratman 1999, 131).  
Collective intentionality, then, is meant as a solution to coordination problems that arise 
between individual agents who wish to collectively act toward some goal, and consists in a public, 
interlocking web of the intentions of the individuals who are all part of the shared intention in 
question (Bratman 1999, 143). Bratman’s narrative of two persons dancing a tango together is 
meant to demonstrate this point: our shared intention to dance a tango together comes about when 
I have an intention that we dance a tango, you have an intention that we dance a tango, our sub-
plans mesh (I arrive at the dance hall ready to dance, as do you), and our individual intentions to 
dance a tango with one another are common knowledge for us both.47 It is important to note that 
neither party has an obligation to dance with the other despite a shared intention to do so. 
For Bratman, mutual obligations are not essential to collective action. However, he argues 
that there does need to be a form of interdependence in persistence, meaning that one party to the 
shared intention has persistence in their relevant intention because the other party to the shared 
intention also has persistence in their relevant intention (Bratman 2006, 7). Nonetheless, this is a 
rather weak condition; it necessitates that if one were to stop intending the shared action, the other 
would no longer be able to intend the shared action either, resulting in the end of the shared 
intention. The inessentiality of mutual obligations may not strike anyone as too disturbing in cases 
such as the two tango dancers, but it does seem to create some tensions when applied to other kinds 
of social situations, especially situations that involve working toward more distant goals.48  
																																																						
47 We can assume that additional intentions would involve knowledge of how to dance the tango (knowledge 
of the specific coordinated steps) and the desire to coordinate steps with one’s dancing partner. 
48 Bratman (1999, 135) argues that the genesis of shared intention involves a purposive creation of 
expectations on the parts of those involved that normally grounds the obligation for the participants to act 
as they have intended. He appeals to Thomas Scanlon’s Principle of Fidelity (see: Scanlon 1990) to bolster 
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Shared intentions are intentions of a group (Bratman 1999, 143). So, our two tango dancers 
constitute a social group, just as do two persons painting a house, several persons engaged in 
coordinated game playing, several persons who are members of the same family, and so on, just 
so long as the persons involved in these groups share the public, interlocking web of individual 
intentions specified in the shared intention thesis. While this set of criteria can perhaps explain 
what persons are doing when they coordinate their actions in dyadic, one-off cases like dancing a 
tango or painting a house, it is hard to see how a larger group that aims toward a distant (or long-
range) goal can endure on Bratman’s account given his weak persistence condition. For instance, 
two parents caring for a young child desire long-term reliability from one another to realize a 
shared goal of continued safety for the child; such a shared goal requires many coordinated actions 
over the course of many years. It seems troubling to base the assessment of the reliability of future 
performance only upon one’s persistence in holding the intention up to that point, especially when 
one’s persistence may just be the result of inertia that may be halted at any time (cf. Smith 2015, 
51). So, a stronger notion of obligation is needed to talk about what would keep long-term groups 
like the family continuously and reliably working toward a shared goal.  
Further, Bratman’s criteria for shared intentions cannot distinguish among social groups. 
On his account, we are able to say that a duo of tango dancers, a stamp collector’s club, a family, 
and the like all count as social groups, but it is not at all obvious how we would be able to pick out 
distinct features of each type of group. Perhaps we could identify which cases exemplify social 
groups proper better than others – more seamlessly meshed sub plans, longer interdependence in 
persistence – but this does not say anything meaningful about why two tango dancers might fulfill 
																																																						
this claim. I will not discuss this argument in this chapter; suffice it to say that Bratman remains committed 
to the claim that obligations are not themselves built into shared intentions.  
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these criteria more efficiently than a family. So, Bratman’s account is unable to provide a robust 
social ontology that captures our experience of the social world.  
John Searle’s account of collective intentionality faces similar problems, though one 
should note that, unlike Bratman, Searle’s “we-intentions”49 are not reducible to a set of individual 
intentions (cf. Searle 2002, chapter 6). However, Searle (2010, 44) does hold that human 
intentionality (collective or individual) exists only in individual human brains, so his focus is on 
presenting what is going on in the mind of individual agents that enables us to appropriately say 
that they are participating in a shared action.  
For Searle, collective intentionality requires each agent that is part of the collective 
intention to assume that the other agents involved are all doing their parts. To use his example of 
making a sauce: agent A intends to make a sauce together with agent B, agent A acts on this 
intention by pouring ingredients into a pot with the assumption that agent B is stirring the 
ingredients, so agent A believes that she and agent B are making a sauce together. So, each agent 
assumes that the other also has the same intention toward a shared goal, though the content of the 
intentions will differ slightly because of the limitation placed on each agent to do their part of the 
action (Searle 2010, 52). Because Searle stipulates that one must presuppose the intentions and 
actions of co-participants, he must also hold that one could be mistaken in their belief that another 
is also sharing the intention and action (Searle 2010, 53). For instance, agent B may appear to be 
stirring the ingredients, but is in fact trying to clean the pot. Agent A’s assumption would be 
mistaken, and agent B might not even be aware that agent A desires to make a sauce in the first 
place. This leads to some pretty strange scenarios, such as an agent being able to have a shared 
																																																						
49 The term “we-intention” first appears in (Tuomela 1984).  
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intention without the existence of other humans, and has lead some to conclude that Searle’s 
account is inherently obscure (cf. Pettit and Schweikard 2006, 32).  
Additionally, for the discussion at hand here, Searle’s account fails to capture our 
experience of the social world for two reasons. First, because collective intentionality need not 
posit the existence of other individuals, Searle’s account provides few criteria for defining social 
groups in general, let alone for distinguishing between different types of social groups, since other 
individuals need not even exist for supposed “social” groups to exist. Second, as Margaret Gilbert 
notes, it is unclear how one would explain how obligations and entitlements would arise in Searle’s 
account (Gilbert 2000, 157).50 While the absence of obligation may not be so problematic for 
Searle’s sauce-making duo, it certainly seems to affect the operation of other types of social 
groups, especially long-term social groups like the family. Families typically have complex 
membership arrangements and complex goals that are not achieved as easily as making a sauce or 
dancing a tango. We need a way to talk about what makes a social group like the family capable 
of carrying out shared plans that involve the coordinated action of many members over a long 
period of time. The biggest obstacle to the explanatory power of both Bratman’s and Searle’s 
accounts lies in their willingness to disregard obligation as a feature of shared intentions. So, to 
provide an accurate account of our experience of the social world, we will need to draw attention 
to the importance of obligation, especially with respect to the endurance of social groups over time. 
Although she does not focus on the family, Margaret Gilbert provides an account of 
collective intentionality that attempts to connect obligations and entitlements to social groups in a 
much more thorough way than Bratman and Searle. Gilbert (2006, 100) proposes that we define 
social groups as being comprised of at least two members who are jointly committed to some 
																																																						
50 Gilbert criticizes Bratman with a similar charge (see: Gilbert 2009). 
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particular goal, belief, attitude or action – that is, the members jointly decide to work together 
toward some particular goal or action, or jointly decide to hold some particular belief or attitude.51 
The joint commitment need not arise through an explicit agreement; rather, Gilbert argues that a 
sufficient condition for the genesis of a joint commitment is for each party to the shared action to 
verbally or physically express their personal readiness to participate in that action with the other 
party (Gilbert 2014, 29). A central element of Gilbert’s view is that those who act together 
understand themselves to be parties to a commitment of this kind, which translates to a commitment 
of the whole (that is, a group commitment) rather than a conjunction of all of the personal 
(individual) commitments of the parties (Gilbert 2000, 158). In this sense, individuals constitute a 
social group if and only if each of them thinks of themselves and the others as a ‘we’ who, upon 
commitment, share in some action, belief, attitude, or some similar attribute (Gilbert 1989, 204).52 
So, a joint commitment delineates who the members of a social group are, but it is the feeling of 
having a shared commitment – the knowledge of a group commitment – that gives meaning to the 
social group qua social group for each of its members.53 
Commitments have normative force; they underlie the important concept of obligation that 
Gilbert’s account relies on. A joint commitment holds each committed member responsible to 
every other member as part of the structure of the commitment. Unlike moral obligations, which 
																																																						
51 Similarly, John Greenwood argues that social groups are constituted by members who are bound by 
shared social forms of cognition, emotion, and behavior (Greenwood 2003, 102).  
52 Gilbert terms this a plural subject (cf. Gilbert, 1989). 
53 Soran Reader makes a similar argument for what constitutes relationships, though she emphasizes that 
the relationship itself need not be valued (i.e. a relationship between a slave owner and a slave is not valued) 
(Reader 2007, 73). She argues that relationships are a particular kind of interaction based on the deliberate 
engagement of agents with one another. So, one might be a member of a group of “persons who have 
received heart transplants” but that status, condition, or substantive property does not become a relation 
until one heart transplant patient seeks out another, becomes engaged with that patient by sharing common 
experiences, and these initial engagements sustain in the long term through friendship and so on (Reader 
2007, 73-77).  
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are often meant to apply universally, obligations of joint commitments are directed obligations, 
meaning that one’s obligation to the other party of a joint commitment is directly correlated to that 
other party’s right against the person to do so-and-so (Gilbert 2014, 50). Directed obligations only 
arise when persons jointly create the condition(s) for the obligation; they do not exist 
independently or prior to any agreement reached between parties. This special feature of Gilbert’s 
account imposes a norm on social groups that is built into the act of commitment: obligations are 
an upshot of a prior act (the act of commitment) and hence an essential part of the genesis and 
composition of a social group (cf. Smith 2015, 55).54 Whereas agents in Bratman’s account 
continue their shared intention on the basis of (potentially fair-weather) inertia, Gilbert’s agents 
continue their shared intention out of the conscious recognition of a preceding commitment to 
continue. So, the idea of joint commitment solidifies the understanding we have of obligation with 
respect to group membership: it can explain dyadic and complex cases, and can provide a reason 
for persistence beyond fair-weather conditions. If we are members of a group, and we are jointly 
committed toward a shared goal, then we have an obligation to continue acting toward the shared 
goal, and we have a right against the other parties of the joint commitment to their continuing to 
act toward the shared goal.55 To use Gilbert’s example of walking together: if two persons jointly 
commit to taking a 3 mile walk together one afternoon, and 2 miles into that walk person one 
abruptly stops and cries, “I’ve had enough, I’m going home” and darts off in the opposite direction, 
																																																						
54 At this point, one might ask: what about the fact that families have involuntary members (infants, 
children)? How would they be obligated under this account? In Section Four, I argue that it is possible for 
infants and children to take on familial obligations, albeit gradually.  
55 Gilbert (2009, 177) sometimes refers to this right as a standing to demand the action of another with 
whom one is jointly committed. She argues that there are certain background understandings that are 
standardly associated with acting together that are in place to prevent hurtful behavior towards others 
(Gilbert 2003, 45).  
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then, unless person two had agreed to such a unexpected change of plans, person one has violated 
their obligation to act toward the shared aim, and person two has a right to rebuke them. 
Gilbert’s inclusion of obligation and entitlement within the structure of joint commitments 
enables her account to be more easily extended beyond dyadic, one-off cases like dancing a tango 
or taking a walk. When the notion of obligation is built into collective intentionality and collective 
activity, we have a stronger sense of security about the performance of other group members over 
the long term. So, Gilbert’s account can be extended to cover different kinds of groups such as 
families, congregations, and political communities because their complex goal structure and larger 
membership numbers can be managed under the notion of continued obligation.  
However, Gilbert’s account of joint commitment does have some shortcomings and, 
unfortunately, some troubling consequences. First, Gilbert’s incorporation of obligation does not 
make her account more adept in distinguishing between social groups, for it does not provide any 
criteria for talking about what group members have obligations to do within these social groups.56 
Specifically, it does not explain why family members have a set of (x) obligations to one another, 
while a sports team has a set of (y) obligations to one another.57 It maintains only that all social 
groups share one distinct feature – joint commitments – and similar to Bratman, it seems that 
Gilbert is only concerned to distinguish between paradigmatic social groups and non-paradigmatic 
social groups (Gilbert 2006, 94). Still, in section four, I will argue that this shortcoming is not 
devastating so long as relevant obligational content for each social group can be identified on 
																																																						
56 We would not want to say that family members have obligations toward one another that are similar to 
the obligations that co-workers have toward one another.  
57 Further, because Gilbert does not specify any content that groups should commit to, when her account is 
extended to something like a political community it must allow for commitments to, and obligations to 
uphold, political regimes that may be dangerous to its members (cf. Gilbert 2006, chapter 11).  
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normative grounds by identifying the different primary purposes that social groups serve for their 
members. 
A second problem that Gilbert faces involves the way that obligations are generated for 
different kinds of social groups. Although Gilbert tries to capture all of our social experiences 
under the theory of joint commitment, this approach can spell trouble when extended to very large 
groups, as she attempts to do when extending her account to cover political communities. A. John 
Simmons’ critique of Gilbert’s use of joint commitment as political obligation-generating 
agreements will help to elucidate some of the troubling consequences of Gilbert’s account, and 
provide a compelling reason to restrict the scope of applicability of joint commitments to smaller, 
more intimate groups. Before discussing this critique and the important conditions it places upon 
joint commitments, I turn to Tuomela’s view of collective intentionality 1) as a basis of comparison 
to demonstrate why Gilbert’s view is preferred for discussing social groups like the family, and 2) 
because it also falls under the scope of critique that Simmons makes. 
 
3. Obligation, Joint Commitments, and We-Mode Thinking 
Raimo Tuomela incorporates a notion of obligation into his social ontology that is similar 
to Gilbert’s use of joint commitments. Before we can discuss Tuomela’s notion of obligation, we 
should first understand the particularities of his view. Tuomela terms collective intentionality “we-
intentions” and argues that they encompass the thoughts, actions, beliefs, goals, and feelings of 
agents that act for group reasons instead of personal reasons. Tuomela (2007, 3) carves 
intentionality into two distinct modes – the we-mode and the I-mode – and argues that all human 
activity fits within these modes, from the private (personal) I-mode, to the progroup I-mode (or I-
mode progroups, which involve acting as a private person in a group context), and lastly to the 
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we-mode (acting as a group member).58 For the purpose of this chapter, I will restrict my discussion 
to the we-mode. 
In the we-mode, group members must know what the group ethos  is – the central or 
constitutive goals, values, beliefs, norms, and standards of their group – and must know how to 
formulate reasons for action based on the group ethos (Tuomela 2007, 5). Group members must 
also be collectively committed to the group ethos, meaning each member is committed to 
performing actions that further the group’s ethos. This commitment is a constitutive element of 
what it means to act as a group member (Tuomela 2007, 13). This commitment also entails that 
group members are socially committed to one another, meaning they act partly because they are 
committed to the other group members in addition to the ethos.  
Tuomela claims that the we-mode is the proper group mode because it requires the full 
collective intentionality of its members. Despite the fact that he provides a plausible taxonomy of 
social life by discussing I-mode progroups in addition to we-mode groups, Tuomela 
problematically extends his account of the we-mode to cover all social groups, including entire 
political communities (Tuomela 2007, 182). He claims that the cultural nature of social institutions 
(the fact that they are collective artifacts that in principle could have been formed other ways – for 
instance, driving on the left-hand side of the road instead of the right-hand side) requires the 
collective acceptance of all members, and hence leads to a we-mode characterization of 
institutional entities and practices (Tuomela 2007, 183). Collective acceptance involves strong 
practical constraints of choice (i.e. what is feasible both psychologically and physically to be used 
by persons as money or as a traffic signal) and requires explicit demonstration – for instance, using 
particular (and otherwise worthless) object as money, or always stopping at stop signs. This seems 
																																																						
58 One should note that Tuomela believes that we-intentionality is explicitly definable by I-intentionality, 
making his account closer to Bratman in this respect (cf. Tuomela 1984).  
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plausible enough, and is in fact similar to the way John Searle characterizes the status function of 
culturally defined entities (cf. Searle 2007, 90-91; cf. Tomasello 2009, Introduction). The problem 
occurs in the extension of the we-mode itself: Tuomela must change the parameters of the we-
mode to allow for the fact that, within such large and complex groups, it is not likely that all 
members will 1) continue to actively commit to the group ethos, 2) have full knowledge of the 
group ethos and ensuing practices, and 3) act on the basis of we-intentions (for instance, those who 
view the accumulation of wealth as disastrous may renounce or challenge the entire institution of 
money). So, on an institutional level, we end up with a hierarchical we-mode group where 1) 
collective acceptance for the group applies only to operative (i.e. actively participating) members, 
hence 2) operative group members decide and act for the group, and as a result 3) non-operative 
group members need not actually be committed to what the group has collectively accepted (so, 
despite the best efforts of the challengers, the institution of money will still be observed) (Tuomela 
2007, 186). Further, non-operative group members need only go along with the decrees of the 
operative group, and may not even have full knowledge of what the group is committed to. This 
makes for an extremely thin notion of the we-mode. In fact, it does not seem much like a we-mode 
at all anymore. If non-operative members need not even be aware of what the group is collectively 
committed to, then it is hardly likely that they will act on the basis of we-intentions. That being 
the case, on the institutional level, Tuomela’s I-mode progroup seems much more appropriate, for 
it seems as though persons in such cases act as private individuals (with their own beliefs and 
intentions) in a group context.  
If we take Tuomela’s account as is and put aside the extension issue just discussed (that is, 
we do not extend his account to large institutions), we see that a further difficulty arises with 
respect to its explanatory power: by restricting all social groups to the we-mode, Tuomela 
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diminishes the ability of his account to distinguish between different types of social groups. 
Collective commitment furnishes group members with the proper authority to control each other’s 
relevant actions; this means they can hold the other group members responsible for failing to do 
their parts (Tuomela 2007, 39). So, it seems that, with respect to how obligations arise with social 
groups, collective commitment is supposed to do for Tuomela what joint commitments do for 
Gilbert. Likewise, discussion of obligation without any specific normative content – without any 
idea of what different groups are normatively committed to – provides no way to discuss why 
family members have a set of (x) obligations to one another, while a congregation has a set of (y) 
obligations to one another. So, his account is also ill equipped to distinguish between types of 
social groups. Further, the priority of commitments in Tuomela’s account makes his account less 
adaptable to explain groups like the family than Gilbert’s view, as I will explain below. 
Tuomela’s example of persons who volunteer to clean up a park together illustrates this 
shortcoming. The volunteers, Tuomela argues, first have the we-intention to clean the park, and 
second, the intention to carry out her part of the cleaning (Tuomela 2007, 88). This is problematic 
because it prioritizes the commitment to the shared goal over the commitment to the other 
participants. Consider the following: if a sanitation crew swept in overnight and cleaned the park 
before the volunteers had a chance to, then it would seem that their commitment to clean the park 
would no longer exist, for their goal would have already been satisfied.59 In turn, they would no 
longer have a commitment to one another to clean the park. This outcome doesn’t seem to pose 
much of a problem for Tuomela’s group of volunteers. However, things are a bit different for 
groups like the family.  
																																																						
59 Tuomela (2007, 4) emphasizes that the collectivity condition involves satisfaction of the goal for all 
members. 
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Families do not seem to follow Tuomela’s commitment structure. Family members are 
typically committed to one another before they are committed to some specific goal.60 This priority 
of commitment enables families to take on many different kinds of goals together, some easily 
satisfied, some complicated, some remaining works in progress. Additionally, once a family goal 
has been satisfied (say, raising a child to independence), we don’t usually say that the satisfaction 
of the goal necessitates the end of the family. Rather, we think there is something more substantial 
about the family members’ commitment to one another that keeps them bound to one another 
despite the comings and goings of group goals.61 So, having a commitment to a goal first, and then 
to group members, is problematic.62  
Gilbert’s account, however, does appear to have the right kind of priority of commitment; 
namely, that parties to a joint commitment are committed to the other members first, and then 
together they commit to a shared goal.63 They have obligations to the other members that are not 
necessarily tied to specific group goals, so presumably, Gilbert’s account would allow for social 
groups to 1) remain committed to one another for longer periods of time, and 2) remain committed 
																																																						
60 Gilbert (2006, 94) argues that families are less likely to have explicit goal and rules than other institutions. 
61 In the case of marriage, for example, two people commit to one another with little knowledge of what 
may be in store for them in the future. One might argue that the parties to a marriage are committing to a 
shared goal to take on all of these future happenings together; still, it seems odd to think that the parties to 
a marriage stay together because of their commitment to the shared goal rather than their commitment to 
one another. 
62 A similar charge can be brought against Iris Marion Young’s account of social group formation from pre-
existing serial collectives (Young 1994, 724). Young employs Sartre’s notion of the series – a collective 
whose members are passively unified by ongoing historical social structures and reflective action – as a 
background for collective action. Groups fuse when members of a serial collective begin to take action 
related to a group goal; this can lead to meetings, decision-making structures, institutions, and so on, until 
the group goal has been satisfied (Young 1994, 735). When goal satisfaction occurs, the group disperses 
back into seriality; hence, in the absence of a group goal, the group dismantles. 
63 Her plural subject account necessitates that parties to a joint commitment can only adopt a shared goal 
once they form a plural subject. Specifically, she argues that “each party must express his or her personal 
readiness to enter a joint commitment to endorse a certain goal as a body” (Gilbert 2014, 33). 
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despite difficulty achieving a group goal.64 If Gilbert’s account is so promising in these respects, 
it is not surprising that she would try to extend her account to cover all social groups, including 
political communities. A. John Simmons, however, disagrees with the temptation to extend joint 
commitments (and, as I will argue, we-mode group structures) on such a large scale.  
 A. John Simmons defines an associative obligation as a type of obligation that is similar to 
an obligation entailed by a role, where a special moral requirement is attached to the role (including 
membership in a group) whose content is determined by what local practice specifies as required 
for those who fill that role (Simmons 1996, 253). Simmons is concerned with the nature of political 
obligation – specifically, he seeks an understanding of how political obligations are generated, and 
ultimately argues that political obligations are mistakenly conflated with associative obligations. 
In this context, he critiques Gilbert’s extension of joint commitments to explain the nature of 
political obligation, charging her with muddling the distinction between associative and political 
contexts for the genesis of obligation.65 It is important to note at the outset that Simmons’ critiques 
apply to Tuomela’s account as well, which I will demonstrate. I will also demonstrate that, 
although Simmons’ critiques seem problematic for Gilbert’s account of obligation, they are 
actually only problematic for the extension of her account to such large and complex groups. If 
Gilbert restricts her notion of joint commitment to smaller social groups such as families, 
congregations, clubs, and the like, then, I will argue, Simmons’ critiques are rendered ineffective.  
Simmons claims that our shared moral experience consists in the special relationships that 
we share with our family members, colleagues, friends, and neighbors (Simmons 1996, 251). 
																																																						
64 What about groups that do form for specific short-term goals, such as taking a walk? Gilbert maintains 
that the priority of commitment to other group members still stands; when we take on a joint commitment 
to a shared goal, we commit to fulfilling our end toward the completion of the goal, which means that we 
make ourselves accountable to the other group members – even if the goal is episodic in nature. 
65 Simmons is not concerned with whether joint commitments obligate; rather, he is concerned with whether 
or not there are any obligating joint commitments in political contexts.  
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Many of these relationships are non-voluntary, so our social practices seem to revolve around a 
great deal of non-voluntary relationships. Likewise, our political relationships seem similarly 
orientated. Despite the voluntaristic nature of Gilbert’s joint commitments in smaller, more 
paradigmatic cases, Simmons argues that Gilbert espouses a “non-voluntarist” contract theory 
approach with respect to political communities and their ensuing obligations.66 This means that, in 
a political context, joint commitments reflect our shared moral experience in that they need not 
involve any datable act of commitment – they can just happen, or grow over time, and they don’t 
even need to be fully voluntary, allowing for coercive circumstances to permeate the nature of the 
commitment and its ensuing obligations (Simmons 1996, 256). Further, joint commitments seem 
to capture the idea that citizens’ obligations are special ties that involve loyalty and commitment 
to the particular political community in which one was born (Simmons 1996, 250). This is implied 
within the claim that jointly committed persons feel themselves to constitute a ‘we’ and hence, feel 
like they owe obligations based on this felt identity. So, Simmons argues that political obligations 
are felt to be obligations that are owed to a particular government over all other governments, in 
the same way that one might claim special affinity, and hence, special felt obligations, for their 
own family members.67 However, Simmons argues that there are serious difficulties involved with 
trying to apply Gilbert’s account to our political lives in a way that will yield clear political 
obligations. He claims that this is due to two confusions. 
The first confusion involves these felt obligations and their mistaken conflation with 
genuine obligations. Just because individuals refer to “our” government and have a vague feeling 
																																																						
66 Non-voluntarists argue that actual political societies are not voluntary associations, nor are they anything 
like the kinds of voluntary associations that we are familiar with. Just as we are born into certain families, 
we are born into certain political communities that already have some authority over us despite our not 
voluntarily agreeing to be governed. (Simmons 1996, 249). 
67 It is important to note that Gilbert, in response to this criticism, has argued that she does not assume a 
widespread sense of political obligation (Gilbert 2006, 267). 
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of indebtedness to “our” country, one should not be led to believe that those individuals have (or 
even believe that they have) political obligations (Simmons 1996, 257). Gilbert’s response to this 
first charge is in agreement; she contends that a ‘sense of obligation’ or a belief that one is obligated 
is not in itself enough to demonstrate the existence of an obligation (Gilbert 2006, 268). However, 
she claims that, should the utterance “our government” be interpreted in plural subject terms, where 
the phrase means ‘that body I am jointly committed to with the rest of us and regard it as having 
authority over us,’ then the utterance would suffice for the existence of the relevant joint 
commitment and its ensuing obligation because it is just affirming one’s commitment (Gilbert 
2006, 268). This response from Gilbert is not very satisfactory, for it presupposes, for the utterer, 
that a voluntary commitment had been entered into at some point prior to the utterance. Since 
Gilbert has already acknowledged that political communities do not necessarily have datable acts 
of commitment (and commitments can just happen/grow over time), there is a very real chance 
that the utterer will not be able to assume (or have knowledge of) this voluntary commitment when 
they utter “our government.” So, the utterance cannot be interpreted in plural subject terms, at least 
not on the scale of political communities.  
One might ask: shouldn’t this apply equally to the family? The newest family members 
(especially children) were not party to an original commitment and may not have knowledge of 
the commitment initially taking place. While this may be true as far as the child’s available 
knowledge is concerned, the child will have knowledge that they are being cared for by other 
family members, which would mean that those family members committed themselves to caring 
for the child. The fact that the child is a member of the family and, hence, receiving care, is enough 
evidence to infer that a commitment to care had been made by other family members (else there 
would be no caring relationship to speak of). 
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The second confusion involves political acquiescence in situations that supposedly involve 
obligation-generating acts or relationships. This confusion relates to the above discussion, for it 
also questions how legitimate the extension of Gilbert’s reasoning is to the political realm, instead 
of just to more intimate groups. Simmons argues that preparedness to go along with some plan or 
authority, even under conditions of full knowledge, is not the same thing as consent or 
commitment, and therefore it does not have the same normative consequences (Simmons 1996, 
257). For instance, one can go along with an arrangement for a long period of time without 
undertaking any obligation to go along with the same arrangement in the future. Gilbert responds 
by making a distinction between complying with demands and obeying demands, and argues that 
Simmons is relying on the former to critique the latter. The ‘average political subject’ does not 
comply on a one-off basis; instead, political obedience is built upon historical circumstance that is 
more concrete because past commitments and a continued commitment to obey gives a 
government a standing to demand (Gilbert 2006, 271). In this sense, Gilbert is appealing once 
again to the plural subject view, which holds individuals (even those in positions of authority) 
accountable to one another. Political obedience, then, involves a citizen remaining accountable to 
those persons who are in positions of authority.  
There are important points from this exchange that are worth discussing. First, Simmons 
critique, although it does not seem to land with much force on Gilbert’s more paradigmatic cases 
of joint commitment, seems right with respect to joint commitment as the grounding for political 
obligations. It is extremely difficult to imagine an entire community forming a joint commitment 
with one another to follow some particular political regime x. Because Gilbert insists upon joint 
commitment for her account of obligation, it seems that she must allow for some degree of 
compliance with the dictates of a government (perhaps those in authority obey governmental 
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directives, whereas those who are not in positions of authority might only comply).  
This conclusion leads to the same structure of compliance that Tuomela has built into his 
account of the we-mode. When we critiqued Tuomela’s account of the we-mode political 
community above, we recognized that expanding his account of the we-mode to such a large and 
complex group ultimately strips the we-mode of its most important defining features. Likewise, it 
seems that Gilbert’s account of joint commitment cannot be extended to large and complex groups 
like political communities without losing some of its most important features (namely, the shared 
feeling of a ‘we’ and the full accountability of all members to one another).68 While this is an 
unsettling conclusion for Gilbert’s account of political obligation, it in no way depreciates the 
strength and compatibility of joint commitments for smaller, more intimate social groups like 
families, congregations, clubs, and the like.  
So, obligations are captured successfully by Gilbert’s account of collective intentionality, but 
only in small-scale social groups like the family. Gilbert’s account of joint commitment is a strong 
foundation for the genesis of small social groups, and her understanding of how obligation is a 
built-in feature of commitments helps to explain how social groups can continue on in the long 
term by binding obligations and corresponding rights to the continued participation of other group 
members. However, because joint commitments have a strong voluntary element, it seems as 
though joint commitments can only be made by those who have the capacity to voluntarily make 
such agreements and undertake such obligations. Prima facie, this seems to exclude, especially 
with respect to commitments made between family members, a large number or individuals who 
are seemingly unable to make commitments: infants, small children, the infirm, and the 
																																																						
68 I have addressed this concern in Chapter One, Section Two with the discussion of religious perpetuation 
and expansion, and large group structures being insufficient for generating a shared “we” between members 
of such large groups. 
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intellectually disabled. Further, we still do not know how an account of joint commitments can 
distinguish among social groups – at this point, all we know is that it is a good foundation, and 
that obligation seems to play a part in the persistence of groups. Before we can discuss what should 
be added to joint commitments to give them the explanatory power to distinguish between social 
groups, it is important to understand just who can be a party to a joint commitment. So, we turn 
first to discuss and develop the conditions for what it means to be an agent capable of forming a 
joint commitment.  
 
4. Who Can Be Obligated? 
A central tenet of Gilbert’s account is the idea that social groups are created and maintained 
based on a joint commitment to one or more persons who then endeavor together toward some 
particular goal, belief, attitude or action. For a social group like the family, this would mean that 
all family members must be jointly committed to some shared goal in which they continually act 
collectively toward its completion. A further condition of Gilbert’s account is her argument that 
joint readiness for participation in a joint action is sufficient for the genesis of a joint commitment 
(Gilbert 2014, 33). This joint readiness is not a prior agreement, nor should it be confused with 
another type of joint readiness that occurs within an already existing social group. This second 
kind of joint readiness stipulates that the members of a social group are all reliably willing and 
prepared for action whenever it should arise, whether the time for action is imminent or a mere 
possibility (Gilbert 1989, 207). Those who are jointly ready in this sense are not yet committed, 
but recognize that their participation in a joint activity 1) would be beneficial to other potential 
group members as well as themselves, and 2) would advance the progress toward a shared goal. 
Taken together, these three elements – being committed to act together, being ready to act together 
when the time comes, and having the disposition to act together with others – can be used to 
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provide a comprehensive picture of what is entailed for one to jointly commit oneself to form or 
join a social group. In this section, I will focus on who is capable of making a joint commitment, 
and how the notion of joint readiness makes more inclusive the criteria required for agency to be 
so committed. Before discussing joint readiness, I must say something about how we should 
understand agency, for the way we define agency will undoubtedly influence just who is capable 
of taking on obligations.  
In Interactive Democracy, Carol Gould argues that the application and scope of human 
rights should be extended to cover individuals who fall outside of the typically restrictive definition 
of agency. This restricted definition is couched in the belief that normative agency is taken to 
ground human rights norms with respect to the fact that agents must “have a conception of a 
worthwhile life” - that is, agents must be capable of the capacity to choose to pursue a worthwhile 
life (Gould 2014, 37). Gould rightly argues that any account of agency that builds a notion of 
“having a conception” into its basic idea is bound to exclude some humans – most notably, those 
who are mentally disabled. Arguments that treat children as potential persons only ignores the fact 
that, as Gould argues, even small babies display a sort of agency. More importantly, though, is the 
claim that the formulation of having a conception of the good life seems distinctively liberal 
individualist, and may not extend cross-culturally (Gould 2014, 38).  
Gould suggests instead that agency be understood as a relational concept with two distinct 
senses: basic agency, which should be understood as open and inclusive, and developed agency, 
which should be understood as the development or flourishing of one’s basic agency (Gould 2014, 
39). The first, basic sense of agency consists in intentionality or choice as a feature of human 
action, and is evident in human life activity as a mode or way of being. The second, developed 
sense of agency is characterized by the exercise of this basic agency in the development of 
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capacities or the realization of long-term projects or goals - this can take both individual and 
collective forms - that is a process over time. This second sense of agency presupposes the capacity 
for choosing that is part of the basic sense of agency (Gould 2014, 39). This enables Gould’s notion 
of basic agency to remain open to infants and the disabled.69 
Can infants and the intellectually disabled form joint commitments? If we take Gould’s 
notion of agency as authoritative, then it seems possible. But why should we think that, say, small 
children are capable of cooperation and reciprocity, and can therefore take on obligations of their 
own? 
Gould’s assertion that children especially are agents, and display some form of agency, is 
not exclusive to her (Gould 1984, 14). Joan Tronto mentions that care receivers often try to 
reciprocate the care that they receive, arguing that even small infants try to return care to their care 
givers (Tronto 2013, 152). Friedrich Froebel and John Dewey both claim that children are capable 
of successfully directing their own learning endeavors, and David Kennedy argues that children 
are able to effectively communicate and demonstrate new facts to adults (cf. Froebel 1887; cf. 
Dewey 1902; cf. Kennedy, 2012; cf. Kane 2016). Likewise, Raimo Tuomela, drawing upon 
Michael Tomasello’s research, claims that young children are capable of agency and, therefore, 
we-mode thinking (Tuomela 2007, 62). To give credence to these claims, it is worth exploring just 
how much young children display agency – especially with respect to cooperative endeavors – to 
see if they are in fact capable of forming joint commitments or, to a lesser degree, at least capable 
of being jointly ready.  
																																																						
69 This account of agency is based on a social ontology of “individuals-in-relations,” a term that appears in 
Gould’s earlier work, and proposes that individuals are fundamentally interdependent. Her social ontology 
sees relations as constitutive of individuals, yet not wholly constitutive as a communitarian account might 
hold. What is important is that individuals remain capable of choosing and changing their relations, even 
though these relations form and constitute persons (cf. Gould 2014, 43; and 1988, 105).  
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Michael Tomasello argues that humans have ultra-cooperative tendencies, and these 
tendencies play a crucial role in the evolution of human culture. Human beings engage in two 
fundamentally cooperative processes toward this end: 1) we actively teach one another things, and 
these lessons are not only reserved for kin, and 2) we have a tendency to imitate others in the group 
simply with the motivation to be like them (Tomasello 2009, XIV). Humans are altruistic in the 
sense that they donate information to others for their own use. Humans also cooperatively agree 
upon social norms of conformity that may be backed by various potential punishments or sanctions 
for those who resist conforming (Tomasello 2009, XV). Because of these two tendencies, 
Tomasello argues that human cultures are based on fundamentally cooperative processes and, to 
an unprecedented degree, human beings are adapted for acting and thinking cooperatively in 
cultural groups. He argues further that children are equipped to participate in cooperative 
groupthink through a special kind of cultural intelligence that encourages shared intentionality 
(Tomasello 2009, XVI).  
Tomasello focuses on identifying children’s naturally occurring cooperative tendencies by 
testing for altruism and collaboration; specifically, he presents evidence that children, from around 
the time of their first birthdays, are already helpful and cooperative in many, though not all, 
situations. Further, this disposition is not learned from adults; it comes naturally (Tomasello 2009, 
4). What happens later on in a child’s life influences their development, often away from these 
naturally cooperative tendencies: cooperativeness becomes mediated by things that influence 
judgments of likely reciprocity and concern for how others in the group treat them or judge them. 
KANE - DISSERTATION 
	
64	
Children then begin to internalize many culturally specific social norms that aid in conformity 
(Tomasello 2009, 4).70  
Further, Tomasello’s experiments demonstrate that children’s helping behavior is mediated by 
empathetic concern, suggesting that infants’ naturally occurring empathetic or sympathetic 
responses to the plight of another affect their tendency to help that other person out (Tomasello 
2009, 13). Paul Bloom (2014, 48) corroborates this finding with his own, claiming that infants 
attempt to soothe someone they perceive to be in pain. Infants also supply information 
altruistically; they inform others of things helpfully, accurately interpret intentions that are directed 
at them, and they understand imperatives in a cooperative fashion, meaning that they recognize 
that imperatives are typically communicated as desires (e.g. “I’d like some water”) and 
automatically want to fulfill the desire in a cooperative way. This suggests that they understand 
the cooperative logic of helping (Tomasello 2009, 19).71 With this is mind, Tomasello argues that 
we need to recognize that even young children already have some shared sense of intentionality – 
they take themselves to be part of some larger “we” intentionality. Without this dimension of “we” 
identity and rationality, it is impossible to explain why children take it upon themselves to actively 
enforce social norms on others from a third-party stance, especially the kinds of norms that are 
																																																						
70 Tomasello defines the three main types of human altruism by the “commodity” involved: goods (being 
generous with sharing food), services (fetching an out of reach object), and information (sharing 
information and attitudes is to be informative) (Tomasello 2009, 5).  
With respect to a “helping” experiment, Tomasello and partners tested 14-18 month olds to see how much 
they helped out an adult in need. The parameters were identified that first, infants need to be able to perceive 
others’ goals in a variety of situations, and second, they must have the altruistic motive to help the adults 
out (Tomasello 2009, 7). There is evidence to suggest that human’s helping behavior is not created by a 
human-like cultural environment, specifically because the same environments applied to primates do not 
yield the same results, suggesting that there is something hard-wired about our altruism as infants 
(Tomasello 2009, 11).  
71 Young children also have an understanding of equitable distribution; 25-month olds and school-aged 
children typically select an equitable distribution over a selfish distribution, or, if challenged about an unfair 
distribution, they almost always square things up (Tomasello 2009, 25). 
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based on constitutive rules (and in a sense, arbitrary) and not only based upon cooperation 
(Tomasello 2009, 40).72 They value conformity (both their own and the conformity of others) to 
the group – a value of “we-ness” that has its original basis on identification with significant-other 
individuals like parents and classmates (Tomasello 2009, 41). Further, children seem to feel 
committed to joint goals, and prefer that all participants get the coveted reward instead of caring 
only about their own satisfaction (Tomasello 2009, 66). So, it seems that children are indeed 
capable of displaying some form of agency, and this type of agency seems at least on par with 
Gould’s account of how we should define basic agency.  
To return to Gilbert’s theory of joint commitments, it should now be evident that at the very 
least, infants and small children are capable of joint readiness in both respects that Gilbert has in 
mind: children have a natural disposition toward cooperating with others, and children also do 
cooperate with others when given the opportunity, demonstrating that they possess a readiness to 
act collectively with others toward group goals.73 While it remains unchanged that infants require 
immense amounts of care and concern that they are unable to reciprocate, and it is indeed a stretch 
to claim that children are capable of forming joint commitments (supposing they have an 
understanding of what it means to take on such obligation), it should at least be clear that children 
																																																						
72 Children respect conventional norms in which no harm is involved (Tomasello 2009, 34). Children also 
actively seek out what they are supposed to do to follow certain norms so that they can behave accordingly 
(Tomasello 2009, 35). When playing a known game with an unfamiliar (foreign) puppet, children will scold 
or stop the puppet when the puppet does not play the game the correct way. Children don’t just disapprove 
of the way the puppet plays the game, but mention that the puppet is playing incorrectly because of the way 
that “we” play the game. The significance of this study concerns the fact that the norm enforced is not just 
regulative, but constitutive - this means that children do not just follow conventional norms because of how 
they are supposed to instrumentally guide action (to please adults or garner a reward), but because they 
view the conventional norms as supra-individual entities that carry social force independent of such 
instrumental considerations (Tomasello 2009, 38).  
73 In the case of the intellectually disabled, there remains, at least, agency in the basic sense. Hence, those 
who are unable to equally or substantially reciprocate because of an intellectual disability or injury are still 
able to cooperate in the sense that they respond to their caregivers and, in some cases, demonstrate 
appreciation for the care they are receiving.  
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are more than capable of collective intentionality and, hence, collective action toward group goals 
because they recognize the significance that other group members place on shared goals. Although 
children may not be committed members of the group, their readiness to participate in group 
activity is sufficient for communicating approval of the group goals, as well as for laying the path 
to eventually become a group member when their basic sense of agency becomes developed.74 So, 
the notion of joint readiness, as a characteristic of joint commitments, enables young children to 
essentially act as though they are part of a social group with a shared goal.  
Now that we have determined that 1) collective intentionality is a good foundation for 
discussing social groups, 2) obligation seems to play a part in the persistence of social groups, and 
3) a more inclusive notion of agency more accurately captures the natural abilities of children and 
adults, widening the pool of agents capable of taking on joint commitments (through joint 
readiness), we can at last discuss what members of a social group have obligations to do – that is, 
we can discuss whether there are any normative criteria that may be used to identify the purpose(s) 
that social groups have and, in turn, determine the kinds of goals and actions that group members 
may be committed to. To flesh out an account of the family, specifically, as a distinct social group, 
we need to identify normative reasons for family members to commit to certain kinds of goals and 
activities, just as we would identify the normative reasons for other kinds of social groups to 
commit to other kinds of goals and activities. If these goals and activities can be identified, then 
we can use Gilbert’s account to explain why these groups ought to promote the goals and perform 




74 I will say more about this development in the Section Six. 
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5. Reciprocity, Mutuality, and the Content of Obligations 
Carol Gould presents a notion of reciprocity that I believe provides the right starting place 
for the discussion of the content of obligations, specifically those that are inherent to family 
relationships. Gould contends that one must know both the enabling and constraining conditions 
in which a joint activity takes place, and that agents are capable of being those conditions for other 
agents (Gould 1983, 61). So, to understand joint activity it is important to take into account the 
actions of agents with respect to one another. This means that we view reciprocity as an important 
feature of joint activity. A reciprocal relation is defined as a relation in which “each acts with 
respect to the other on the basis of shared understanding, and a free agreement, to the effect that 
the actions of one with respect to the other are equivalent to the actions of the other with respect 
to the first” (Gould 1983, 67). For Gould, a dimension of reciprocity is present in all social 
relations. When this dimension is positive (meaning that agents act as enabling conditions for one 
another), agents act reciprocally by taking the mutual enhancement of each other’s agency as a 
conscious aim (Gould 1983, 78). Thus, reciprocity contributes to the flourishing of all members of 
a social group that participate in a joint commitment. Gould mentions a specific type of reciprocity 
for the family, called cooperative reciprocity, which is meant to capture a relation among 
individuals who are all engaged in activities towards common ends, in this case, the well-being of 
the family unit (Gould 2004, 44). She argues that caring about achieving this shared end is a 
compelling reason for family members to pay attention to their own responsibility for the joint 
undertaking in addition to the concern over the continued participation of other family members 
(Gould 2004, 45).  
The idea of a joint commitment solidifies the understanding we have of obligation with 
respect to social group membership. However, it does not give us any meaningful way to 
distinguish between social groups because it does not focus on the relations between group 
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members in any normative way.75 Instead, it maintains only that all social groups share one distinct 
feature – joint commitments. Gould’s notion of reciprocity gives us the tools to talk about the 
relations that occur within social groups, and can provide some content for group obligations. 
Different kinds of social groups will require different kinds of behavior to promote member 
flourishing. An understanding of the kinds of behaviors required for member flourishing can 
furnish us with a set of normative principles, specific to the social group in question, and these 
principles can help us assess whether the members of a social group are upholding their shared 
obligations to one another.76  
Another way to understand how goals and obligations are to be maintained within a group 
like the family is to consider family members in specific roles that relate to one another. Virginia 
Held (1989) defines a role as a set of rights and obligations, or of goals and competencies, or some 
combination of these characteristics. An important condition that Held places upon persons who 
occupy specific roles is that, in addition to being guided by a comprehensive morality, these 
persons in roles, “should be guided by appropriate segments of morality … the moral norms for 
various roles are not the same” (Held 1989, 24). By this she means that certain roles – a lawyer, 
parent, sibling, public official, etc. – have moral conditions placed upon them that other roles do 
not have. So, a person in the role of a parent should care for their child (but perhaps not all 
children), a person in the role of public official should always place the good of the community 
that they govern above their own personal gain (but perhaps not the good of a different 
community), and so forth.77 So, a role is also defined by a set of norms or rules that concern 
																																																						
75 We would certainly not want to say that members of a family behave toward one another in the same way 
that inhabitants of a certain city who all obey and uphold the same traffic laws behave toward one another. 
76 I will discuss the specifics of these normative principles in chapter three. 
77 Although we may say that, for the parent and the public official, they have a comprehensive (that is, not 
role specific) moral duty to be concerned for all children and to not put their own personal gain above any 
community, respectively. 
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behavior, and by accepting to occupy a certain role, we thereby accept the norms on the behavior 
expected of us (Held 1989, 30).78 If we think about members of the family as occupying specific 
familial roles and we acknowledge that, in addition to following the tenets of a comprehensive 
morality, these specific familial roles come with their own obligations (for instance, that a parent 
cares for their child, that a child cares for their parent when they become elderly, that siblings help 
one another to care for elderly parents, and so on), then we can rely upon those family members 
to act according to their specific obligations, and similarly hold those family members accountable 
when they do not adhere to the obligations that come with their role.  
What is important to note here is that, despite the fact that comprehensive moral principles 
might provide the parameters for obligated behaviors in joint commitments (i.e., that family 
members care for one another in particular ways – for instance, by not controlling one another or 
physically abusing one another), these same comprehensive moral principles do not justify the 
obligations. That is to say, our obligation to care for our particular family members is not 
determined by comprehensive moral reasons, but by the role-specific moral reasons which are only 
generated by the commitment itself.79 
Understanding the family as a set of individuals who occupy specific roles within the 
																																																						
78 Similarly, Michael Hardimon (1994) defines a role obligation as a moral requirement, which attaches to 
an institutional role, whose content is fixed by the functions of that role, and whose normative force flows 
from that role (Hardimon 1994, 335). He follows Hegel in drawing a sharp distinction between the 
obligations and relationships that arise within family and state and the obligations and relationships that 
arise within Civil Society. This contrast is meant to show that familial and political obligations do not arise 
via voluntary commitment, but are situations that we just happen to find ourselves in. Civil Society, on the 
other hand, is the sphere of the market, where voluntary commitments and obligations are the norm - choice 
is required for Civil Society, but it is not required for the family or the state (Hardimon 1994, 352-353).  
79 There may also be some obligations to family members that do derive from general moral principles; for 
instance, to not lie to family members.  
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family is compatible with the account of joint commitment and reciprocity discussed above.80 A 
joint commitment does not preclude those who are jointly committed from occupying specific 
roles within a group. Part of the reciprocal nature that joint commitments should have can be 
characterized by the kinds of norms of behaviors that roles are defined by: these roles (and their 
corresponding obligations) give us an indication of what to expect from those who occupy those 
roles. For instance, Elizabeth Brake (2012, 106) argues that (for a contractualist view of the family, 
specifically) those who care about the welfare of others should also care about fairness, and so 
should articulate fair protective ground rules early on in a relationship. In the case of the family, 
this does not mean that members negotiate daily over responsibilities, but it lays the protective 
ground rules (legal, financial, domestic chores) that cover what individuals within the relationship 
should expect from one another. Though such planning may seem to threaten trust and sincerity, 
Brake argues that it creates conditions for trust by limiting risk within the relationship. I agree with 
Brake’s sentiments, and believe that can be worked into an approach with joint commitments. A 
joint commitment has an acknowledged openness (as part of the nature of a joint commitment), 
wherein all family members are aware that they are jointly committed to one another, and they 
know what that commitment entails. This openness and understanding of what obligations are 
expected of jointly committed members make conflict resolution easier, and actually helps to 
identify points of conflict as they arise. So, a joint commitment in this sense helps to identify the 
role(s) that family members will take on with respect to one another, and helps them to continually 
meet their obligations to one another. So, what are these obligations? 
 
																																																						
80 I don’t believe that these roles have to be pre-defined and unique with respect to one another within the 
family; rather, roles in the family should be defined mainly by their difference from roles outside of the 
family. 
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6. Obligations and Group Purpose 
In Chapter One, I claimed that the purpose of a social group is what forms the identity of 
the social group and, hence, what distinguishes it from other social groups. Having now discussed 
the significance of obligation for all group members – clarifying that our group obligations are not 
wholly determined by comprehensive moral reasons, but by the role-specific moral reasons that 
are only generated through joint commitment – the importance of group purpose should be more 
evident. The role-specific obligations that we have to other group members are determined by the 
purpose that our role serves toward the group goal. To return to a previous example, the role-
specific obligations of a parent and a public official are quite different, as are the role-specific 
obligations of those with whom they share each joint commitment (for instance, as a parent we 
would not expect a child to vote on policy referendums, but we would expect such behavior from 
our constituents if we were a public official). Hence, the purpose of a social group is the shared 
goal, belief, or practice that members jointly commit themselves to. This purpose elucidates for all 
members what specific obligations they have toward one another, how long they have these 
obligations, and what rights they have to rebuke members who do not perform or uphold their 
obligations to the group. I propose that we conceive of the family as a kind of social group whose 
purpose is based upon a commitment to interdependent caring relations and the fulfillment of 
mutual wellbeing through those relations. Carol Gould’s notion of reciprocity and its focus on 
contributing to the flourishing of all members of a group should be understood within the family 
as obligating caring behaviors as means for ensuring that all family members are given the caring 
resources they need to flourish. This signifies that a joint commitment to form, join, or maintain a 
family obligates family members to actively care for one another by virtue of the shared goal of 
interdependent caring relations. Further, especially for a kind of social group like the family, group 
members should be committed to continue their obligations to one another in longevity – that is, 
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they should actively care for one another over a long period of time to be able to work toward the 
mutual flourishing of all family members. Gould calls this focus on active work toward the 
enhancement of well-being mutuality (Gould 2004, 42).  
An important aspect of actively caring in the long term toward the mutual flourishing of 
all family members involves the development of agency, especially for the family’s youngest 
members. By receiving care from other family members and participating in caring activities 
through joint readiness, children will arrive at a developed sense of agency that includes a 
conception of the good based upon their experiences with their family members. This developed 
sense of agency leads children who have grown into young adulthood to identify a conception of 
the good that they are willing to make their own. This conception of the good will most likely 
involve the maintenance of their family’s group goal. Their developed sense of agency enables 
them to fully join the family as a committed member (meaning that they are now capable of being 
held accountable to other members), and to do so voluntarily. Thus, they willingly commit to 
remain members of the family that they were brought up into because they have identified this 
family, and the group goal of the family, as fitting within their conception of the good life. 
 In conclusion, I propose that we understand the family in the following way: 1) the family 
is a social group created by a joint commitment to the goal of maintaining the well-being of all 
family members and the family unit as a whole, 2) the family is maintained by joint activity that 
works toward the shared goal of mutual well-being, and 3) this joint activity is comprised of the 
practice of active care that family members are obligated to perform for one another by virtue of 
their joint commitment. In other words, the family is a unique kind of social group with a particular 
purpose – to provide active care in intimate settings for the mutual flourishing of all family 
members. But why care? In Chapter One, I discussed many of the purposes that are commonly 
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attributed to the family and found each one lacking. After a lengthy discussion in this chapter about 
the kinds of obligations that group members have toward one another, I believe that mutual, active 
care is the most accurate purpose for the family. I turn now to Chapter Three where I will argue 
for the necessity and importance of care in the family, and discuss the criteria for active caring 







































In Chapter Two, I argued that Margaret Gilbert’s theory of joint commitment best explains our 
understanding of obligation with respect to social group membership (cf. Gilbert 2014).81 
However, we were left with the unsatisfying conclusion that joint commitments do not provide 
any meaningful way to distinguish between social groups because they do not focus on the 
relations between group members. Gilbert’s account maintains only that all social groups share 
one distinct feature – joint commitment – that underlies the concept of obligation, but not the 
content of obligation. To flesh out an account of the family as a distinct kind of social group, we 
need to identify the primary purpose that the family serves for its members – that is, we need to 
identify the normative criteria for members of a family to commit to certain kinds of goals and 
activities, just as we identify the normative criteria for members of other kinds of social groups to 
commit to other kinds of goals and activities. The account I present here holds that the family is a 
unique social group with a particular primary purpose – to provide care in intimate settings for the 
mutual flourishing of all family members – that determines the kinds of behaviors that are required 
for member flourishing.  
																																																						
81 A joint commitment holds each member responsible to every other member as part of the structure of the 
commitment. Unlike moral obligations, obligations of joint commitments are directed obligations, meaning 
that one’s obligation to the other party of a joint commitment is directly correlated to that other party’s right 
against the person to do so-and-so (Gilbert, 2014, 50).  
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I propose that we conceptualize the family in the following way: 1) the family is a social 
group created by a joint commitment to the goal of maintaining the well-being of all family 
members and the family unit as a whole, 2) the family is maintained by joint activity that works 
toward the shared goal of mutual well-being, and 3) this joint activity is comprised of the practice 
of active care that family members are obligated to perform for one another by virtue of their joint 
commitment. In Chapter Two, I defended claims one and two by discussing the necessity of joint 
commitment, joint readiness, and obligation for the genesis and maintenance of social groups. 
Therein, I also laid the groundwork for claim number three by demonstrating the significance of 
reciprocity for determining (in particular) the content of familial obligations. Carol Gould’s notion 
of mutuality (which is one of the modes of reciprocity that she proposes) holds that persons act 
reciprocally by taking the mutual enhancement of each other’s agency as a conscious aim. For the 
family members who are party to a joint commitment, the group purpose is worked toward 
successfully if and only if all members work collectively toward the group goal.  
Different kinds of social groups will have different primary purposes that require different 
kinds of behavior to promote member flourishing.82 In this chapter, I argue that reciprocity should 
be understood within the family as obligating caring behaviors over time as means for ensuring 
that all family members are given the caring resources they need to flourish. This means that a 
joint commitment to form, join, or maintain a family obligates family members to actively care 
for one another by virtue of the shared goal of maintaining the mutual well-being of all family 
member. Additionally, family members should be committed to continue their obligations to one 
																																																						
82 For instance, a corporation is a kind of social group that consolidates decision-making power, 
responsibility, and liability into one group agent (independent of the individuals who are members of the 
corporation) with the purpose of continually increasing profits for the corporation and limiting liability for 
individual members. This purpose determines the normative criteria for member behavior: to act toward 
the joint goals of increasing profits and diffusing responsibility. For more on corporations as social groups 
/ group agents, see Pettit 2007. 
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another in longevity – that is, they should actively care for one another over a long period of time 
to be able to work toward the mutual flourishing of all family members.83 In the sections that 
follow, I will elaborate upon what it means to actively care for one’s family members, what this 
caring activity is comprised of, and why care is so important for families. Before launching into 
these discussions, it is important to note the methodological approach that I will take to justify the 
practice of care as the purpose of familial relations.  
Although I am making a normative claim that families should be the place where primary 
caring activities take place for most (if not all) persons, I will appeal, initially, to descriptive claims 
about the nature of human beings and the needs that human beings have.84 These descriptive claims 
will provide a sound foundation for the normative claims that I will make later on in this chapter; 
namely, that human beings are all dependent at certain points in their lives, the needs that arise out 
of dependency are varied and require different levels of care and, while some care can be provided 
by impersonal care givers (such as the state, or institutions built around provided care like nursing 
homes and daycares), there are certain needs that human beings have that should only be taken 
care of by the family.  
It is also important to remind readers at the outset that the conception of the family that I 
am talking about is not necessarily biologically based, but social in nature. This conception enables 
persons to form, maintain, or join families throughout the duration of their lives, and gives persons 
the ability to revise their familial relationships if they are not receiving (or giving) the kind of care 
that families ought to provide.85 To clarify what I mean by the social nature of the family, I discuss 
																																																						
83 Gould calls this focus on active work toward the enhancement of well-being mutuality (Gould 2004, 42).  
84 In Section Three I will discuss the difference between primary and secondary caring activities. 
85 I do not refer to the family as a biological group, as I do not believe that biology itself is a marker for 
determining familial connection in the qualitative sense. For a further discussion of this point, please see 
Chapter One, Section Three. 
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below how my conception of the family differs from de facto families (revisiting arguments found 
in Chapter One) and suggest who the members of a family might be, which will facilitate a greater 
understanding of the nuances of my account going forward by giving readers a better idea of what 
the family might look like.86  
After discussing the social nature of the family, I provide an analysis of the concept of 
need, detailing how my own conception of need differs from others, and then propose a taxonomy 
of needs that will ground many of the claims that I make about familial care. By combining a 
conception of the person that is rooted in the nature of dependency and need with a practice of 
meeting needs determined largely by the ethics of care framework, I aim to provide an account 
that can make sense of the relationship between dependency, need, and the obligation to meet 
needs. This methodology for determining caring responsibility sets my account apart from other 
theories of needs-based morality, and my focus on the family as the primary responder to needs 
distinguishes my account from the larger ethics of care framework, which prefers to see caretaking 
diffused more evenly to institutional and global levels (cf. Miller 2012; cf. Held 2006; cf. Tronto 
2013). 
 
A Departure from the De Facto Family 
The normative conception of the family that I discuss will, at times, be in tension with the 
way we understand the family colloquially (hereafter called the de facto family). For example, 
when we think about our own de facto families, we often think about close relations – those who 
might comprise something like the nuclear family, such as parents and siblings – and contrast them 
with extended de facto family relations comprised of grandparents, aunts, uncles, cousins, great-
																																																						
86 I will discuss these points more thoroughly toward the end of this chapter, and again in Chapter Four. 
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aunts and great-uncles, second-, third-, and perhaps even fourth-cousins. Often, the qualitative 
aspects of our relationships with these close and distant relations are based upon our proximity of 
biological relatedness to them. While we may regularly see, talk, and share day-to-day activities 
with our close relations, it may be the case that we do not regularly see or talk with our great-aunts 
and great-uncles, and it may also be the case that we do not even know our third- and fourth-
cousins. So, it might seem odd to claim that, for extended de facto family member especially, we 
have all committed to the shared goal of having interdependent caring relations with one another. 
We might consider all of these persons to be our de facto family members, but we do not share a 
commitment to interdependent caring relations with all of them – at best, we might share this 
commitment with those who might form our nuclear family only.  
In the Introduction to this Dissertation, I argued that social benefits are conferred upon 
families who use those benefits appropriately to benefit each family member. In practice, this 
means that family members direct those benefits toward one another’s mutual well-being because 
they are obligated to do so through their joint commitment to the goal of maintaining one another’s 
well-being (and the family unit as a whole). The most effective and appropriate way to use these 
benefits is to establish and maintain intimate caring relations between family members, where the 
benefits facilitate the success of these caring relations. In Section Four of this chapter, I expand 
upon exactly what that entails.  
For now, I mention social benefits to raise the concern that, in the case of distant de facto 
family members like third- and fourth-cousins, it seems rather unlikely that we would jointly 
commit to the goal of maintaining one another’s well-being (especially since we do not personally 
know one another, despite possibly knowing of one another) and consequently, it seems equally 
unlikely that we would use social benefits appropriately, as we would have no caring relations to 
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apply them to. More pointedly, it may even be the case that we do not make a joint commitment 
like this with our closest de factor family members, or that if we did at one point have a joint 
commitment with them, it may have been undone by repeated transgressions by one member (or 
several) against other members. So, who, then, actually makes such a commitment? 
As I will argue more thoroughly in the next section, the various dependencies that we all 
have throughout our lives make it the case that we must have intimate caring relations with at least 
some other person(s), and many of these relations begin when we are born (some may even 
continue over the course of our lives). Despite an inclination to compare these relations to de facto 
familial arrangements (e.g., between a mother and a child), the point to make here is that these 
relations need not mirror de facto familial arrangements. Instead, they can exist between what we 
might colloquially consider to be friends, distant de facto familial relations, or the like. As such, a 
family can be comprised of any group of individuals – biological relations, communes, tribes, and 
the like – who uphold a joint commitment to reciprocally work together toward the mutual well-
being of one another and the group as a whole.87 
While it may sound as though I am making a transhistorical claim about the nature of the 
family, I do not intend it as such. Rather, this conception is meant to challenge those views of the 
de facto family that (either intentionally or unintentionally) preserve problematic relationships in 
the name of biological relatedness or some insufficient primary purpose, such as religious 
perpetuation and expansion, that we discussed in Chapter One. This conception is also meant to 
challenge the notion that our family members are a determinate set of individuals regardless of the 
																																																						
87 These commitments can be made and upheld by an unspecified number of persons, although, as I have 
argued in Chapter One, they are not as intimate or effective in very large numbers. While this may lead 
some to conclude that the account I propose is reserved primarily for the equivalence of de facto nuclear 
families, I argue that these committed intimate caring relations can be taken on by any group of persons 
who uphold their obligation(s) to one another, including infants and small children whose joint readiness is 
sufficient for group membership (see Chapter Two, Section Four for a discussion on joint readiness). 
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quality of our relations with them. My account affords persons the ability to revise their familial 
relations if necessary, with the goal of establishing better, more caring relations with those we 
consider to be family members.  
This last point strikes a tense chord with traditional theories of care that argue that the 
majority of our relations to other family members are completely unchosen for many years of our 
lives. Care theorists argue that these unchosen relations shape us in significant ways (our 
demeanor, beliefs, values, and so on) before we are typically given the choice to revise our familial 
relations. Further, when we do revise those relations, we do so having been heavily affected by 
those initial familial relations, so we often don’t change the kinds of familial relations that we have 
in a substantial way.88 Although I discussed the concept of joint readiness with respect to the 
capabilities of infants and children to make and maintain eventual joint commitments in Chapter 
Two, I did not touch upon the ways in which familial relations might be revised. Section Eight of 
this chapter will focus on how persons revise their familial commitments over time and will 
discuss, in more detail, how an understanding of the family as a social group with a particular 
purpose toward interdependent caring relations, if put into practice, would curtail harmful 
situations from arising within families.  
In the section below, I will sketch the foundation for the importance of caring behaviors 
and caring relations by examining the nature of human beings with respect to needs and 
dependency. The ethics of care, and some elements from the philosophy of education, will provide 
guiding ideals about the nature of dependency and its relationship the needs that persons have 
while offering important suggestions for how those needs ought to be met. After the discussion of 
needs, I will propose that different institutions, including the family and the state, are obligated to 
																																																						
88 See: Fagan 2005; Narang & Contreras 2005.  
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take care of different kinds of needs that we have. By doing so, I incorporate notions of dependency 
and interdependency into the argument for the obligation to provide care within families.  
 
2. A Needs-Based Morality and an Ethic of Care 
As mentioned above, this chapter puts forth a normative claim that families should be the 
place where primary caring activities take place for most (if not all) persons. To ground this claim, 
I will appeal, initially, to descriptive claims about the nature of human beings and the needs that 
human beings have. 
Philosophers who argue for a needs-based conception of morality often work to challenge 
a historical trend, advanced by dominant moral theories, that neglects the moral significance of 
need and dependency and instead prioritizes preferences, interests, desires and rights as the 
foundation for moral theory (Miller 2012, 2). Sarah Clark Miller rightly claims that omitting 
needs from moral consideration misconstrues certain vital aspects of our shared humanity by 
focusing too much on idealized notions of human beings instead of human beings as they are 
(Miller 2012, 2; cf. Reader 2007). In the same vein, the impetus behind the emergence of the 
ethics of care is the recognition that liberal theories have consistently omitted the most basic 
universal human experiences and relationships that do not fit with a liberal conception of the 
person. A central assumption that these dominant theories hold is that, for purposes of 
constructing political and moral theory, human beings can or should be thought of as self-
sufficient, autonomous, fully capable, rational moral agents. This assumption is crystalized by 
the liberal belief that the home, and the types of relationships that occur within the home, are 
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private, and the law and government should not be extended into the private sphere unless 
egregious behaviors are occurring (Held 2006, 12).89  
Virginia Held argues that since dominant moral theories have posited that morality should 
be sought for the autonomous, fully (and equally) capable, rational (male) adult, they miss the 
moral issues that arise between interconnected persons in the contexts of family, friendship, and 
other social groups (Held 2006, 13). The ethics of care aims to understand, evaluate, and prescribe 
moral values for those underrepresented contexts and to generalize these moral values beyond 
them, much the same way that needs-based moral theories seek to generalize the necessity of 
meeting the needs of others to apply to various contexts.  
An important step for promoting care as a way to meet needs involves challenging the view 
that dependency is a deficiency. Dependency, which is often equated with incompleteness and 
immaturity, has been portrayed as an undesirable stage of life that one must strive to rid oneself of 
(cf. Dewey 1997, 45). John Dewey argues that society treats immaturity as a privation. In contrast, 
maturity, like autonomy, is equated with adulthood and as a desirable trait. Dewey suggests that 
we understand the concept of immaturity differently, that we view it not as a privation, but as a 
power (Dewey 1997, 46). Immaturity is the power to grow, and its two primary traits – dependency 
																																																						
89 John Locke writes that the purpose of education is geared toward a very specific end result: the production 
of ‘rational citizens’ capable of autonomous, political activity (Locke 1946, Ch. 6, §58). This view is made 
more concrete by the liberal philosopher’s stance on the family. For Locke, as well as Thomas Hobbes, 
children were meant to submit to their father (likewise, wives to their husbands), who was “abler and 
stronger” and the natural ruler of the home. Such an arrangement presupposes the dependent status of 
women and their children, but also champions the liberal political ideal of family: a pre-political 
(precontractual) natural hierarchical association (Hobbes 2012, 124). Caring for children beyond the aim 
of autonomy is not something discussed much at all in liberal philosophy, primarily because of the rigid 
divide between the political public and the private family: it is beyond the scope of liberal political theory 
to discuss care within families. The perpetuation of the public/private split between the state and the family 
is also present in contemporary liberal political works such as John Rawls’ A Theory Of Justice. For Rawls, 
the family is a part of the basic structure of society, yet the principles of justice are not directly applied to 
it (cf. Rawls 1971; cf. Okin 1989, 95). This commitment continues on the tradition of viewing dependency 
within the family (especially the dependency of children and the disabled) as something that does not fall 
under the scope of political theory (cf. Nussbaum 2009, 331-351). 
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and plasticity – are integral to harnessing that power. Dewey recognizes that dependency has been 
historically maligned as an undesirable trait because it is consistently conflated with helplessness 
– a type of deficiency when measured against autonomy. Because children and the disabled have 
needs that they are unable to fulfill themselves, they are looked upon as being totally dependent – 
helpless – and hence, deficient. Dewey argues that this is the wrong way to view dependency. 
Instead, he suggests that dependency is actually a constructive component for one’s ability to grow 
(Dewey 1997, 47-48). 
Dependency is a social phenomenon that, when viewed as a strength and not a weakness, 
encourages interdependence beyond childhood to the relations between adults. Dewey contends 
that if helplessness was synonymous with dependency, no development could ever take place: “the 
fact that dependency is accompanied by growth in ability, and not by an ever increasing lapse into 
parasitism, suggests that it is already something constructive. Being merely sheltered by others 
would not promote growth,” (Dewey 1997, 47). This shift in the concept of dependency is a move 
in the right direction, and a foundation for interdependent relationships that are a core element in 
theories of care.90  
If dependency is construed as helplessness, and thus as a deficiency, then surely 
dependency will be viewed as something unfortunate – something that must be overcome and 
transformed into independence. Holding, as care theories do, that dependency is an inevitable, on-
going part of the human condition would seem to claim that human beings are all deficient. 
However, if dependency is understood as a constructive element in the continuous growth of 
human beings, then its inevitability will be seen more positively as an opportunity for one to grow 
																																																						
90 Joan Tronto argues that this is a necessary step toward a more inclusive state – that all citizens bravely 
admit their vulnerability and their status as care receivers at different points in their lives (Tronto 2013, 
146). Similarly, Eva Kittay argues that interdependency should be a goal in human development more 
broadly (Kittay et. al. 2005, 453).  
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as a person.91 Understood in this light, the acceptance of the universality of dependency would 
lead social and political theorists to value interdependency much more favorably, as the 
relationship of persons and institutions that recognize and respond to one another’s dependencies 
as they arise. Hence, a better alternative for discussing dependency, and the needs that dependency 
reflects, is provided by the ethics of care. Care theorists argue that we must accept the fact that 
human beings are dependent and not self-sufficient; human beings are organisms that have many 
different needs, affecting many different areas of their lives, and these needs require care from 
many different places to be satisfied.  
Further, dependency is experienced in various forms throughout one’s life. We may 
personally be chronically disabled or injured, or we may have fallen ill or aged beyond self-
sufficiency, finding ourselves in states of dependency that – at best – periodically require that we 
be cared for at different times in our lives. Beyond personal physical (in)capabilities, we may 
suffer emotionally from traumatic or unfortunate events and find ourselves dependent (sometimes 
for our lives) upon those who will listen to us, or offer us guidance and support to help us find our 
way out of emotional trauma. We also find ourselves dependent upon finding child care or elder 
care so that we can work; upon our local grocery store for stocking enough food to sustain (us and) 
the local population; upon the banks to be a safe place for what savings we have; upon 
unemployment insurance to sustain us when we cannot find work; upon affordable housing that is 
safe and does not consume the money that must be used to pay for groceries, bills, utilities, and 
transportation; upon a transportation system that reliably gets us where we need to go; upon an 
affordable and adequate healthcare system that provides the treatments and care that we need in 
																																																						
91 That being said, one can view dependency merely as a fact, and not ascribe a value (negative or positive) 
to it at all. In discussing dependency in a more positive light, I am attempting to show that it need not always 
be described negatively. 
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all situations; and so on. In short, our dependencies are varied and permeate many different areas 
of our lives over the course of our lives. Thus, care theorists argue that interdependency and social 
cooperation are also facts of life, although as a foundation for social and political theory these 
features of human existence do not receive the same attention as, most paradigmatically, the liberal 
tenets of autonomy and contract.92 
Instead, we ought to recognize that, because persons are all dependent in a variety of ways 
over the course of their lives, the needs we have matter, and ought to be met. To that end, we must 
understand the kinds of needs persons have, what kinds of responses those needs require, and who 
(or what) the appropriate responder to those needs might be. The taxonomy of needs that I propose 
in the following section is meant to respond to this challenge by specifying the content of familial 
obligation (i.e. the kinds of needs that intimate caring behaviors meet) as well as the content for 
other institutional responses (i.e. the kinds of needs that institutions and governments meet). The 
distinction I will draw between primary needs and secondary needs, and their respective correlates 
primary caring activities and secondary caring activities, is meant to establish where the 
responsibility to meet needs is situated, rather than to provide a thorough examination of the 
genesis of different kinds of needs. Specifically, I will argue that a particular set of needs, primary 
needs, can only be met by certain kinds of caring activities, primary caring activities, which should 
be performed by family members. Likewise, secondary needs, it will be argued, are those needs 
that can only be met by secondary caring activities, which may be performed by a variety of 
																																																						
92 Virginia Held argues that the biggest problem with the liberal model is that it portrays individuals as 
being self-sufficient and, hence, downplays the universality of dependency. This obscures the fact that 
social cooperation is a precondition of autonomy (Held 2006, 86).  
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institutions or through the regulatory power of the state.93 Before giving my proposed taxonomy 
of needs, I must clarify the methodology used to arrive at its central distinction. 
The concept of need has commonplace, explanatory uses. David Braybrooke writes, “If 
people realize that their lives depend on providing for certain needs, we may expect them to take 
steps to provide for them; we explain the steps taken by citing the need” (Braybrooke 1987, 10). 
However, the concept of need is often susceptible to indefinite expansion, creating confusion about 
what to consider a need and what to consider a preference.94 Using Braybrooke’s relational 
formula – “N needs x in order to y” – reveals that almost anything can be communicated as a need: 
Betty needs tickets to attend the game; Darnell needs books to study; Angelina needs money to 
buy food, and so on. Once the formula is filled in, argues Braybrooke, we can make a judgment 
about how important the need is by assessing how important the end y is, or how important it is 
for N to accomplish that end (both for N and for others who might be affected) (30). To avoid 
conflating needs with preferences, Braybrooke argues that there are limits to the relational formula, 
and these limits help determine where to draw the line between basic needs and preferences: 
“…one cannot sensibly ask, using the language of needs, “Does N need to live?” or “Does 
N need to function normally (robustly)?” N does not have to explain or justify aiming to 
live, or aiming to function normally. …Being essential to living or to functioning normally 
																																																						
93 By using the term secondary I do not mean to suggest that these needs are temporally secondary or any 
less significant than the needs I have termed primary. Rather, my use of primary and secondary are only 
meant to distinguish between the two different categories of needs that I outline in this Chapter.  
94 For Braybrooke, preferences are not morally compelling. There is no license to disregard the preferences 
of another, but there is nothing morally compelling to meet the preferences of another (Braybrooke 1987, 
8). That being said, there are differences between the needs that persons have, which should not be conflated 
with preferences. These needs vary because of convention: “…no one can deny that in some respects - for 
example, in what provisions are familiar - there are variations in needs between persons and between 
cultures. The variations between cultures imply that needs are affected by conventions and suggest that 
truly general - universalized - arguments for meeting any specific need with specific forms of provision 
may be hard to find” (18). Likewise, Carol Gould argues that, “the identification and interpretation of needs 
have a socially constructed aspect and also involve a personal ascription of these needs to oneself” (Gould 
2004, 98).  
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may be taken as a criterion of being a basic need. Questions about whether needs are 
genuine, or well-founded, come to the end of the line when the needs have been connected 
with life or health” (Braybrooke 1987, 31).  
 
This approach helps to identify a set of needs that cannot be reduced to a concept of preferences 
or determined solely by convention: 
“…course-of-life needs do not depend on preferences: People have a need for exercise 
regardless of what they wish, prefer, want otherwise, or choose. They have the need even 
if they do not much care to live or be healthy” (Braybrooke 1987, 32). 
 
Braybrooke goes on to identify a number of proposed lists that aim to capture our course-of-
life needs. He argues that these lists are incomplete on their own, but that a family of lists might 
produce a more comprehensive collection of course-of-life needs. In creating a family of lists, 
Braybrooke proposes his List of Matters of Need, which contains two parts: the first part is 
informed by notions of physical functioning, and the second part is informed by notions of what 
one needs to function as a social being. The list he provides is as follows (from Braybrooke 1987, 
36):  
 
The List of Matters of Need 
 
Part 1 
1. The need to have a life-supporting relation to the environment 
2. The need for food and water 
3. The need to excrete 
4. The need for exercise 
5. The need for periodic rest, including sleep 
6. The need (beyond what is covered under the preceding needs) for whatever is 
indispensable to preserving the body intact in important respects 
 
Part 2 
7. The need for companionship 
8. The need for education 
9. The need for social acceptance and recognition 
10. The need for sexual activity 
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11. The need to be free from harassment, including not being continually frightened 
12. The need for recreation 
 
Braybrooke’s List of Matters of Need is indeed thorough (yet, he admits, not complete), and 
informs many of the needs that I include within my own proposed taxonomy of needs. The 
structure of his list also informs the way I divide needs within my own account. However, 
significant differences exist between the needs that I include and the needs included by 
Braybrooke, as well as where the line between different kinds of needs is drawn.  
First, Braybrooke explicitly includes the need to have a life-supporting relation to the 
environment, whereas I will not explicitly specify this need as a primary need. Material needs 
(such as food, clothing, and shelter) are unconditionally essential for human survival, and a 
relationship with the natural world where persons transform nature into material goods through 
work is required to meet those needs (cf. Gould 2004, 95). This work is often cooperative and 
social in nature, as material needs require organized forms of political and economic life to be 
satisfied (Gould 2004, 98). However, I claim that to be fed and hydrated is a primary need 
because it reflects the fact that, for (at least) the first several years of our lives, we are unable to 
have the kind of relationship with the natural world that could yield material goods for our 
survival (namely, we cannot yet work, either on our own or with others, to produce material 
goods for ourselves or our communities). We are dependent upon others to have those needs met 
until we can develop the right kind of relationship with the material world ourselves (and even 
then, some persons never develop this relationship sufficiently). So, my account specifies the 
primary need for nutrition and hydration in a way that necessitates a caring relationship with 
others. This relates to the second difference between Braybrooke’s List and my proposed 
taxonomy. 
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Braybrooke divides his List of Matters of Need by notions of physical functioning first, 
notions of what one needs to function as a social being second. While the majority of his social 
needs are adopted within my own account,95 I do not divide my taxonomy of needs along the same 
lines. Most of the basic needs that Braybrooke includes on his List comprise my category of 
primary needs. Primary needs involve those things that persons cannot live without regardless of 
social, economic, or political context; specifically, they are needs that arise independently of where 
one lives, how wealthy or poor one is, what local customs or traditions one adheres to, and what 
political system one lives under. However, I specify a second category, secondary needs, and claim 
that these needs are those things that persons require to secure the resources necessary to meet 
their primary needs. By using the term secondary I do not mean to suggest that these needs are 
temporally secondary or any less significant than the needs I have termed primary; as I will go on 
to argue in the next section, many of our primary needs cannot be met unless our secondary needs 
are satisfied first. Rather, my use of the terms primary and secondary are only meant to distinguish 
between the two different categories of needs, and the unique caring activities related to each, that 
I discuss here. 
Unlike primary needs, secondary needs are circumstantial – that is, all persons do not have 
them equally, and they may change (for better or worse) depending upon forces external to persons 
(such as governmental policy, job termination, weather patterns, and so on). In an important 
respect, this categorization is similar to the way that Braybrooke conceptualizes conventionality: 
“At the very heart of the concept [of need], as close to a firm footing for it as it ever gets in ordinary 
use, conventionality takes the place, without renouncing the claims of biological necessity: What 
people are held to need for subsistence is always considerably more than the biological minimum 
																																																						
95 I find it problematic that Braybrooke includes the need for sexual activity in the social category, as it can 
be misconstrued to condone forceful sexual contact with others.  
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required to sustain life” (Braybrooke 1987, 19-20). Conventions (be they social, cultural, or 
political) have the power to create and perpetuate additional needs that must be met for persons to 
subsist. I expand upon this notion of convention to highlight the fact that many of our primary 
needs cannot be met unless our secondary needs are also met.96  
My proposed taxonomy of needs is meant to highlight how central care is to meeting the 
majority of our needs throughout our lives. As such, I sketch out a taxonomy of needs and the 
corresponding caring activities that may successfully meet those needs.97 The kinds of caring 
activities involved in meeting particular needs will, I hope, evince who has an obligation to provide 
care in these different contexts. Before proceeding, it is important to remind the reader that I do 
not aim to provide an exhaustive taxonomy of needs and their corresponding caring activities; 
rather, I seek to highlight the different areas of our lives that our needs fall into, and the different 
kinds of caring activities that best meet those diverse needs. It would be impossible to provide a 
full taxonomy of needs because our needs change and diversify over time and in different contexts 
(for instance, the ever-increasing use of technology in our lives may alleviate some needs that we 
have while also creating new needs that are non-existent at this time).98 That being said, I try to 
offer a thorough analysis and a sound foundation for the claim that certain persons (namely, family 
members) are obligated to perform caring activities to meet certain needs. 
 
																																																						
96 I will explain this process more thoroughly in the following section, though it is important to note here 
that the economy and many of the activities associated with economic production straddle both processes 
for meeting primary and secondary needs. 
97 I don’t mean to claim that all needs are met through caring activities. Rather, I am claiming that many of 
our needs are met through caring activities, and it is an important task to figure out just what kinds of caring 
activities most effectively meet our needs. 
98 Karl Marx argues that the first historical act of mankind is the production of the means to satisfy needs 
(food, water, clothing, shelter, and so on), which is the production of material life itself. The satisfaction of 
first needs, which includes the act of satisfying and the instrument of satisfaction used, eventually leads to 
new needs (Marx 1978, 156). 
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3. A Taxonomy of Needs 
Needs vary between persons and over the course of a person’s life (Braybrooke 1987, 43). 
Needs also vary by stability: some needs are stable throughout our lives (such as the need for 
hydration and nutrition) while other needs are more circumstantial (such as the need for medical 
care or childcare) (Noddings 2002, 58). Likewise, caring activities that respond to these needs vary 
as well: some caring activities are physical, others are emotional, and some are financial. For 
instance, a person may be chronically disabled, injured, have fallen ill, or aged beyond self-
sufficiency. In such cases, that person may be dependent upon others to do for them what many of 
us take for granted as activities we can do for ourselves: to be fed and hydrated, bathed, to excrete 
without complication, to be physically stimulated to prevent blood clots or bed sores, to dress our 
own wounds, and so on. These physical states of dependency require physical care: a particular 
kind of care work that responds to the physical needs that persons have. To borrow Joan Tronto’s 
terminology, the kind of care work required for physical care involves caring for the person with 
the need, or being an active caregiver. (Tronto 1993, 107). This kind of care work might involve 
feeding the care receiver, bathing and exercising her, helping her use the restroom, cognitively 
stimulating her (perhaps through conversation) to prevent decline, tending to wounds or 
administering medication when necessary, and so forth. While the activity of caring for another 
might demand a significant amount of direct physical care work, caring for another might 
alternatively involve indirect physical care work as well: preparing meals for the care receiver 
(if/when they are able to feed themselves), maintaining facilities for the care receiver to bathe and 
exercise herself (a clean bathroom and a safe uncluttered space), providing reading material or 
visual/audio entertainment, filling prescriptions, or ensuring that there are adequate bandaging 
materials available.  
KANE - DISSERTATION 
	
92	
Caring for another might also involve emotional care: a particular kind of care work that 
responds to the emotional needs that persons have. This kind of care work aims to meet the needs 
of those who are suffering from emotional or psychological trauma (perhaps the loss of a loved 
one, the ending of a relationship, an assault, or the witnessing of a disturbing event), or those with 
a chronic emotional or psychological condition such as depression, body dysmorphia and related 
illnesses, dementia, schizophrenia, post-traumatic stress disorder, and the like. While this kind of 
caring activity may be less physical in nature, it is nonetheless as direct and demanding upon the 
caregiver.99 Care receivers in these cases may be (and in many cases, are) dependent for their lives 
upon caregivers who are able to listen, guide, support, and (in professional cases) prescribe and 
administer medications for these conditions. It is also likely that, as a result of many of these 
conditions, the physical kinds of caring for may also be required, in tandem, by the same 
caregivers. That is, those who are unable to emotionally or psychologically take care of themselves 
may also need a caregiver to care for some of their physical needs as well.  
So, caring for another involves direct or indirect physical or emotional care work that aims 
to meet the specific physical or emotional needs of the care receiver – one cannot care for another 
in these circumstances by sitting on the sidelines. However, one can certainly take care of the 
needs of another at a greater distance through financial care (cf. Tronto 1993, 106).100 Financial 
care is a particular kind of caring activity that may or may not involve a degree of care work. To 
return to our example above, someone who either does not have the time, capacity, or means to 
care for another person may instead take care of that person by using financial resources to provide 
																																																						
99 In Section Four I will discuss how reciprocation, even to a degree, helps to alleviate some of the burden 
that caring for another places upon the caregiver. 
100 Tronto does not specifically cite financial care as an element of taking care of another person, but her 
examples tend more toward financial activity. The important distinction here is between taking care of and 
caregiving, where taking care of does not have the same direct and intimate element of care as caregiving 
(cf. Tronto 1993, 105-108).  
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the direct or indirect care that the care receiver needs.101 For instance, one might hire a caregiver 
to provide direct physical or emotional care, or one might rent certain equipment that helps the 
care receiver to exercise. Likewise, one might pay for a professional psychiatrist or a specialist 
who might be more helpful to diagnose and care for emotional and psychological conditions in the 
care receiver.  
Taking care of another person does not mean that the caring activity being done involves 
less responsibility than directly or indirectly caring for the care receiver. Rather, taking care of 
another person is yet another way to responsibly ensure that the needs of that person are being met 
adequately, even if one cannot respond to those needs directly. Further, taking care of another 
person’s needs may involve a degree of labor similar to the degree involved in caring for another 
person. For instance, one may be unable to afford the right kind of caregiver necessary to meet the 
needs of the care receiver without taking on a second or even third job – a very taxing amount of 
labor that helps to provide the required care. Likewise, one might take on personal debt to take 
care of another person, adding years of work onto their life. Additionally, taking care of another 
person is no less effective than caring for that other person oneself, provided that the hired 
caregiver, specialist, rented equipment, or the like are caring for the person adequately.  
The examples above detail cases where persons may or may not depend upon others for 
prolonged periods of time or have many different dependencies at the same time that require 
physical, emotional, and financial care simultaneously. A much more certain example, and one 
																																																						
101 The distinction that I am drawing between caring for versus taking care of does not correspond exactly 
to the colloquial uses of these phrases. For example, when someone says that they are “taking care of” their 
child, they typically mean to communicate (and are typically understood to be communicating) that they 
are providing the more direct, hands-on kind of care that I designate caring for. Similarly, “caring for” is 
often used colloquially to describe an attitude or feeling about something or someone (“I don’t care for the 
game of football” or “I care for you dearly”) rather than to directly care for someone. Although my 
terminology differs in these important respects, I believe that my usage of these phrases helps to distinguish 
the ways that care is provided to others in more precise terms.  
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that applies to all of us much in the same way as we are all some mother’s child, is the fact that, as 
children, we were all dependent upon caregivers for our very lives and well-being (cf. Kittay 1999, 
25). The needs that all infants and children have – namely, to be fed, sheltered, clothed, given 
affection, educated, looked after and, when necessary, disciplined – require near constant care that 
is comprised of physical, emotional, and financial care work. Caregivers must feed infants and 
young children, must provide enough food for older children to feed themselves, must provide 
adequate shelter and clothing to protect against environmental elements, must educate children – 
at least minimally – so that they are able to communicate and (to the extent possible) care for 
themselves as they grow, must protect them from harmful situations (removing sharp objects from 
grasp, for instance) and discipline them (at least in situations where they are a danger to themselves 
and/or others) so that they do not repeat harmful behavior. Caregivers must also show, at minimum, 
a degree of affection to infants and children that research suggests helps to foster a sense of 
security, self-esteem, and self-worth within the child as they grow (cf. Roberts & Bengtson 1996; 
cf. Harris et. al. 2015; Engster 2015). Simply put, without a majority of this care work infants and 
children would not reach adulthood. Likewise, for adults with disabilities, injuries, physical or 
psychological illnesses, age-related incapacities, and the like, care work is necessary to ensure that 
one’s life does not end as a result of the (potentially chronic) condition, and that one’s quality of 
life is maintained at an adequate level.102 
Thus, these primary caring activities address the primary needs that persons have at any 
given time during their lives. Primary needs involve those things that persons cannot live without 
regardless of social, economic, or political context; specifically, they are needs that arise 
independently of where one lives, how wealthy or poor one is, what local customs or traditions 
																																																						
102 For instance, that one eats and drinks clean water regularly, is bathed and moved around regularly to 
prevent infections and sores, is mentally stimulated to prevent decline of cognitive faculties, and so forth.  
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one adheres to, and what political system one lives under. In Braybrooke’s terms, these most basic 
needs are not derived from other needs; they are the most essential needs that cannot be reduced 
to preferences shaped by political, social, or cultural convention (Braybrooke 1987, 37). Primary 
needs, when they cannot be met independently, must be met by others through primary caring 
activities – those activities that involve direct or indirect physical and emotional care, which 
include the activities outlined above – else one’s life may potentially end. While I will argue in 
Section Four below that the family is obligated to engage in primary caring activities, it is 
important to note that our primary needs are also met through organized forms of social and 
economic life that have existed, in different forms, alongside families both before and after the 
advent of the modern state (Gould 2004, 98-99). Although these organized forms of social and 
economic life are regulated by modern states, they are not entirely conventional in character and 
may be thought to straddle the processes for meeting both primary and secondary needs.  
Although primary needs encompass a significant portion of the needs that all persons have, 
they are not the only needs that all persons have. Because all persons live in societies, and these 
societies are now typically governed by particular political and economic systems that affect the 
resources persons have available to meet their primary needs, all persons also have secondary 
needs specific to their socio-economic and political status. Thus, secondary needs are those things 
that persons require to secure the resources necessary to meet their primary needs. Unlike primary 
needs, secondary needs are circumstantial – that is, all persons do not have them equally, and they 
may change (for better or worse) depending upon forces external to persons (such as governmental 
policy, job termination, weather patterns, and so on). To use Braybrooke’s terminology again, we 
might say that secondary needs are primarily affected by conventions that are specific to particular 
social, cultural, and political systems (Braybrooke 1987, 18). These conventions make it very 
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difficult to propose a universal assessment of secondary needs, as each social/cultural/political 
system will produce different versions of them.  
For instance, unless we forage in unoccupied or uncontested territory, we are dependent 
upon an economic system that enables bartering or trading, or upon a social and political system 
that enforces private property laws, allowing us to work on some land and keep the results. Since 
a system of property rights and enforcements is already in place for much of the world, ownership 
of, and access to, private property is unequally distributed. If we do not own our own land to grow 
our own food (if we do not have a direct relationship with the natural world, where our labor 
directly produces material goods), then we find ourselves dependent upon trading or bartering with 
farmers (who in many cases do own their own land) and/or purchasing items at grocery stores 
(who purchase the products of labor for resale) to stock enough food that is reasonably priced for 
us to purchase to meet our primary need of nutrition. In turn, if the economic system in place 
determines that food is a commodity to be valued monetarily, then we are dependent upon 
acquiring money to purchase the food that we need. Further, if we have a need for money to 
purchase the things that are required to meet our primary needs, then we are dependent upon having 
a steady source of income, which in turn makes us dependent upon having a certain political status 
– citizenship – that enables us to legally work, and so on and so forth. In short, secondary needs, 
while not themselves life-dependent, are needs that must be met to ensure that our primary (life-
dependent) needs are also met.  
If primary needs require direct or indirect physical and emotional caring activities to be 
met, then what kind of caring activities meet the secondary needs that we have? Given the breadth 
of secondary needs, their primarily circumstantial nature, and their footing in social, economic, 
and political systems, a variety of different sources for caring activities are required, but not 
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necessarily a variety of different caring activities. Since our secondary needs are shaped primarily 
by convention and derived from primary needs, the caring activities that will meet these needs will 
most often be shaped by convention and derivative of primary caring activities as well. They will 
be comprised of activities that take care of, rather than care for, the needs that persons have – 
although there will be some cases that require primary caring activities.103 To continue the most 
recent example, if we are dependent upon having a steady source of income then we need to work, 
which in turn requires us to learn or apply some skill that is considered valuable for the 
workforce.104 If we have no children or elderly parents, our time away from home (or away from 
others) doesn’t seem too problematic. However, if we do have children and/or elderly parents, then 
we will need to secure childcare (perhaps in the form of daycare or a nanny) or elder care (perhaps 
in the form of a home aide or a nursing home) to be able to work and earn money.105 Further, if 
we are earning a steady income, and that income exceeds our expenses, then we become dependent 
upon financial institutions like banks to provide us a safe place to keep our earnings. When our 
income does not exceed our expenses (or breaks even with our expenses), then we are dependent 
not only upon grocery stores and childcare, but also upon affordable housing and affordable 
transportation. If we should lose our steady income (perhaps through job layoffs or retirement), 
then we become dependent upon unemployment insurance or social insurance programs like Social 
Security. Additionally, we are all in need of affordable healthcare (and an adequate, efficient 
healthcare system) to prevent the accrual of medical debt should we require medical, dental, or 
																																																						
103 Most notably here I mean care received from childcare workers, eldercare workers, and medical 
professionals. 
104 Or for some in capitalist economic systems, ownership of capital can generate income.  
105 Susan Moller Okin argues that the structure of the workplace assumes that workers are free of caregiving 
responsibilities (Okin 1989, 176). It is not within the purview of my argument here to highlight the troubles 
with this conception of the workplace, only to draw attention to the fact that it exists. 
KANE - DISSERTATION 
	
98	
psychological care from medical professionals, and to keep us healthy enough (and alive!) to 
continue working and earning money.  
In short, there are many conventions that determine which and how many secondary needs 
we have (a representative sample might include money, a marketable skill for the workforce, 
affordable childcare, employment, an advanced degree, and citizenship), and many different 
institutions that are capable of taking care of these needs (such as public or private companies, 
vocational schools, graduate schools, governments, and daycares). In some cases, taking care of a 
secondary need involves financial care, such as unemployment insurance, social insurance, 
subsidized housing, subsidized transportation, and food-purchasing assistance programs. In other 
cases, taking care of secondary needs involves providing services or goods that would otherwise 
be unavailable to persons in need, such as publicly run daycare and eldercare centers, banking 
institutions, grocery stores, walk-in clinics, and hospitals.106 These services and goods may also 
be provided through less conventional means; for instance, through social organizational 
arrangements within communities to provide community childcare or through local economic 
arrangements such as Community Supported Agriculture initiatives. That being said, in the 
majority of cases, the needs one has, and the response to those needs, are produced by social, 
economic, and political conventions.  
So, primary and secondary needs can be met, when necessary, by primary and secondary 
caring activities that are performed by certain persons, practices, institutions, and governments. 
However, just because they can be met does not mean they ought to be met by certain persons, 
practices, institutions, and governments. Why should there be an obligation to meet primary and 
secondary needs? To answer this question, we need to examine how valuable care is to us and to 
																																																						
106 It is important to note that some of these services involve hiring employees to provide primary caring 
activities, especially daycare and eldercare centers, and medical centers. 
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our institutions. For instance, if no one were obligated to care, at the very least, for the youngest 
members of a community, society, or state, then there would cease to be communities, societies, 
and states, as we know them.107  
Additionally, as Daniel Engster (2007) argues, human beings implicitly value care as a 
necessary good because we all make claims on others when we need care. We at least implicitly 
assert that others should help us to meet our basic needs, alleviate or mitigate pain and suffering, 
and develop and maintain our basic capabilities when we are unable to do so on our own (Engster 
2007, 46). By making these claims on others, we imply that capable human beings ought to provide 
care for others in need (when they are able to do so consistent with other caring obligations). 
Engster continues that, since our own care does not morally outweigh the care of others (including 
self-care), and since we all depend upon the care of others at different times and implicitly believe 
that capable individuals should help us when we are in need, we should consistently recognize as 
morally valid the claims that others make upon us for care when we are able to provide the care 
required without harming ourselves (Engster 2007, 49). This principle, called the principle of 
consistent dependency, grounds Engster’s claim that citizens have an obligation to provide care to 
other citizens who need it. We might also appeal to this principle to ensure that our society 
organizes and maintains a caring infrastructure that can sustainably and successfully meet the 
demands of care. 
There must, then, be persons, institutions, or governments that are obligated to care for, or 
take care of, the needs that persons have for states and societies to maintain themselves over time 
and thrive. That being said, it may be the case that certain persons, institutions, or governments 
																																																						
107 Many parents do, in fact, want to care for their children. The notion of obligation here is to ensure that 
children are being cared for well. 
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might be more effective than others at carrying out different kinds of caring activities. This brings 
the primary purpose of the family to the core of this debate.  
 
4. Why is The Family Obligated to Care? 
In Chapter One, I argued that the family should not be defined as a biological group, but 
instead as a social group with a particular purpose. We determined that the primary purpose of the 
family should not originate from outside of the family: from a desire to protect property and assets, 
to indoctrinate members to a specific belief system, or to raise future citizens for a political regime. 
In Chapter Two, we discussed Margaret Gilbert’s view that social groups are created and 
maintained based on a joint commitment to some particular goal, belief, attitude or action, and this 
constitutes the primary purpose of the social group (cf. Gilbert 2014). Joint commitments are 
upheld when all members of a social group participate in joint activities that work toward realizing 
the primary purpose of the group. The discussion of needs and dependency in the first part of this 
chapter elucidates the necessity of caring activities for the well-being of persons throughout their 
lives. If following Engster, we accept that the moral imperative for providing care makes claims 
on us all to provide care to others when we are able to. However, it may be too overwhelming – 
or too disorganized and ineffective – if these morally prescribed caring activities fail to specify 
any particular persons that we ought to be responsible to care for. That is, our ability to care for 
others who are in need is greatly enhanced if we are only obligated to care for a certain number of 
others, rather than an indefinite (and unknown) number of others. 
Taking these premises into account, I propose that we conceive of the family as a kind of 
social group whose primary purpose is based upon a commitment to interdependent caring 
relations and the fulfillment of mutual wellbeing through corresponding caring activities because 
it is an ideal arrangement for persons to care for and receive care from one another. I call this 
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conception The Social Family. This means that a joint commitment to form, join, or maintain a 
family obligates family members to actively care for one another by virtue of the shared goal of 
interdependent caring relations. Correspondingly, the notion of reciprocity that we have discussed 
in this chapter and in Chapter Two adds further weight to the claim that caring activities are 
required of all members. Family members are all obligated to care for one another because all 
family members require care from one another. The youngest and most vulnerable members of the 
family benefit greatly from the care they receive, as do those who are temporarily ill or injured, 
and those who are suffering emotionally and psychologically. Being on the receiving end of a 
caring relationship is still a part of joint activity, since caring is a relational activity that requires 
more than one person (or one person’s disposition to care) (cf. Bubeck 2002, 160; cf. Held 2006, 
12).108 Care receivers are obligated to reciprocate, to the best of their ability, to continue the joint 
activity (and continue to realize the purpose of the family). Accordingly, family members must be 
committed in the long term – that is, they should actively care for one another over a long period 
of time to be able to work toward the mutual well-being of all family members (who all need care 
at different points in time).109 So, as persons we are morally obligated to care for others on the 
basis of our universal dependency (the principle of consistent dependency), and as family members 
we are obligated to care for a particular set of persons (our other family members) on the basis of 
our joint commitment.110 Thus, the obligation to care for our family members is both morally and 
																																																						
108 Virginia Held argues that a disposition to care is one-sided; it merely says that someone is ready to care 
and has some idea of what caring behaviors might be. Being in a caring relationship, however, means 
understanding what the needs of the care receiver are, and meeting them appropriately (Held 2006, 55). 
Persons in caring relations are acting for self-and-other together, in the same acts. Caring relations involve 
the cooperative well-being of those in the relation, which leads to the well-being of the relation itself (Held 
2006, 12). 
109 Carol Gould calls this focus on active work toward the enhancement of well-being mutuality (Gould 
2004, 42).  
110 By narrowing down the scope of those who may demand care from us, we potentially alleviate some 
moral dilemmas (cf. Frankfurt 1988, 81). 
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socially grounded through the appeal to our universal moral convictions and the significance of 
our particular relationships with our family members.  
The caring obligations that family members have do not encompass the full range of caring 
activities discussed above. Family members may not be able to provide many of the secondary 
caring activities discussed above, but they are certainly capable of providing many of the primary 
caring activities discussed. What’s more, family members are in a special place to provide that 
kind of care for one another – they have intimate knowledge of one another’s capabilities and 
dependencies – which, I will argue, makes families more efficient and effective primary caregivers 
than other institutions and governments. This, in turn, gives specific content to the caring activities 
that family members are obligated to perform for one another. 
 
5. The Family and Primary Caring Activities 
There are important moral considerations involved in meeting the needs of others that we 
have a responsibility to care for (Held 2006, 10). Some needs that persons have may be stable over 
time, but other needs are more circumstantial – for example, a person has a need for food and water 
on a daily basis, but may only need medication now for a health condition that has just been 
diagnosed. Likewise, some needs that persons have may be able to be met by the person herself – 
such as feeding herself, bathing herself, and using the restroom by herself – while other needs 
require care from a caregiver – such as filling and picking up prescriptions, grocery shopping, and 
mental health counseling. These examples suggest that 1) different kinds of caring behaviors are 
needed at different times, and 2) caregivers need to know something about the individuals they are 
caring for – they need to have knowledge of what the care receiver needs at a given time to provide 
the right kind of care, else more harm may be caused (Noddings 2002, 58). Joan Tronto argues 
that care should be viewed as a practice that involves both thought and action (Tronto 1993, 108). 
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It is not enough merely to provide any kind of care in a situation; care must be provided to meet a 
particular need (or set of needs) that a person has. Determining the most appropriate caring 
response to a person’s need is just as crucial as the caring activity itself. So, the role of the caregiver 
(and the knowledge that the caregiver has) is extremely important for ensuring that the dependent 
is cared for appropriately. This means that the role of the caregiver cannot be filled by just anyone. 
Social Families are intimate; the nature of joint commitment shapes the kind of relationship 
that family members have with one another to be closer and more personal than other relationships 
outside of the family.111 Part of this intimacy arises from the fact that family members interact with 
one another on a regular basis through joint activity, and know many of the intricate details of one 
another’s lives, making them jointly ready for activity when the need arises.112 Consequently, 
family members have comprehensive, intimate knowledge about one another’s capabilities, 
dependencies, needs at any given time, and dispositions (how much or little care family members 
want from one another). This knowledge gives family members the ability to evaluate these 
dispositions, capabilities, dependencies, and needs and transform them into knowledge about what 
types of caring activities particular family members should receive, and how often: some members 
require many different direct physical caring activities on a daily basis while others only require 
indirect physical caring activities (such as maintaining facilities, preparing meals, filling 
prescriptions, and the like); some members require significant emotional care (for instance, a need 
to speak with others daily) while others only need that kind of care from family members weekly 
																																																						
111 For example, relationships between coworkers, congregation members, and friends. 
112 By regular basis I mean that family members interact with one another, in some form, at intervals of 
time that they each find acceptable. Joint readiness and joint activity makes it difficult for these intervals 
to be very long, for the longer the interval, the less that family members know about each other. If family 
members know very little about one another, then they cannot be jointly ready for action, nor could they 
successfully take on any joint activity. (cf. Gilbert 1989, 207; and Chapter Two, Section Four of this 
dissertation).  
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or monthly; some members may require time away from primary caring responsibilities (requiring 
assistance from others so that they may take that time off), and so on. In short, different family 
members require different types of caring activities. Virginia Held claims that these differences 
reflect the individuality of persons.113 These differences also highlight the importance of familial 
intimacy that makes needs like these, and their corresponding caring activities, known in the first 
place.  
While it is universal that all persons have primary needs, not all persons have the same 
primary needs at any given time. Moreover, the nature of primary needs, especially for those that 
cannot be filled by persons themselves, regularly requires very intimate direct or indirect caring 
activity, often over lengthy periods of time. Those who respond to our primary needs must have 
substantial knowledge not just about us, but about what kinds of caring activities will best meet 
the needs that we have. As such, it is not likely that institutions or governments, or even local 
social or economic organizations, would have such comprehensive intimate knowledge about us, 
nor the resources to respond to each and every person with the appropriate, adequate caring 
responses – especially since all persons need caring responses at different times. So, it seems that 
other persons are the only entities that are capable of possessing this intimate knowledge and 
ability to carry out primary caring activities for one another efficiently and effectively. But, of 
course, not just any person can provide effective primary care to another person: the caregiver 
must have intimate knowledge about the other person to be able to care effectively. So, family 
members, who are in a special place to have this kind of intimate knowledge about one another, 
are the most effective providers of primary care for one another. Because families are comprised 
																																																						
113 However, Held notes that one can think of relationships that are extremely demanding and possibly 
dangerous to the caregiver. Held responds that in such cases, when relationships are so entangling that they 
impede free agency, they are often the kinds of relationships that need revision (Held 2006, 50).  
KANE - DISSERTATION 
	
105	
of persons 1) who all have needs and, thus, certain dependencies and demands (the principle of 
consistent dependency); 2) whose needs are best met by other persons that they share intimate 
knowledge with; and 3) who have jointly committed to a group goal that aims toward the mutual 
well-being of all family members, family members are obligated to care for one another’s primary 
needs, or to take care of those needs when necessary. Providing care for one another’s primary 
needs accords with the notion of reciprocity that makes caring relations beneficial to all family 
members.114 But what about those family members who cannot reciprocate the care that they 
receive? 
Familial reciprocity does not require that all actions be met with equivalent responses.115 
In certain cases, such as for those with severe disabilities, it may only be possible to receive 
emotional feedback in the form of positive gestures (i.e. smiles, hugs, and the like), love, or 
camaraderie. Even still, that kind of feedback keeps the caring relationship positive for both 
caregiver and care receiver and, on many occasions, reduces the heavy burden on the caregiver 
(Kittay 1999 150-152; cf. Kittay 2002).  
In other cases, former care-receivers may only be able to take care of the primary needs of 
those who cared for them, rather than care for those needs directly.116 I will return to this point 
																																																						
114 Carol Gould mentions a specific type of reciprocity for the family, called cooperative reciprocity, which 
is meant to capture a relation among individuals who are all engaged in activities towards common ends, 
in this case, the well-being of the family unit (Gould 2004, 44). She argues that caring about achieving this 
shared end is a compelling reason for family members to pay attention to their own responsibility for the 
joint undertaking in addition to the concern over the continued participation of other family members 
(Gould 2004, 45).  
115 Persons who receive adequate care who become directly responsible for the care of others will likely 
develop a moral orientation that Nel Noddings believes captures the ethic of care (Noddings 2002, 29). 
Hence, they will seek to care for those who have cared for them, to the best of their ability – even if they 
cannot fully reciprocate that care. 
116 I have in mind here an adult child who cannot reciprocate the direct care given to them as children by a 
caretaker (to be fed, bathed, and so on), but can take care of the needs of their childhood caretaker by hiring 
a home health aide or the like. 
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shortly. What is most pressing to understand here is that reciprocity itself does not dictate whether 
certain caring activities are appropriate; rather, reciprocity dictates that caregivers always try to 
appropriately meet the needs of their particular others to the best of their ability, as their own needs 
were similarly met. We might understand this process, as it unfolds over time, as exemplifying a 
sort of practice of care similar to the way that care theorists discuss care as a practice (cf. Tronto 
1993; cf. Bubeck 2002; cf. Held 2006). Caroline Whitbeck defines a practice as a coherent form 
of cooperative activity (joint action) that not only aims at certain ends but also creates certain ways 
of living and develops certain characteristics in those who participate in the cooperative activity 
(Whitbeck 1984, 65).117 Practicing primary care in the family would develop certain ways of living 
that help facilitate the maintenance of caring relations over the long term. The practice of active 
caring might look something like the periodic shifting of roles within the family from caregivers 
to care receivers as needs are met and new needs arise. For example, family member A has a broken 
leg and requires direct and indirect physical care from family member B as they heal, yet at the 
same time, family member A provides emotional care to family member B by discussing a troubling 
situation that family member B is struggling with. So, family members cooperatively work toward 
the mutual well-being of each member by taking on the appropriate role at the appropriate time. 
But what about those times when family members are unable to perform primary caring activities 
because of other obligations that arise outside of the family, or because there are too many needs 




117 Specifically, Whitbeck writes, “By “practice” I mean a coherent form of cooperative activity, or “joint 
action,” as Carol Gould calls it, that not only aims at certain ends but creates certain ways of living and 
develops certain characteristics (virtues) in those who participate and try to achieve the standards of 
excellence peculiar to that practice” (Whitbeck 1984, 65). 
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6. Secondary Caring Activities and the Family 
Family members are not always able to care for the primary needs of those who are on the 
receiving end of the caring relationship. Contemporary political, social, and economic systems 
each have a hand in creating, perpetuating, and (potentially) mitigating a variety of secondary 
needs that must also be met to ensure the well being of persons. For instance, parents of young 
children may not be able to directly or indirectly care for all of their children’s primary needs 
because of a secondary need for money that results from not having direct access to material goods 
from nature. These parents would have to work to fulfill the family’s secondary need for a steady 
income while taking care of their children’s primary needs by, say, placing their children in 
daycare or preschool. Relatedly, some family members may not be the appropriate responder for 
certain needs that arise, such as the need for psychiatric evaluation, monitoring, and prescribing 
medication if the care receiver has had a traumatic psychological experience. In such a case, a 
medical or psychiatric professional would be better able to care for the care receiver’s primary 
need. As discussed above, this does not make the caring action(s) of the family member any less 
effective, although it does make the caring action(s) less direct.  
The secondary needs that arise within families are typically the result of the family not 
being able to meet the primary needs of all of its members due to socio-economic and political 
forces. For instance, in the contemporary world, families who do not grow their own food rely on 
grocery stores to stock enough food to purchase for family members to eat regularly. This entails 
another set of needs including, but not limited to, the need for money to purchase food (and other 
goods to meet our primary needs), the need for a steady source of income, the need for citizenship 
so that one might be able to work, the need for childcare or eldercare (should the worker have 
children or elderly family members), the need for affordable healthcare to prevent catastrophic 
medical debt, and so on. Institutions like daycares, eldercare centers, medical centers (hospitals, 
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walk-in clinics, private practices), and schools, as well as private care workers such as nannies, 
nurses, home health aides, and tutors, perform primary caring activities that address the unique set 
of primary needs that each care receiver has similarly to how family members meet the primary 
needs of one another. However, there are two differences between family members providing 
primary care and care workers providing primary care to dependents.  
First, in many cases, care workers do not possess the same knowledge about the care 
receiver that their own family members do. For instance, a doctor or nurse who is caring for a 
patient’s specific primary need does not typically know anything about the patient beyond the 
relevant information necessary to the caring activity at hand (they may know what allergies the 
patient has and how their injury or illness must be treated, but they may not know that the patient 
has difficulty sleeping at night and has high anxiety, leading them to be more tired and clumsy, 
and more prone to illness). The primary caring activities are effectively and efficiently carried out 
(the wound is dressed or the illness diagnosed and medicated), but perhaps the root of the problem 
has not been addressed. That is, the caring activity has not been as comprehensive as if a family 
member, knowing that the care receiver needs to sleep more, offers an additional level of care to 
ensure that the care receiver is given more opportunities to sleep. Likewise, an eldercare worker 
might know a significant amount about his charges – their health history, capabilities, disabilities, 
likes, dislikes, and so on – but may not recognize emotional trauma from losing a long-term partner 
or friend, or regret for not having fulfilled a life-long dream. The eldercare worker might attribute 
a somber disposition to more recent events, or as a side-effect of their physical state, and so any 
emotional care offered by the eldercare worker would be less targeted than a caregiver who knows 
more about the person’s overall history and can more accurately target the need in question 
(perhaps by watching home movies or sharing memories and stories).  
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While care workers are effective and efficient primary caregivers to those persons who are 
under their care, in most cases care workers will not possess the same amount of knowledge about 
the care receiver, resulting in less comprehensive primary care than family members would be able 
to provide. Again, this does not mean that the charge is receiving less effective care, for their 
specific primary needs are being met. Instead, it is meant to highlight the fact that family members 
are usually able to care for one another’s needs on several fronts because they have comprehensive 
intimate knowledge about the person being cared for. That being said, some care workers are able 
to gain a substantial amount of knowledge about their charges, leading to the same kind of 
comprehensive care that family members could provide. For instance, childcare workers, 
especially those who are privately hired and work in the child’s home, or daycare workers who 
have cared for a child for several years, may in fact have a significant amount of knowledge about 
the child and be able to offer primary care as comprehensively as the child’s parents. Even still, it 
is likely that the child will not remain a charge of the childcare worker for the long term (the child 
may switch schools or daycares, the family may move to another state, or the child may start to 
attend public school, eliminating the need for home care). This leads to the second difference 
between primary care provided by family members and primary care provided by care workers. 
Care workers and their charges do not have the same kind of reciprocal relationship that 
family members do, since care workers and their charges are not committed to a shared goal of 
mutual well being. In the care worker-care receiver relationship, the care receiver need not ever 
provide primary care to the caregiver. Instead of receiving reciprocal care, care workers typically, 
although not always, receive compensation, and this compensation is usually monetary (although 
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it may be a bartered service).118 Care workers ought not expect to receive care from their charges, 
and care receivers ought not expect to provide care themselves in the future.  
It is important to clarify that a lack of reciprocity does not mean that the care receiver need 
not care about the care worker. Virginia Held argues that caring about another person involves 
concern about whether or not they are doing well independent of caring activities; if caring 
activities happen to be present, then caring about another person also involves concern about 
whether one’s caring activities are positively affecting that person (Held 2006, 33). So, the care 
worker and the charge may care about each other, even if their relationship does not involve 
reciprocal care for one another. Similarly, Nel Noddings claims caring about another person can 
help to establish, maintain, and enhance caring relations. However, for Noddings the objective of 
caring relations is for caring activities to take place; caring about is empty if it doesn’t result in 
caring for another individual (Noddings 2002, 24). In this sense, a care receiver cannot care about 
the care worker since they are not obligated to (and most likely never do) provide care for the care 
worker themselves. Noddings’ conception of the caring about / caring for relationship seems 
misguided. For instance, Joan Tronto’s account of caring about, like Held’s, does not posit this 
same emptiness. Instead, Tronto treats the phenomenon as a first step in the recognition that care 
is necessary to meet the needs of others (Tronto 1993, 106). Understood in this way, caring about 
another person involves recognizing the moral consideration that all persons require care and, 
whether or not we are obligated to (or able to) care for another person, we may at least care about 
them and hope that they are receiving the care that they need. Even if our caring relationships 
emerge from different circumstances, we are not precluded from caring about one another even if 
we do not care for, or take care of, one another reciprocally.  
																																																						
118 Unfortunately, this compensation is not always adequate (cf. Robinson 2011; Tronto 2013).  
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To return to the discussion about secondary needs, family members often meet these needs 
through conventional means without much assistance: they pay for their own groceries with their 
own money that they earned through working; they pay for their own childcare or eldercare 
arrangements, and they facilitate their own (and their family’s) healthcare coverage either through 
their employer or through direct payment to insurance companies. In such cases, private 
institutions are able to provide the primary caring activities to dependents when family members 
are unable to themselves.119However, many families are not able to meet their secondary needs 
without assistance. For instance, some families have difficulty keeping a steady income because 
of disabilities, availability of employment, market conditions, and the like. Other families struggle 
to make enough money to cover the costs involved with having dependent family members like 
children, the disabled, and the elderly, who all require considerable amounts of primary care that 
must be provided by care workers if not by family members themselves. What are we to do in such 
cases? Are these families to be punished, or to suffer, for not being able to care for, or take care 
of, one another’s needs? 
 
7. Secondary Caring Activities and the State 
In Section Three I argued that family members were obligated to care for, or take care of, 
one another’s primary needs. I argued for this on the basis that family members are in a special 
place to provide that kind of care for one another because they have intimate knowledge of one 
another’s capabilities and dependencies. This makes families more efficient and effective primary 
caregivers than other institutions and the state. However, families are not obligated to (and often 
face difficulty trying to) meet one another’s secondary needs, especially because these secondary 
																																																						
119 It should also be noted that persons could take care of their own primary needs by paying for their own 
care when they need it. 
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are often shaped by conventions that apply to life outside of the family, such as political systems, 
and by social and economic organizational arrangements that affect how family members access 
material goods and services.  
Secondary needs are circumstantial; they are specific to social, economic, and political 
statuses and arise because some particular social, economic, and/or political structure is in place. 
This means that all persons do not have the same secondary needs, nor do they have them equally. 
Secondary needs may change (for better or worse) depending upon forces external to persons, such 
as a newly introduced government policy, market conditions that dictate the availability of 
employment opportunities, weather events that affect one’s health, home, or employment status, 
and so on. What is not circumstantial, however, is the fact that social, economic, and political 
structures create or perpetuate secondary needs through policy, regulation, and conventional 
practices: the need for money, the need for employment, the need for childcare, the need for 
citizenship, and so on (Braybrooke 1987, 18). Because economic and social arrangements are 
typically regulated by governments, political structures (governments) are in a unique position to 
create, maintain, alter, and alleviate the secondary needs of persons living within the state in a 
number of ways, including the creation or revision of policies that pertain to citizenship, wages, 
healthcare, and the like, or by insufficiently regulating harmful market practices (cf. Rawls 1971, 
54-58). For instance, states may enter into trade agreements with one another that directly affect 
the availability of jobs for citizens; they may introduce and uphold laws that make it unnecessary 
for workplaces to accommodate employees that have constant primary caring responsibilities; they 
may subsidize grocery items like milk, produce, and grains so that consumer prices are kept 
affordable; they may create social insurance programs that provide income to those who are 
temporarily unemployed or retired through taxation policies; and so on. The most problematic 
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aspect of a government’s power to create secondary needs is that it creates these needs unequally, 
meaning that some persons have more secondary needs than others depending on their social, 
economic, and political statuses. Families must have their secondary needs met in order to meet 
the primary needs of their family members, and an unequal level of secondary needs between 
families means that certain families have a much more difficult time meeting their primary needs 
– a consequence that is in tension with the principle of consistent dependency.  
The moral considerations involved in the principle of consistent dependency ground the 
requirement that all persons should have adequate care for primary needs as they arise. The Social 
Family is the most effective and most efficient place to meet the primary needs that arise for all 
members of the family. Having families in place that take care of these primary needs (in 
conjunction with social and economic organizational schemes) means that most persons in the 
state will, in fact, have their needs met adequately – or at the very least, will be involved in 
interdependent caring relationships where that is the aim. Thus, in order for the government to 
abide by the moral considerations involved in meeting the primary needs of its citizens, it should 
take care of the secondary needs of families who most effectively meet the primary needs of all 
family members.  
The state has a moral obligation to take care of the secondary needs of families, but it also 
has a social obligation to take care of these needs. Since governmental policy and regulatory 
practices create and perpetuate secondary needs, often hindering families’ abilities to meet their 
primary needs, the state has an obligation to take care of the secondary needs of families that arise 
as a direct result of policies, regulations, and procedures. This social obligation is certainly rooted 
in the moral obligation to meet the secondary needs of families, yet it also recognizes that the cause 
of secondary needs is inherent in the conventions upheld by social, political, and cultural 
KANE - DISSERTATION 
	
114	
structures. This recognition puts the state in a particular position to assess its own policies and 
make changes when necessary. 
There are several different ways that the state might take care of the secondary needs of 
families so that family members may focus upon meeting their own primary needs. The state may, 
through taxation policies aimed at individuals or employers, create a system of public daycares 
and eldercare centers that are free of cost, enabling family members to work without an additional 
expense of paying for care workers. Alternatively, the state may subsidize the costs of private 
daycares and eldercare centers, or subsidize the cost of hiring care workers to work in one’s home, 
as a means of reducing the cost of these caring services. This might be done through the use of 
vouchers, tax credits, or through a guaranteed minimum income so that families can choose how 
best to use their resources to pay for the care they need. Likewise, the state may require that the 
minimum wage paid by employers is adequate to cover all of the expenses that are incurred as 
family members care for and take care of one another, and may insure against a substantial loss of 
income due to unemployment and retirement through social insurance programs. Additionally, the 
state may provide (or subsidize) healthcare for all citizens to ensure that no one accrues substantial 
medical debt or is unable to seek medical attention when necessary.  
The state may implement any of these methods, or a combination of them, in an effort to 
fulfill its obligation to take care of the secondary needs of families. These secondary caring 
activities enacted by governing bodies should be thought of as social benefits – as benefits that 
help families to care for and take care of one another’s primary needs.120 We may also think of 
social benefits as a set of privileges, bestowed by the state, that family members receive in relation 
to one another: visitation rights in hospitals, prisons, and care centers; the ability to speak on behalf 
																																																						
120 The state may also take care of political rights – i.e. free speech, freedom of religion, etc. – but these 
political needs are less immediately related to our ability to provide care within families. 
KANE - DISSERTATION 
	
115	
of those who are unable to communicate their needs (i.e. children, the infirm or the cognitively 
disabled); privacy for intimate moments and conversations (especially those that result in decisions 
for how to provide care); and the ability to transfer assets between one another to address needs 
(such as providing money for a car payment, or leaving one’s home to other family members upon 
death). These benefits should be conferred upon social families: families that are actively caring 
for, or taking care of, one another’s primary needs. They should not be conferred upon groups that 
purport to be families, yet fail to actively care for, or take care of, the primary needs of family 
members.  
The social family is the only kind of social group that stands to use these benefits to benefit 
each family member. This is because the primary purpose of the social family is to work toward 
and promote the mutual well being of all family members through caring activities. Other kinds of 
social groups – for instance, corporations, congregations, trade unions, and the like – would not 
have the explicit goal to use such comprehensive benefits for their ultimate intended purpose: to 
meet the primary needs of members. Instead, these benefits might be used to enhance profits 
(perhaps by monopolizing on institutional care and increasing prices), to promote particular belief 
systems (that may encourage certain persons to shoulder the majority of care work at their own 
expense), or to consolidate property for financial gain. Similarly, for those groups who purport 
themselves to be families, these benefits may contribute to harmful behaviors toward group 
members, such as the facilitation of intimidation and abuse (if, say, an abusive member is able to 
speak on behalf of the abused during medical exams, or if abusive behaviors are going on in 
private), the swindling of assets from a gravely ill member, or if monetary benefits like social 
insurance are being used irresponsibly (not to alleviate the needs of all members).  
The kinds of benefits that states confer upon families demand that families be the kinds of 
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groups that actually use those benefits to benefit each family member. If a group of jointly-
committed persons is recognized as a family, conferred the status of family by the state, and given 
the benefits that go along with it, yet do not use those benefits for the purpose of benefitting all 
family members (potentially even harming them instead), then the state should not recognize that 
group as a family and those benefits should not be conferred. Certain financial benefits (social 
insurance, subsidized groceries, healthcare, and so on) may still be conferred upon persons who 
have lost or disbanded their families (especially children and the disabled), but a majority of social 
benefits would be forfeited in such cases. This is because social benefits appertain to the 
relationships between individuals because they affect the functioning of those relationships. As 
such, social benefits only have meaning when applied to relationships – most integrally, familial 
relationships – and cannot be applied to individuals apart from their relationships. This 
requirement is not just in the best interest of all persons, but it is also in the best interest of the 
state.  
From an earlier discussion in this chapter, if persons were not cared for by family members 
as infants and small children at the very least, then there would be no citizens to make and maintain 
the state. Similarly, if persons were not cared for throughout their lives when needs arose, there 
would be far fewer persons who could participate in the necessary activities that keep a state going 
(such as maintaining infrastructure, producing goods to meet needs, and defense). So, primary care 
is clearly crucial not just to the well being of persons, but also to the well being of the state. 
That being said, families may exist par excellence in the right kind of state – one that values 
care by meeting secondary needs so that family members may care for, or take care of, one 
another’s primary needs. The Social Family is the instantiation of this excellence, and thrives in a 
state where universal needs, dependency, and caring activities are valued by the state. But how do 
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we ensure that all groups that purport themselves to be families are indeed social families? That 
is, how do we know that all families are actively caring for the primary needs of all members? 
 
8. Dissolution and Revision of Families and Relationships 
The Social Family is not a biologically based group, but a social group. Understanding the 
family in this way enables persons to form, maintain, or join families throughout their lives. It also 
gives persons the ability to revise their familial relationships if they are not receiving (or giving) 
adequate primary care because families are less rigidly defined in terms of biology and 
procreation.121 As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the ability to revise or change one’s 
familial relationships is at odds with many theories of care that argue that the majority of our 
relations to other family members are completely unchosen for many years of our lives. Care 
theorists argue that these unchosen relations shape us in significant ways (our demeanor, beliefs, 
values, and so on) before we are given the choice or opportunity to revise our familial relations. 
Further, when we do revise those relations, we do so having been heavily affected by those initial 
familial relations, so we often don’t change the kinds of familial relations that we have in a 
substantial way.122 We may have been raised by persons who were not adequate caregivers, or who 
were abusive and neglectful, or who were emotionally distant, and so on. We may be so heavily 
shaped by these formative experiences that, even when we recognize that our relations are not 
caring relations, we choose to remain in them or we change them for very similar uncaring 
relations. Alternatively, we may seek to change these relations for better, more caring relations 
and distance ourselves from our past or existing relations.  
																																																						
121 The social family is not dependent upon biological relationship or procreation for familial status. For a 
more detailed explanation, please see Chapter One, Section Three of this dissertation.  
122 See: Fagan 2005; Narang & Contreras 2005.  
KANE - DISSERTATION 
	
118	
Virginia Held argues that we are not constrained by our upbringings and circumstances; 
the relations that we are enmeshed in are capable of being reshaped or changed when necessary 
(Held 2006, 48). When we do reshape or change our existing relations, we act with the desire of 
having better and more caring relations. So, we replace existing relations with other, better 
relations – we do not choose complete independence and liberal autonomy (Held 2006, 49).123 Nel 
Noddings similarly contends that if we are concerned with developing caring relations, we need to 
know about the kinds of encounters that support or undermine caring (Noddings 2002, p 102). 
While we may not be able to choose all of our family members at a given time, we certainly are 
able to revise our caring relationships over time to reflect the kinds of familial relationships that 
we want, which may involve dissolving some (un)caring relationships that we feel are harmful.124 
This does not mean that we go off on our own, completely independent, and without need of caring 
relationships. Rather, we gain the ability to choose what kinds of relationship we are going to be a 
part of as we grow: we may choose to stay a part of the family that we were born into, or choose 
to join a different family that welcomes us, or we may choose to start a new family with others 
who are similarly situated.  
That being said, it may not be possible to completely distance ourselves from persons with 
																																																						
123 This approach is also proposed by Carol Gould, whose account of “individuals-in-relations,” understands 
individuals as fundamentally interdependent. Gould argues that relations are indeed constitutive of 
individuals, yet not wholly constitutive. What is important is that individuals remain capable of choosing 
and changing their relations, even though these relations form and constitute persons (cf. Gould 1988, 105). 
I discuss Gould’s view more fully in Chapter Two. 
124 I argued in chapter two that infants and small children are capable of joint readiness: children have a 
natural disposition toward cooperating with others, and children also do cooperate with others when given 
the opportunity (cf. Tomasello 2009). That young children possess natural cooperative tendencies (and hone 
and develop those skills over time) enables them to evaluate their relationships as they grow and choose 
either to affirm their commitment to their family, or seek to leave an abusive or negligent family. While 
this is undoubtedly more difficult for those who are cognitively impaired, those who are not being cared 
for well may not show the same responsiveness to medicines or care routines, potentially signifying that 
the relationship with the caretaker is a negative one. 
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whom we’ve previously had caring (or uncaring) relations. For example, we may hold some 
affinity for biological siblings, parents, aunts, uncles, and the like, especially if they have been a 
significant presence in our lives. We may still care about them. However, if (at best) we are not 
actively caring for them and they are not actively caring for us, I contend that the familial 
relationship has ceased. We might then say, for example, that we have a brotherb (to mark our 
biological brother), who is no longer (or perhaps has never been) our brothers – our social brother, 
which would signify that there is no active care and no recognized family relationship.125 The 
family that one is a member of – the social family – is the group of persons who are jointly 
committed to, and jointly maintain, caring relations. Families are families because family members 
actively care for one another. If members of a family cease to care for other members, or worse, 
begin to harm other members of the family unit, they no longer have a standing to demand care 
from the other members and, if the harm is ongoing, they lose membership in the family or the 
entire family dissolves.126  
Assessing for ourselves what kind of familial relationships we want to have, although a 
challenging task for sure, reflects the personal and moral considerations involved in the principle 
of consistent dependency (that we want to be cared for, and that we ought to be cared for). It also 
reflects our dispositions, since different persons desire to give more or less direct (or indirect) 
caring activities to others and to receive more or less direct (or indirect) caring activities from 
																																																						
125 I am indebted to Virginia Held for this distinction.  
126 If we are members of a group, and we are jointly committed toward a shared goal, then we have an 
obligation to continue our acting toward the shared goal, and we have a right against the other parties of the 
joint commitment to continue their acting toward the shared goal. Gilbert (2009, 177) sometimes refers to 
this right as a standing to demand the action of another with whom one is jointly committed. She argues 
that there are certain background understandings that are standardly associated with acting together that are 
in place to prevent hurtful behavior towards others (Gilbert 2003, 45). 
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others.127 We cannot ensure that our formative familial relations are caring relations, but we can 
aspire to improve those relations, or work towards changing them, if we find them inadequate or 
harmful. Of course, this may not be possible for all persons. Some purported families are rife with 
abusive, neglectful, and/or oppressive behaviors and persons become, for lack of a better word, 
accustomed to such behaviors. In such cases, persons do not act to revise their relations or, if they 
do, often revise them for similarly problematic relations. The perpetuation of abusive, neglectful, 
and/or oppressive behaviors is certainly a challenge to the viability of the social family: how 
possible is it to base our conception of the family on something like the social family if there are 
so many purported families that are uncaring, distant, neglectful, oppressive, and abusive? For 
those persons within such problematic groups who are able to assess and revise their relations, we 
might think that they would realize the idea of the social family by changing their current relations 
for better relations. But what about those persons who are unable to revise their relations by 
themselves?  
For those groups that are perpetually uncaring, as well as those social families that devolve 
over time into uncaring groups, the state has a responsibility to intervene on behalf of those persons 
who are no longer having their primary needs met adequately. To be sure, qualitatively analyzing 
each and every family is an extremely daunting task for the state, and may seem very invasive, 
especially in relation to other social and political theories that aim to protect privacy in such 
																																																						
127 That being said, some dispositions may be overridden by moral considerations. For instance, Harry 
Brighouse and Adam Swift argue that parents have no duty to love their children, and children have no 
right to their parents love. However, parents do have a duty to try to develop the capacity to love their 
children, and if a parent does have the capacity to love their children, then they have a duty to exercise that 
capacity (Brighouse & Swift 2014, 21). Similarly, if a family member has the capacity to care for other 
family members, they are required to exercise that capacity as part of their joint commitment to the group. 
If a family member has no such capacity, then they are not required to care for the family that they are a 
part of, and they have no standing to demand care from others.  
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contexts.128 Further, punishing groups that fail to adhere to certain familial relationship standards 
by removing their recognized status and corresponding social benefits might seem to be even more 
harmful to those who are in problematic situations than leaving the group to its own devices. This 
outcome should certainly be the last resort as far as state policy is concerned. The state should be 
able to apply a range of options when faced with groups that are in danger of losing their familial 
status. These options might include mandatory counseling, training programs, safe departures or 
relocations for family members under duress, criminal charges when applicable, and so on. In 
short, the state should take steps to further assist families who are in trouble before dissolving the 
family, even if that the ultimate outcome.  
It may be impossible to peer into the day to day lives of all families – some problematic 
relations will certainly exist and may never be rectified – but a state that actively promotes the 
value of care by taking care of the secondary needs of all families sends an important message to 
families that they ought to fulfill their obligations to one another and use those benefits as intended. 
Moreover, the root causes of many kinds of familial discord stems from the inability of families to 
meet their own secondary needs: tensions over a lack of money, food, adequate housing, childcare 
and eldercare, and the like lead to other disputes between family members that may ultimately turn 
violent or neglect many primary needs. A state that takes care of its citizens thoroughly by meeting 
the secondary needs of all families can help to reduce a significant number of these tensions before 
they become dangerous. So, the state, which actively promoting the value of care by meeting the 
secondary needs of all families, helps to ensure that all families are upholding their joint 
commitments to actively care for one another. In the following chapter, I discuss just how the state 
may assess the qualitative relationships within families. 
																																																						
128 I discuss this concern more fully in Chapter Four. 




9. Concluding Remarks 
Prima facie, my account may seem to require a great deal more state involvement within 
the family than liberal or even communitarian accounts would allow. However, in the next chapter 
I will argue that my account merely shifts the boundaries between the family and the state, a move 
that does not translate into an appreciable increase of state involvement in familial affairs. The 
approach I take behooves us to examine what parameters those boundaries are drawn around and 
then question why those boundaries need to be drawn as such. In doing so, we come to recognize 
that 1) the boundaries drawn between the family and the state is within the state’s power to control; 
2) the state does in fact control where those boundaries are drawn; and 3) this boundary-drawing 
is not unique to my account, but can be found in any approach that attempts to conceptualize the 
family. In response, my account uses different criteria to draw the boundary between the family 
and the state in an effort to remedy the lack of oversight for familial relationships within existing 
theories.  
Highlighting this problem in other social and political theories is an important task from 
the standpoint of doing philosophy, but it is also a crucial task for how we live: these problematic 
theories have consistently informed state policies that ignore or fail to rectify 1) intra-familial 
abuse of all kinds; 2) oppression that disadvantages women and children, especially (both inside 
the family and outside of it); and 3) the systematic neglect of familial needs (lack of infrastructure 
for daycares, eldercare, universal healthcare, and so forth). I maintain that it is the responsibility 
of the state to ensure that families have the resources they need to maintain healthy and mutually 
beneficial relationships for all family members. While my account will undoubtedly unsettle 
liberal and libertarian theorists especially, I believe that it offers a substantial challenge to 
traditional theories of the family-state relationship that must be taken seriously.  
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In the next chapter, I defend my account of the social family against these other social and 
political theories that have often dominated how we think about the family-state relationship. I 
divide these theories into four different camps, each with their own distinct view of the family-
state relationship: the Traditionalist View, the Liberal View, the Abolitionist View, and the View 
From Recognition Theory. I argue that my own account more accurately defines the purpose of 
the family and discerns what makes families so significant both for persons and for the state. 
Further, I argue that a state that actively promotes the value of care by taking care of the secondary 
needs of citizens, and meaningfully intervenes on behalf of persons who are not receiving adequate 




















The Social Family account that I have presented conceives of the family as a kind of social group 
whose purpose is based upon a commitment to interdependent caring relations, and the fulfillment 
of mutual wellbeing through corresponding caring activities, because it is an ideal arrangement for 
persons to care for and receive care from one another. A joint commitment to form, join, or 
maintain a family obligates family members to actively care for one another by virtue of the shared 
goal of interdependent caring relations. In Chapter Three, I argued that this active care is comprised 
mainly of primary caring activities which respond to the primary needs that all persons have.129 
Families are in a unique position to provide primary care for one another because of the intimate 
knowledge that family members have about one another. The special circumstances that enable 
family members to possess such knowledge makes the family a more efficient and effective setting 
for primary caregiving than other institutions and the state.130 Family members, however, are not 
always able to care for one another’s primary needs for a variety of reasons – most centrally, a 
																																																						
129 For a thorough discussion about primary needs, primary caring activities, and the family’s obligation to 
meet primary needs, see Chapter Three, Sections Three, Four, and Five. 
130	It is important to reiterate here that our primary needs are also met through organized forms of social 
and economic life that have existed, in different forms, alongside families both before and after the advent 
of the modern state (Gould 2004, 98-99). Although these organized forms of social and economic life are 
regulated by modern states, they are not entirely conventional in character and may be thought to straddle 
the processes for meeting both primary and secondary needs. 
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lack of resources (financial and temporal, especially). Contemporary political, social, and 
economic systems each have a hand in creating and perpetuating a variety of secondary needs that 
must also be met to ensure that families are able to meet their primary needs adequately.131  
In Chapter Three, I drew a comparison between my conception of secondary needs and 
David Braybrooke’s conception of conventionality: “At the very heart of the concept [of need], as 
close to a firm footing for it as it ever gets in ordinary use, conventionality takes the place, without 
renouncing the claims of biological necessity: What people are held to need for subsistence is 
always considerably more than the biological minimum required to sustain life” (Braybrooke 1987, 
19-20). Conventions (be they social cultural, or political) have the power to create and perpetuate 
additional needs that must be met for persons to subsist. I expanded upon this notion of convention 
by highlighting the fact that many of our primary needs cannot be met unless our secondary needs 
are also met.  
Secondary needs are circumstantial; they are specific to social, economic, and political 
statuses and arise because some particular social, economic, and/or political structure is in place. 
This means that all persons do not have the same secondary needs, nor do they have them equally. 
What is not circumstantial, however, is the fact that social, economic, and political structures 
create or perpetuate secondary needs through policy, regulation, and conventional practices: the 
need for money, the need for employment, the need for childcare, the need for citizenship, and so 
on (Braybrooke 1987, 18). Because economic and social arrangements – even those that are not 
wholly conventional – are typically regulated by governments, political structures (specifically, 
governments) are in a unique position to create, maintain, alter, and alleviate the secondary needs 
of persons living within the state in a number of ways, including the creation or revision of policies 
																																																						
131 For a thorough discussion of secondary needs and secondary caring activities, see Chapter Three, 
Sections Three, Five, and Six. 
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that pertain to citizenship, wages, healthcare, and the like, or by insufficiently regulating harmful 
market practices (cf. Rawls 1971, 54-58). Before moving on, it is important to note exactly what I 
mean by “the state”, which will inform later discussions about the family-state relationship.  
Following Chandran Kukathas, I intend “the state” to mean a political association that has 
some structure of authority (through which some course of action can be determined) and a 
capacity for agency (in the sense that it is akin to a corporate entity and, hence, can be held 
responsible for actions) which is best expressed through the state’s government (Kukathas 2014, 
360).132 The state is not identical to the government (states do not need governments to exist, and 
vice versa), but the government is a group (or person) that rules or administers a state.133 The 
government creates and regulates policies and practices that affect all persons and groups within 
the state, and the state acts to uphold such policies and practices.  
In Chapter Three I argued that the state has both a moral and a social obligation to take 
care of the secondary needs of families. By appealing to the principle of consistent dependency, I 
claimed that all persons should have adequate care for primary needs as they arise.134 Since the 
social family is the most effective and most efficient primary caregiver for family members, and 
																																																						
132 Kukathas argues that the state is a corporation in the way that a people or a public cannot be. “It is a 
corporation because it is, in effect and in fact, a legal person. As a legal person a corporation not only has 
the capacity to act but also a liability to be held responsible. … A corporation cannot exist without the 
natural persons who comprise it – and there must be more than one, for a single individual cannot be a 
corporation. But the corporation is also a person separate from the persons who comprise it” (Kukathas 
2014, 360).  
133 Kukathas writes that, “Until the emergence of the state, however, government did not attend to the 
interests of a corporate entity but administered the affairs of less clearly defined or demarcated publics. 
With the advent of the state, however, government became the established administrative element of a 
corporate entity” (Kukathas 2014, 360).  
134 The principle of consistent dependency, proposed by Daniel Engster, contends that 1) since our own care 
does not morally outweigh the care of others (including self-care), and 2) since we all depend upon the care 
of others at different times and implicitly believe that capable individuals should help us when we are in 
need, then 3) we should consistently recognize as morally valid the claims that others make upon us for 
care when we are able to provide the care required without harming ourselves (Engster 2007, 49). This 
principle grounds the claim that citizens have an obligation to provide care to other citizens who need it. 
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having families in place that take care of primary needs means that most persons in the state will 
have their needs met adequately (or be on the path to do so), the state, in an effort to abide by the 
moral considerations involved in meeting the primary needs of its citizens, should take care of the 
secondary needs of families.  
The state has a moral obligation to take care of the secondary needs of families, but it also 
has a social obligation to take care of these needs. Since governmental policy and regulatory 
practices create and perpetuate secondary needs, often hindering families’ abilities to meet their 
primary needs, the state has an obligation to take care of the secondary needs of families that arise 
as a direct result of policies, regulations, and procedures. This social obligation has roots in the 
moral obligation to meet the secondary needs of families, but its true force comes from the 
recognition that the cause and perpetuation of secondary needs is inherent in the conventions 
upheld by social, political, and cultural structures. This recognition puts the state in a particular 
position to assess its own governmental policies and make changes when necessary. So, while my 
understanding of the functional capacity of the state is more or less empirically based (including 
the way that the state intervenes in problematic familial affair), I am making a normative claim 
that the state ought to value care by recognizing social families and by responding to the needs of 
social families through policies and regulatory practices that promote caring relations in the family. 
The social family account thus implores us to contemplate the family-state relationship as 
more than merely two institutions that are entangled with one another due to the way that state 
policy affects familial arrangements and relationships. We are instead forced to consider the 
symbiotic relationship that exists between the family and the state, especially with respect to the 
moral obligations that both institutions have to persons: the family as the most effective and 
efficient primary caregiver cannot function optimally without secondary care and support from the 
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state, and the state cannot function optimally (if at all) without the primary caregiving of families. 
What is unique about this approach to understanding the family-state relationship is that the 
symbiotic nature of the relationship stems from a shared value of care and caring activities: the 
family expresses the value of care by engaging in primary caring activities for the mutual benefit 
of all family members, and the state expresses the value of care by promoting policies and engaging 
in secondary caring activities that serve to benefit families as well as the state. A shared and 
promoted value of care sets the social family account apart from other theories that postulate a 
family-state relationship based upon alternative conceptions of the family.  
In this chapter I critique these alternative conceptions of the family and the claims they 
make about the characteristics of the family-state relationship in an effort to demonstrate that the 
social family account offers a more comprehensive and advantageous picture of the family-state 
relationship. Specifically, I argue that a shared and promoted value of care in both the family and 
the state is more beneficial to both institutions because of the mutual recognition of obligation on 
both sides. This approach more adequately defines the primary purpose of the family, more aptly 
describes the significance of families for persons and the state, and provides an account of the state 
that highlights the responsibility that the state has to its citizens as a direct result of its policies and 
actions.  
In Section One I provide a theoretical framework for the family-state relationship that 
elucidates how the social family account treats the concepts of familial privacy, state intervention, 
and social benefits. I argue that a relational framework allows for state intervention and the 
conferral of social benefits without infringing upon familial privacy. Further, I contend that a social 
and political system built upon a relational framework better serves the needs of both the family 
and the state. In Section Two I discuss some different historical stages that the family has 
KANE - DISSERTATION 
	
129	
transitioned through in an effort to identify the periods of time when other views of the family 
have been the most influential in shaping familial arrangements. In doing so, I analyze how the 
state shapes permissible familial arrangements and clarify how the social family account 
determines the kinds of permissible familial arrangements that best adhere to practicing and 
promoting care within the state. 
Sections Three, Four, and Five present alternative conceptions of the family that have been 
very influential at different periods of time, either as guiding ideals for familial arrangements or 
as direct challenges to them. I divide these alternative conceptions into three different camps, each 
with their own distinct view of the primary purpose of the family and the significance of the family-
state relationship. I call these three approaches the Traditionalist View, the Liberal View, and the 
Abolitionist View, respectively. The traditional view of the family adheres to a hierarchical model 
of familial relations that privileges the male head-of-household. It strictly separates productive and 
reproductive labor and emphasizes the “naturalness” of reproductive labor, consigning women to 
perform the majority of this “natural” labor.  
Many problematic aspects of the traditionalist view were recognized by liberal theorists 
who sought to improve the relations between family members by appealing to women’s rights, 
consent, and a model of the family-state relationship that granted the state minimal power to 
intervene into familial affairs. As such, the liberal view of the family departs from the traditionalist 
view by granting women conjugal rights and granting the state the right to intervene into private 
familial relations on behalf of those who are in danger. Still, the liberal view has its own 
shortcomings, some of which apply to the traditionalist view as well. 
Proponents of the abolitionist view recognize the problems attached to the traditionalist 
and liberal views and call for certain aspects of the family structure to be completely abolished. 
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While some abolitionists call for the abolition of the private or well-defined family as we know it, 
others call for the abolition of marriage or any public status that sets those with certain benefit-
conferring relations apart from those without such relations.  
Before discussing these views in detail, I turn to an analysis of the relational framework 
that underpins the social family account.  
 
1. Shifting Boundaries: Social Benefits and Intervention 
The account of the social family that I have presented places care and caring activities at the 
forefront of our understanding of the primary purpose of the family. Although I’ve argued 
vehemently that the significance of care stems from the fact that all persons have needs, this is not 
the whole story. The significance of care also arises from the sociality inherent in my account of 
the family – that is, the fact that the family is a social group emphasizes the relational aspect of 
family life and informs discussions about the relational characteristics between the family and 
other institutions, as well as the family and the state. These relational characteristics highlight the 
interdependency between family members, the pervasive ways that family members affect one 
another (through care or, in less exemplary circumstances, through harmful behaviors), the ways 
that a family’s ability to thrive is affected by other institutions and the state (public and/or private 
care centers, market conditions, and state policy), and the ways in which a state either thrives or 
falters depending upon the quality of familial care (citizens who are capable of civic participation 
because their needs are consistently met). Jennifer Nedelsky argues that we ought to be thinking 
relationally about social structures in this more general way: we ought to see how both personal 
relationships and personal choices are inevitably shaped by wider relationships (Nedelsky 2011, 
21). Relational thinking, she argues, enables persons to see clearly the structures that shape their 
own lives: 




…they can see how these relationships intersect with institutions, such as family law 
(which defines marriage and stipulates spousal and parental obligations), a market 
economy, the presence or absence of state-supported child care, the presence or absence of 
a “family wage” (and the norms of one or both parents in the paid labor force). These 
national (or regional) institutions, in turn, interact with global markets and institutions, 
such as the World Bank, as well as with relations of economic and political power 
generated over centuries (Nedelsky 2011, 21). 
 
Relational thinking makes clear the fact that persons, institutions, markets, and states are 
shaped by one another, and these shaping forces change or reinforce the relationships that 
constitute each. To tie this into the social family, Nedelsky’s point serves to explain why the family 
and the state have a symbiotic relationship: the state needs citizens who will actively and 
effectively maintain political structures (by serving, voting, obeying laws, and the like), and it 
cannot achieve this without ensuring that persons are adequately cared for to be able to participate 
politically. The family, as the most efficient and effective primary caregiver, can provide that care. 
But a family that is a part of the state is affected by the choices, actions, and policies of the state 
and its governing body – especially with respect to the kinds of resources available for the family 
to care for its members. For the family to adequately care for its members, it must have adequate 
resources; the state (as well as the market, which is regulated to a large degree by the governing 
body of the state) has the power (and the moral and social responsibility) to provide those resources 
or arrange for the provision of them.135  
																																																						
135 A unique need that families must have met in order to adequately care for its members is that of security. 
Although I do not have the space to offer a thorough analysis of security in the dissertation, I offer a brief 
proposal here: Security is not a resource, nor is it something that can be created or regulated. Rather, it 
seems to be a status that is provided by the state to some degree (i.e. a family is very secure, not very secure, 
or somewhere else on the spectrum) in relation to some other force. Being secured from outside forces (such 
as other states, other institutions, other families, other persons, and so on) enables families to focus upon 
their own relations, and not their relations to these potentially dangerous forces. That being said, the state 
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If we extend this exercise in relational thinking, we see that the state has the ability to shape 
many aspects of the family: the boundaries that are drawn around the family, the structure of 
familial relations, and the capabilities of families.136 For instance, the American legal conception 
of the family draws boundaries between families and non-families by referencing a specific set of 
criteria meant to pick out those persons within a family and separate them from those persons 
outside of that family.137 Often, the criteria that determine who counts as a family member involve 
intergenerational biological ties and/or contractual relations (specifically, marriage and/or 
adoption). The social family account does not draw boundaries like this, but does indeed maintain 
that there are boundaries between families and non-families.  
Boundaries drawn between families and non-families are typically drawn by criteria that 
are determined to be appropriate by the governing body of the state; that is, the government decides 
which features are significant for picking out certain persons and labeling them a family (i.e. 
biological relatedness, contracts, and so on). On the social family account, the criterion that 
determines where the boundary between families and non-families is drawn originates from the 
family itself, in the kind of relationships that family members have with one another. So, the social 
family account defines the family independently of the state. It is therefore the state’s responsibility 
																																																						
itself can become a danger to the family, necessitating a need to be secured from the actions of the state 
(perhaps by an intermediary institution).  
136 David Archard argues that societies also play a role in determining whether or not there are families, 
and have the power to influence the kinds of families that exist and flourish (Archard 2010, xv). I also hold 
that societies (and elements of society, including, but not limited to, civil society, institutions, practices, 
traditions, and interpersonal interactions) shape the way(s) that familial arrangements take form; however, 
for the purposes central to this chapter, I limit my discussion primarily to the state’s ability to shape and 
influence familial arrangements through its actions, and through the decrees of its governing body.  
137 The U.S. Census Bureau defines the family as a group of individuals (2 or more persons) who live 
together who are related either by birth, marriage, or adoption (a family or family household is defined by 
the United States Census Bureau for statistical purposes as "a householder and one or more other people 
related to the householder by birth, marriage, or adoption.”). Webster’s New World Law Dictionary defines 
the family as: “A group of individuals who share ties of blood, marriage, or adoption; a group residing 
together and consisting of parents, children, and other relatives by blood or marriage; a group of individuals 
residing together who have consented to an arrangement similar to ties of blood or marriage.” 
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to recognize the significance of caring relationships as defining the family, and then draw the 
boundaries between families and non-families accordingly, especially because these caring 
relationships offer the best guarantee for ensuring that social benefits are being used appropriately 
by families.  
The social family account holds that those who qualify as families are conferred certain 
benefits such as reduced taxation, inheritance transfers, visitation and decision rights in hospitals 
and prisons, shared healthcare, and immigration eligibility by the state. I have called these kinds 
of benefits, among others, social benefits. For social benefits to be conferred upon family members 
of the same family, we must have some notion of who those particular family members are, else 
there would be no reliable way to discern whether those benefits are being used to benefit each 
member of the family.138 But families receive more than merely social benefits; the boundaries 
drawn around families by the governing body of the state also protect them from scrutiny and 
intervention – something that Nedelsky argues gives those boundaries, as defined and enforced by 
the law, the means to, “wield power, shield power, and shield from power” (Nedelsky 2011, 107). 
The boundaries that contribute to protections often influence what kinds of familial structures are 
permissible within a state and which ones are not permissible. While the social family account 
holds that there are indeed boundaries between families and non-families, it does not conceive of 
those boundaries the way that other theories do, and challenges the way that those boundaries are 
drawn precisely because of how they affect the structure of familial relations. 
Within many accounts of the family-state relationship (several will be discussed in 
subsequent sections), families are given a certain amount of freedom (or complete freedom, in 
certain cases) to structure their relations and acceptable behaviors without interference from the 
																																																						
138 See Chapter Three, Section Six for a more thorough discussion about why social benefits should be used 
to benefit each family member. 
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state. For instance, several theories hold that the family is subject to no more than protective 
intervention into familial relations, and even then intervention occurs only when extreme cases of 
abuse or neglect are uncovered.139 Although it seems as though the boundaries erected around the 
family on such accounts preserve a robust level of privacy and autonomy for the family to structure 
itself, this is in fact not the case. Frances Olsen argues that policies that only support protective 
interventions still shape what models of familial relations are acceptable and influence how family 
relations are structured (Olsen 2014, 165). More precisely, the state – through policies, actions, 
and protections decreed by its governing body – shapes permissible relations within the family on 
these accounts by either choosing to intervene or by abstaining from intervention.  
 If a protective interventionist policy only warrants intervention in exceptional situations, 
then the governing body of the state is still making a judgment that declares it permissible for 
families to structure themselves and operate in certain ways – albeit within a wide range of 
acceptable arrangements as a means of protecting the “privacy” of the family. Even if the 
governing body of the state allows a wide range of options for familial structure, it still might 
prohibit certain familial structures or alter others it finds unsatisfactory.140 Further, should public 
opinion change in favor of a once-prohibited familial structure, the governing body of the state 
																																																						
139 The protective intervention argument stems from the belief that nonintervention into the family would 
be possible, but is not always a good idea. Rather, the protective intervention argument makes the claim 
that selective intervention is permissible in exceptional situations, such as when the interests of society and 
of the family members who may be at risk need to be protected (Olsen 2014, 165). Even then, the threshold 
for when intervention is deemed appropriate is extremely high, potentially permitting years of abusive, 
neglectful, or domineering behavior to occur.  
140 For instance, in the United States polygamy is still not a permissible familial structure, and it is becoming 
increasingly impermissible throughout the world (cf. Macedo 2015, 192-194). Likewise, in the fight for 
gay partners to marry and adopt children, certain states have made it extremely difficult for marriage and 
adoption procedures to be carried out or upheld (see the American Supreme Court reversal of Alabama 
Supreme Court opinion V.L. v. E.L. 577 ____ (2016); and Campaign for Southern Equality, Et. Al. vs. The 
Mississippi Department of Human Services, Et. Al., Civil Action No. 3:15cv578-DPJ-FKB (2015)).  
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must recognize and legalize the familial structure before it is counted as permissible.141 So, for the 
protective interventionist stance, the governing body of the state has a direct role both in shaping 
the kinds of familial structures that it is populated by, and in determining the criteria for what 
constitute permissible familial relations. Those familial structures that are deemed permissible are 
granted protection from intervention and scrutiny regarding the way those families choose to 
arrange their relations, enabling families to structure their relations and behaviors according to 
diverse religious doctrines, secular doctrines, and personal preferences.  
While it does not sound problematic prima facie to permit a wide range of familial 
structures, the protective interventionist stance has made it permissible for certain family members 
to dominate others, for abuses of women and children to go unchecked or unchallenged, and for 
certain family members (predominantly women) to be prevented from civic participation. For 
instance, families structured around the tenets of patriarchal hierarchy (whether or not inspired by 
religious belief) will typically be spared from intervention (as has been the case historically) save 
those cases where severe physical harm befalls women and children (and even then protective 
intervention methods are often slow to respond). Protecting the privacy of the family through the 
boundaries of protective interventionist policies often enables harmful behaviors to continue 
between family members, such as a detrimentally unequal division of reproductive labor (where 
women are required to take on all reproductive tasks, often without compensation, that limits their 
ability to leave due to financial dependency upon the income-earning male), and the domination 
and intimidation of partners and children that affect their ability to fully enjoy their political rights 
																																																						
141 See such American Supreme Court cases as Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Lawrence v. Texas, 
539 U.S. 558 (2003); and Obergfell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 14-556 (2015).  
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and participate in civic activities.142 This type of boundary-setting also serves to perpetuate the 
systematic neglect of familial needs (a lack of infrastructure for daycares, eldercare, universal 
healthcare, and so forth) that may fuel these problematic situations further because the needs of 
families are also considered a private matter.  
In less controversial cases, the state must usually step in to decide a wide variety of parental 
disputes (particularly among divorced or unmarried parents) that then influence the relations 
between parents and between parents and children (cf. Olsen 2014, 175).143 In short, the boundaries 
that are drawn between families and non-families enable the state to confer benefits to families 
and protections from scrutiny and intervention into the relations between family members that 
relations between non-familial citizens do not receive. These boundaries affect how power 
relations within families arise and influence how families meet their needs.144 Although these 
boundaries are meant to instill a sense of privacy and autonomy to the arrangement(s) of familial 
relations, they nonetheless shape permissible familial structures and directly influence the 
relationship between the family and the state, especially with respect to meeting the needs of 
families.  
Despite these findings, the account that I have presented appears to involve a great deal 
more state involvement within the family – in terms of both an increase of benefits and an increase 
in intervention – than other theories that adhere to strict protective interventionist boundaries 
																																																						
142 I am not advocating here for coercive force to be used to rectify the unequal distribution of reproductive 
labor. Rather, I am highlighting the way that the boundaries are drawn, and the problematic consequences 
of neglecting certain familial arrangements. 
143 For instance, whether or not a child will be brought up with a particular religious doctrine, or whether 
or not a parent will be responsible for child support payments. 
144 Olsen argues that courts must frequently draw lines that either protect individual family members or 
promote familial authority (Olsen 2014, 175). Exactly where a line is drawn, or where a line is expected to 
be drawn, affects the power relations within the family. Olsen contends that the courts make these decisions 
based off of the policy considerations by the state, so the state cannot avoid making decisions that will 
influence family relations. 
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would allow. Yet, even with a significant number of social benefits conferred upon families and a 
potentially lower threshold for intervention efforts on the part of the state, the social family account 
does not diminish or strengthen the boundaries between families and non-families; rather, as I will 
go on to explain, it merely shifts the boundaries in a way that takes account of the relational aspects 
between family members, families and institutions, and families and the state.  
An account like the social family, which seems to erode the privacy around families and 
diminish the boundaries that so staunchly protect privacy, instead behooves us to examine what 
parameters those boundaries are drawn around and then question why those boundaries need to be 
drawn in that way. As I argued earlier, the social family account urges the state to determine where 
to draw the boundary between families and non-families using a criterion that originates from the 
family itself that reflects the relationships that family members have with one another. Drawing 
the boundary in such a way requires the state to recognize the significance of caring relationships 
as defining the family when using its power to draw boundaries. That is, the social family account, 
and the framework of relational thinking that it is built upon, recognizes that the boundaries drawn 
between families and non-families is within the state’s power to control, and that the governing 
body of the state does in fact control where those boundaries are drawn. The state retains the power 
to determine the boundaries of what a family is, what a family is not, and how the relationships 
within the family ought to be structured, even if the state is mistaken about where the boundaries 
should be drawn (Nedelsky 2011, 108-109; cf. Olsen 2014, 175). In this respect, the social family 
account does not challenge the empirical understanding of the power and functioning capacity of 
the state, at least not for the purpose of this dissertation.145 Recognizing these things means that 
																																																						
145 Although I am accepting the state as it is in this dissertation, a full discussion of the family-state 
relationship would need to consider whether an alternative form of the state, or a different kind of political 
organization, might be able to facilitate the goals of the social family account without the kinds of 
intervention (coercive or otherwise) found in contemporary accounts of the state.  
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the social family cannot just break down the boundaries around families, for these boundaries arise 
from the relationship between the family and the state. Rather, the social family reconceives how 
those boundaries ought to be drawn and then treats those reconceived boundaries as movable when 
faced with a situation that challenges a mutually beneficial relationship between the family and 
the state. Specifically, as I will explain more thoroughly below, the social family account conceives 
of the boundaries drawn around families as arising from the recognition that intimacy is a 
necessary condition for effective and efficient caring relations between family members and 
requires privacy to thrive, yet it also holds that those boundaries should be shifted when necessary 
to protect those family members who might suffer by the allowance – or promotion – of certain 
kinds of familial structures that are not conducive to reciprocal caring relations among family 
members.  
The Social Family draws boundaries around the family that are based upon the qualitative 
aspects of familial relations.146 These qualitative aspects are primarily concerned with how family 
members interact with, and behave toward, one another. Specifically, the qualitative aspects of 
familial relations are not based upon any politically expedient purpose; rather, they are based upon 
a natural condition of being a human being – dependency – and the kinds of relations that make it 
possible for all members of a family to thrive given that all family members have needs that 
correspond to particular dependencies.147 This means that the governing body of the state must 
assess how its policies affect the capabilities of the family to meet the needs of its members – 
especially policies that disrupt those capabilities. Such an assessment requires the state to examine 
the inner workings of familial relations (such as the arrangement of child care, elder care, mental 
																																																						
146 See Chapter One, Section Two in this dissertation for a more thorough discussion of the qualitative 
aspects of familial relations. 
147 See Chapter Three, Section Two in this dissertation for a thorough discussion of the relationship between 
dependency and needs. 
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health counseling, and so on) and act to confer more robust and comprehensive benefits where 
necessary. Hence, the governing body of the state makes a judgment about how satisfactorily 
families are getting by, which involves determining what criteria are acceptable for the structure 
of familial relations and, consequently, what primary purpose the family ought to serve for its 
members.148 This judgment warrants stronger state support for families through the increase of 
social benefits, such as the provision of child care services, elder care services, universal 
healthcare, counseling services for those with mental illness and for those in stressful relationships, 
and various social insurance programs that help families provide primary care for their members. 
Increasing the social benefits that families receive does not increase the amount that the state 
intervenes within the family, nor does it break down the boundaries that protect the intimacy of 
familial relations.  
That being said, the state must also assess whether or not individual families are using 
those social benefits to benefit each family member. To do so, we might imagine an assessment 
model that combines the more effective procedures that currently exist (in the United States, for 
example) with some additional measures that are justified by the enhanced benefits the social 
family account requires.149 For instance, regular assessment of the overall physical and mental 
health of family members – perhaps required annual or semiannual physician exams – may reveal 
early signs of abusive or neglectful behaviors within a family. These exams may be required of all 
persons in families (children and adults), potentially as a condition for continual family healthcare 
coverage.150  
																																																						
148 I will discuss the differences between the purpose of the family for the traditionalist, liberal, and 
abolitionist views in detail in subsequent sections on this chapter. 
149 I do not intend to specify a comprehensive assessment and intervention model in this dissertation. Rather, 
I aim to give an indication of what such a model might include. 
150 By this I do not mean to say that family members who fail to get their annual exam would lose coverage; 
rather, I have in mind family plans that are updated annually to take account of membership changes or 
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When necessary, early interventions that include individual or family counseling, 
rehabilitative therapies, or required classes that offer information and best practices may serve to 
prevent any additional harmful behaviors in situations deemed dangerous or unstable. These 
interventions may focus on improving physical relations between family members (curtailing 
aggression, informing family members about the importance of consent for intimate relations, 
discussing appropriate disciplinary methods, and so on) and emotional relations between family 
members (curtailing oppressive or domineering behavior, discussing the significance of mutual 
respect and the importance of education for all family members, and so on) while encouraging and 
instructing family members to behave in a wide variety of caring ways. In particularly severe 
situations – if early interventions have failed or a situation is initially diagnosed as egregiously 
harmful to family members – then the state ought to be responsible for temporarily (or 
permanently, if the situation warrants it) separating family members from their abusers, potentially 
pursuing criminal charges against abusers, and implementing a variety of post-intervention 
programs that aim at restoring caring relations among remaining family members. If the 
interventionist policies of the social family account were adopted, relations between family 
members would more closely resemble ideal relations between non-family members, preserving 
the state’s ability to justly regulate the relations between the state and its members, and upholding 
the state’s moral responsibility to provide for the primary needs of its citizens. 
An assessment of the inner workings of the family, a corresponding increase in social 
benefits, and a more restorative interventionist policy does not eliminate the boundary between the 
family and the state and infringe upon familial privacy. Instead, as argued above, it merely shifts 
																																																						
health changes within the group. Relatedly, consistent tracking of health conditions across the population 
may help to adjust the skewed relationship between research funds acquired to treat specific illnesses and 
the rates with which those illnesses occur (cf. Belluz 2014).  
KANE - DISSERTATION 
	
141	
the boundary between the family and the state by applying a criterion based in the significance of 
intimate caring relations. Although the state must assess whether or not individual families are 
using social benefits to benefit each family member, the state does not infringe upon a family’s 
intimate decision-making processes regarding how primary caring activities will be performed, 
how arrangements for child care and elder care will be made, or how a family will add new 
members (perhaps through biological reproduction, adoption, or fostering) or embrace those who 
wish to join a family (perhaps those who wish to become partners, surrogates, or cohabitators). So, 
the boundaries drawn between the family and the state still preserve the intimacy that makes 
familial relations unique, yet they are shifted enough to recognize the significant role that the state 
plays in determining the capability of the family to adequately care for its members.  
Further, these shifted boundaries will influence the relationships between the state and 
various other institutions, such as the adoption of policies that regulate a livable minimum wage 
for all public and private employees, an increase in social esteem and economic value for care 
work vocations, increased ownership and benefits for employees in large companies, and so 
forth.151 The recognition of the family’s unique primary purpose influences how the state draws 
the boundaries around the family, which in turn influences how markets and other institutions 
relate to both the family and the state and the improved function of each. The symbiotic 
																																																						
151 Here I have in mind Virginia Held’s argument for alternative valuations of vocations and Carol Gould’s 
argument for democratic management of the workplace. Held argues that we can and should recognize 
many values, of things and activities, other than their market value, and we can demand that people be paid 
something that more nearly reflects the other-than-market value of their work (Held 2006, 109). This means 
recognizing the intrinsic, and not merely instrumental, value of an activity. For care work, this means 
recognizing that care leaves people knowing that they are valued, which leads to social connectedness, well-
being, and social cohesion (Held 2006, 109). Gould proposes an account of democratic management of the 
workplace that includes workers and management sharing particular decisions about work allocations and 
methods, the conditions of work (including environment and facilities), and corporate policy, as well as the 
acknowledgement that external stakeholders (those affected by corporate decisions) have valuable input 
and a right to communicate their interests (Gould 2004, 231-33).  
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relationship between the family and the state is manifest through the practice of relational thinking, 
and the benefits for both the family and the state are enriched by the adoption of a system, such as 
the social family, that has relational thinking as its foundation.  
Still, one might object that the shifted boundaries of the social family account do not allow 
for much freedom for determining familial structure or allow too many instances for intervention. 
While the social family is subject to direct state intervention in cases where adequate primary care 
is not being provided, the policy of state intervention is no more extreme or invasive than the 
intervention policy set forth by protective interventionists. The governing body of the state is still 
making a judgment about which kinds of familial arrangements are permissible and which ones 
are not. The shifted boundaries between the family and the state certainly inform this judgment, 
but a judgment about permissible family structures is equally present on both accounts – the 
difference between judgments within the social family account and the protective interventionist 
account lies in the criteria used to make such assessments.  
The criterion that the social family account uses has its foundation in relational thinking, 
but it is also a response to the shortcomings of other theories built upon protective interventionist 
principles that fail to protect the individual members of families from domination, oppression, 
abuse, and neglect. Sigal Ben-Porath, in arguing for her account of structured paternalism, 
employs a similar rationale: individuals may make choices that others would regard as weak and 
destructive, and these problematic choices may carry over into their intimate lives and affect others 
(Ben-Porath 2010, 53).152 Rather than adopt a more liberal policy that views such choices (and 
their problematic repercussions) as private matters not warranting intervention, Ben-Porath claims 
																																																						
152 Structured paternalism organizes choice sets and access to opportunities through the creation of policies 
that enable (and rarely coerce) individuals to express their diverse preferences within these created 
structures (Ben-Porath 2010, 40).  
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that the state has an obligation to provide means for individuals to minimize, or at best prevent, 
destructive choices when the effects of such choices significantly harm a person’s own well-being, 
or when they undermine the civic equality of those with whom the individual is intimately 
connected (Ben-Porath 2010, 54). If the state were to not act in such cases, Ben-Porath argues that 
the inaction would hinder the project of justly regulating the relations between the state and its 
members. So, the state should extend and structure the scope of acceptable intimate choices while 
minimizing the acceptability of destructive intimate choices (Ben-Porath 2010, 58). Ben-Porath 
proposes that structured paternalist policies can be put in place to: 
“…address intimate matters preventatively, rather than responding to them mostly when a 
breach of law occurs, this possibly obviating criminal intervention. They allow individuals to 
manifest various forms of self-regulation, but they do not abandon them in potentially 
destructive situations, such as unplanned pregnancy or abusive spousal relations” (Ben-Porath 
2010, 59). 
She continues: 
“In order to prevent destructive choices in the intimate sphere, unacceptable intimate choices 
need to be identified. Beyond them, a vast diversity of intimate preferences has to be accepted, 
allowing for as rich an intimate life as possible to be expressed without social intervention” 
(Ben-Porath 2010, 60).  
Applying this thinking to the social family account means that the state ought to promote 
and encourage a wide-range of permissible familial structures and arrangements that will lead to 
adequate caring relations between members while minimizing the acceptability of neglectful, 
harmful, or abusive structures and arrangements through programs and practices that communicate 
what these problematic behaviors are. This may indeed preserve a wide variety of choices for 
families while also reducing the kinds of harmful choices that may hinder the caring relations 
between family members. As mentioned above, early interventions that include individual or 
family counseling, rehabilitative therapies, or required classes that offer information and best 
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practices may serve to prevent additional harmful behaviors while promoting and encouraging a 
wide range of acceptable or permissible behaviors, such as safe disciplinary methods and the 
importance of consent and mutual respect in interactions between family members.  
Additionally, the criteria for interventions in the social family account also extend to state 
relations with the market: the state ought to promote and encourage a wide-range of permissible 
market practices that will lead to adequate care for all citizens while minimizing the acceptability 
of neglectful, harmful, or abusive economic structures and practices.153 The state may be warranted 
to impose regulations on market practices, such as setting a livable minimum wage, requiring 
businesses to pay mandatory over-time, and to require adequate paid family leave time for 
employees, in addition to creating public alternatives to private childcare centers, eldercare centers, 
and medical clinics. Such steps work to promote and encourage market practices that benefit 
citizens, families, and the state by contributing to the improvement of caring relations between 
citizens and between family members.  
A state that enables the relations within families to be more caring by creating conditions 
for caring relations to thrive also helps families to positively shape the state. Families that have 
strong foundations of caring relations will produce persons/citizens who are themselves more 
caring, potentially perpetuating the value of care beyond their most immediate family members 
into communities and institutions, and into regional and global policy.154 The social family account 
embodies relational thinking and recognizes the positive changes that can occur when families, 
states, and institutions work together to improve their relations. Policies set to promote and 
																																																						
153 Although I do not specify exactly what kind of state I have in mind in this dissertation, I am strongly 
inclined to believe that the best kind of state for the social family account is one that is organized 
democratically. 
154 Nel Noddings argues that people who are directly responsible for the care of others (so long as they 
themselves have been adequately cared for) will likely develop a moral orientation that is described as an 
ethic of care (Noddings 2002, 28).  
KANE - DISSERTATION 
	
145	
encourage caring relations between family members, between families and institutions, and 
between families and the state better address the needs of families, the needs of citizens, and the 
needs of the state than other theories that are more closely aligned with the traditional, liberal, or 
abolitionist approaches to the family-state relationship. Before turning to an analysis of these 
accounts to assess their shortcomings, I must make one more point about the significance of 
preserving a wide variety of choice for permissible familial structures and arrangements.  
 
2. History, Heteronormativity, and the Modern Family 
Preserving a wide variety of choices for permissible familial structures and arrangements 
is crucial for the social family account because it demonstrates that the relational approach taken 
is not detrimental to the privacy and autonomy of familial relations. The social family account 
provides opportunities for persons to advance their conception of the good for themselves and for 
those with whom they share intimate familial relations by granting family members the freedom 
and privacy to make intimate decisions regarding how primary caring activities will be performed, 
how the family will add new members, and how they will embrace those who wish to join a family. 
The significance of this freedom (and a particularly unique aspect of the social family) is made 
truly apparent by the social family account’s refusal to promote one particular kind of familial 
structure over others, or to claim that caring relations may only successfully arise between certain 
kinds of persons. This means that the social family account is more inclusive of the diverse kinds 
of familial arrangements that 1) have not always been thought of as families, 2) have had to fight 
for social and legal acceptance before being considered families, and 3) are still not considered 
families by other theories and states.155 Without delving too much into the history of the family, a 
																																																						
155 In particular, I am referring the United States of America and the historically slow acceptance of 
interracial marriage, gay marriage, and other familial arrangements. 
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brief recounting of some of the more representative periods of the American family will be helpful 
to demonstrate not just how the social family account improves upon these historical conceptions 
of the family, but also to reveal how particular theoretical views have influenced these transitional 
periods. These theoretical views will themselves be critiqued in subsequent sections.  
Judith Stacey offers a compelling analysis of the defining periods that the American family 
has transitioned through over the past three hundred years.156 Starting with the “pre-modern 
family”, Stacey argues that this type of familial arrangement had an integrated economic, social, 
and political unit and was the constitutive element of American Colonial society (Stacey 2014, 
17). The premodern family had three particular characteristics: 1) individual interests were 
subordinate to the interests of the family; 2) boundaries between the family and the 
community/state were permeable, granting communities the power to regulate proper family 
conduct; and 3) women and children were subject to the authority of the household’s patriarchal 
head (children in particular were often exchanged to serve as apprentices and servants for other 
families) (cf. Stacey 2014, 18).157 Although this period would intuitively lend itself to be called a 
“traditional” account of the family, the traditionalist approach as I will define it here instead refers 
most accurately to what Stacey calls the “modern” period of familial relationships.158 The liberal 
approach, which to an extent will be derived from liberal social and political philosophy, finds its 
																																																						
156 For a more thorough analysis of the different stages discussed by Stacy, she points readers to the 
following sources: Mintz, Steven, and Susan Kellogg. (1988). Domestic Revolutions: A Social History of 
American Family Life. New York: Free Press; Evans, Sara M. (1989). Born for Liberty: A History of Women 
in America. New York: Free Press; Zinn, Maxine B, and D S. Eitzen. (1987). Diversity in American 
Families. New York: Harper & Row; Coontz, Stephanie. (1988). The Social Origins of Private Life: A 
History of American Families, 1600-1900. London: Verso; Mills, C. Wright. (1959). The Sociological 
Imagination. New York: Grove Press. 
157 The exchanging of children as apprentices and servants for other families was a tradition that carried 
over from the Medieval period, as noted by Philippe Ariès (cf. Ariès 1962, 193). 
158 As with the premodern family, the modern family typically covers white American familial arrangements 
because racism, oppression, and segregation prevented any other group from making such a popular cultural 
impression.  
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home within the modern period as well, although there are significant departures in the liberal 
approach that eschew several key elements of the traditionalist approach. Of the modern American 
family, Stacey writes that four radical innovations separate it from premodern family life: 
1) Family work and productive work became separated, rendering women’s work invisible 
as they and their children became economically dependent on the earnings of men. 2) Love 
and companionship became the ideal purposes of marriages that were to be freely 
contracted by individuals. 3) A doctrine of privacy emerged that attempted to withdraw 
middle-class family relationships from public scrutiny. 4) Women devoted increased 
attention to nurturing fewer and fewer children as mothering came to be exalted as both a 
natural and demanding vocation (Stacey 2014, 18).  
 
Stacey argues that the rise of the modern American family accompanied the rise of industrial 
capitalist society because of the way it reorganized social, spatial, and temporal elements of work 
and domestic life (for instance, segregating the sexes by extracting men from the home and 
consigning women there) (Stacey 2014, 18).159 Although the peak of the modern family period did 
not occur until after World War II, the theoretical underpinnings that defined the period – a strict 
adherence to a gendered split between the public and private realms, an emphasis on familial 
privacy, and the naturalness of reproductive labor – were present in the philosophical writings of 
Aristotle and Robert Filmer, among others, who I take to be some of the central architects of the 
traditionalist approach. The liberal approach relies heavily on many of these tenets as well, 
although an emphasis on love and contractual marriage (favored by Locke and Mill, especially) 
granted women more rights outside of the family and created a distinct approach to regulating 
some aspects of family life that was absent in the traditional approach. In this respect, the liberal 
																																																						
159 This line of reasoning follows Carole Pateman’s argument that the social contract, which concerns the 
origins of the civil sphere and capitalist relations, relies upon the adherence to sexual difference in the home 
and the patriarchal division of labor that enables men to sell their labor outside of the home (Pateman 1988, 
135). 
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approach can be thought of as motivating the philosophical foundation for the later stages of the 
modern family period.160  
 The modern family period, perhaps the most culturally well-defined period in American 
family identity, ultimately did not last. Stacey argues that the undoing of the modern family 
structure was tied to its embrace of the liberal ideologies of individualism, democracy, and 
conjugal love (Stacey 2014, 19).161 Women and men began to remake American family life in the 
face of post-industrialism, newly-won women’s rights, and an embrace of diversity that challenged 
familial structures based solely upon marital love and childrearing. Stacey calls the result of these 
diverse efforts the “postmodern” family, and claims that it is not a new model of family life, but 
the breakdown of the norms of the modern family in a logical progression of stages (Stacey 2014, 
25). The postmodern family retains little of the rigid structure of the modern family and heralds 
itself on diversity by including single-parent households, domestic partnerships, and childless 
couplings among the remnants of modern families. Some have claimed that the changes 
implemented during the postmodern period have begun to dismantle the family and will ultimately 
																																																						
160 Analyzing these relatively recent periods of the family might be seen by some as omitting significant 
stages of family life that occurred prior to the 18th Century. Philippe Ariès, preceding Stacey, argues that 
the (to use Stacey’s terminology) “premodern” period of familial arrangements began roughly around the 
16th Century with the improvement of hygienic practices and, consequently, the newfound perspective to 
view children as unique individuals (Ariès 1962, 401). Prior to this time, high rates of infant and child 
mortality, open homes that included servants, guests, and travelers, and conditions of poverty prevented 
any substantial identity of the family (cf. Ariès 1962, 365-400). Because of these factors, the intimacy, 
privacy, and microcosmic ‘way of life’ characteristics that have come to define how we view families as 
valuable, unique entities did not occur until late in the premodern period. This devaluation of the family 
extended beyond day-to-day living: prior to the 16th Century, Ariès argues that the family did not inspire 
paintings, poetry, or philosophy (cf. Ariès 1962, 364).  
161 Stacey argues that the early feminist movement provided ideological support for divorce and for the 
soaring rates of female-headed households after the 1950’s. She notes that the majority of benefits won at 
this time went to privileged women (Stacey 2014, 22). 
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lead to its complete demise, while other have embraced the changes as moving in the right direction 
for the conception of familial relations (Stacey 2014, 16).162  
Those who argue for the de-establishment of marriage and the related norms of 
heterosexuality and childrearing often espouse elements of what I call the abolitionist view, which 
underpins many of the critiques against the modern family. The abolitionist view has cropped up 
in several forms as a response to the structural problems inherent in the modern family: the 
gendered division of labor, the reliance on monogamous marriage to define legitimate 
relationships, the hierarchical structure of the family, and so on. The postmodern family movement 
to embrace diversity and, in some cases, to reduce the significance of “familial” relations has 
influenced some to defend the significance of marriage and childrearing, while still embracing 
certain forms of diversity for familial arrangements, by calling attention to the social and economic 
benefits that marriage grants spouses, and the social and emotional benefits that may come with 
childrearing. However, despite the transitions – both structural and theoretical – that the family 
has undergone and continues to undergo, two features have remained fairly constant fixtures of 
how the family is paradigmatically defined, even in postmodern times: monogamous marriage and 
intergenerational procreation. To return to a previous example, the American legal definition of 
the family still maintains that families are defined through relations to a household head via birth, 
marriage, or adoption.163 This definition places significant emphasis on the procreative aspect of 
																																																						
162 “Profamily” movements have railed against domestic partnerships (hetero- or homosexual), childless 
women, and other non-modern arrangements as destroying the sanctity of the family. Stacey, in contrast, 
ultimately argues that we ought to hasten the demise of the family in favor of a rich variety of kinship 
stories that allow such diversity (Stacey 2014, 27). This places Stacey in the abolitionist camp, which I will 
discuss shortly. 
163 The U.S. Census Bureau defines the family as at least 2 or more persons who live together and are related 
either by birth, marriage, or adoption. A family or “family household” is defined by the United States 
Census Bureau for statistical purposes as "a householder and one or more other people related to the 
householder by birth, marriage, or adoption.” 
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familial relations while also privileging (primarily heteronormative) marriage, or what Elizabeth 
Brake calls amatonormative relationships, over other kinds of relations (see footnote six above, 
and cf. Brake 2012).164 The recent Obergefell v. Hodges decision (Supreme Court decision 576 
U.S. 14-556 (2015)) has broadened the criteria for who can be legally married to include same-sex 
couples, yet the decision permits same-sex couples to form the kind of familial structure that still 
privileges monogamous marriage, continuing the view that monogamous marriage serves as the 
primary mode for creating a family (followed by biological procreation and adoption).  
 Correspondingly, several philosophers have also recently upheld these paradigmatic 
criteria for the creation and identity of the family despite a defense of same-sex marriage. For 
instance, Stephen Macedo argues that we ought to preserve marriage and extend it to same-sex 
couples, yet he also contends that justice does not require extending marriage to groups of three or 
more, nor does it require adopting a privatized contractual model of relationships that would 
subvert marriage as an institution (Macedo 2015, 8). He argues that monogamy helps to advance 
the core values of liberal democracy, such as equal liberty and fairness among citizens, by 
surrounding the institution of marriage with expectations and norms that can help stabilize and 
support a marriage commitment (Macedo 2015, 14). Although he recognizes that the law ought to 
do more to recognize and support a variety of forms of non-marital caring and non-marital 
caregiving relationships, he offers little in the way of how to provide such caregiving relationships 
with the same social significance and benefits as marriage. 
In a similar vein, Mary Lyndon Shanley proposes an “equal status view” of marriage that 
ought to serve as the genesis of the family (Shanley 2004, 6).165 She argues that marriage ought to 
																																																						
164 Amatonormativity is the focus on marital and amorous love relationships as a special site of value, as 
opposed to other kinds of caring relationships like friendships (cf. Brake 2012, 4).  
165 Martha Fineman argues that Shanley adheres to the assumption that the genesis of families is dependent 
upon the sexual affiliation of two adults (Fineman 2004, 50). 
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be viewed as a special bond deserving of a public status, yet she eschews the traditional aspects of 
marriage relations that have ordered marriage hierarchically, instead proposing that marriage 
requires the equal status of consenting partners (especially opposite-sex partners). Like Macedo, 
Shanley also rejects the contractual model of relationships, arguing that contracts obscure the fact 
that the public has a legitimate interest in marriage and promoting the dual-statuses of 
husband/citizen and wife/citizen (Shanley 2004, 16).166 For Shanley, marriage as a status suggests, 
where a contractual model does not, that the role of committed relationships is most important in 
shaping the self in this dual sense: through the promise to love someone else, in a very particular 
and public way, a person is bound to act in ways that will fulfill that obligation (Shanley 2004, 
27). Shanley, in upholding the significance of monogamous, primarily heterosexual, marriage, 
leaves little room for other caregiving relationships that do not structure themselves around 
amatonormative relations.  
Other philosophers have focused less upon the marriage aspect of familial relations and 
have instead tied the identity of the family to procreation and child-rearing practices. For instance, 
David Archard defines the family as, “a multigenerational group, normally stably co-habiting, 
whose adults take primary custodial responsibility for the dependent children” (Archard 2010, 26). 
This functional definition emphasizes the defining role of the family as the custodial care of 
dependent children and allows for an appraisal of how well (or poorly) families are fulfilling this 
purpose, especially as it relates to preparing children to become citizens (Archard 2010, 62-64). 
Similarly, Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift claim that the identity of the family is tied to a 
particular way of raising children: one in which children have parents, the relationship between 
																																																						
166 Advocates of the contractual model, such as Martha Fineman, argue that abolishing marriage as a legal 
category is a necessary step in the fight for gender equality because it replaces the gendered stereotypes and 
protective intervention model of traditional accounts with the recognition of equal agency for contracting 
partners (Shanley 2004, 19).  
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parents and children is intimate-yet-authoritative, and the relationship produces familial 
relationship goods (Brighouse and Swift 2014, 50). Familial relationship goods are a set of goods 
that make the parent-child relationship itself beneficial for parents, children, and the state; because 
of this, they are not easily achievable outside of parent-child relationships, so the state has an 
interest in promoting parent-child relationships (Brighouse and Swift 2014, 57). For instance, a 
parent sharing their values with their child counts as a familial relationship good because it fosters 
loving, intimate relations between parents and their children and contributes to the development 
of the child and the flourishing relationship between the parent and the child (cf. Brighouse and 
Swift, Chapter 6). Although they argue that familial relationship goods may be successfully 
produced between parents and either biological children or adoptive children, and that families 
may have a single-parent or multiple parents with no specified gender, the account that Brighouse 
and Swift propose does little to challenge the notion that procreation and child-rearing are essential 
features of families.  
All of these recent definitions of the family promote either monogamous marital relations 
or procreative practices as paradigmatic conditions for the genesis and identity of the family. 
Further, although they all account for the state’s interest in maintaining more positive and inclusive 
familial relationships, all of the proposed definitions see the purpose of the family as involving 
some greater contribution to the state in the form of enhanced citizenship, the development of 
future citizens, or the preservation of an institution that benefits the state above more diverse 
arrangements that might better serve individuals. Without going the route of the abolitionist, one 
can still see the problem with keeping the definition of the family so heavily bound up with notions 
of marriage and reproduction: a narrow set of permissible familial arrangements are being 
privileged over and above other types of arrangements that may be equally as good (if not better) 
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at realizing the primary purpose of the family. Macedo recognizes this, claiming that, 
“…monogamous marriage imposes a certain ordering on the most intimate aspects of almost 
everyone’s personal life. … It creates certain kinds of families and rules out other forms of family 
life that have prevailed across most human societies in the past and much of the world today” 
(Macedo 2015, 11).  
The social family account does not restrict familial arrangements so narrowly, yet it also 
does not call for abolishing marriage or diminishing the importance of intimate familial 
relationships. Rather, the social family account aims to include as many types of familial 
arrangements as possible – just so long as they adhere to the purpose of the social family: providing 
reciprocal, adequate primary care for all family members. This means that the social family 
account is open to families that have children and those that do not, to those who are biologically 
related and those who are not, to partners or spouses of the same or opposite sex, to partners who 
choose to have more expansive amorous relationships, to persons who wish to have no amorous 
interactions with one another, to caregivers and care receivers engaged in caring relations over the 
long term, and so on.167 The social family is not interested in promoting one kind of arrangement 
over others so long as all arrangements are capable of creating conditions for family members to 
cooperatively work toward the mutual well being of each member through the provision of primary 
care. Thus, the social family account preserves a wide variety of choices for permissible familial 
structures and arrangements.  
Some may argue that including such a range of arrangements may potentially allow for 
harmful situations to arise between existing family members or persons looking to form families 
																																																						
167 The social family account is also open to those who live together and to those who do not, but a condition 
of engaging in intimate caring relations with family members requires that they live within a reasonable 
proximity to one another to carry out such caring behaviors effectively. 
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around potentially harmful doctrines. For instance, the United States prohibits both polygamy and 
incestuous relationships from receiving any legal protections or social benefits (in fact, these 
relationships are sometimes prosecuted for their illegality). The theories outlined above do not 
condone expanding marriage to polygamists or biologically related sibling-pairs or parent-child 
pairs either. These kinds of arrangements have the potential to be very harmful to those who 
participate in them, even if they are comprised of fully consenting participants. And although the 
social family account aims to be inclusive of as many types of familial arrangements as possible, 
it ultimately does not hold these particular arrangements to be permissible for two reasons.  
First, the social family account does not promote any familial arrangement over others – in 
theory, this could include arrangements based upon polygamy and incest. While these 
arrangements may be theoretically permissible, just as monogamous heterosexual marriage may 
be theoretically permissible, the social family account needn’t promote any particular arrangement 
as being desirable, nor make any claims at all about the desirability of one particular arrangement 
or another.  
Second, what the social family account does make claims about is the desirability of having 
families arranged around the primary purpose of reciprocally providing adequate primary care for 
all family members. When such claims are made, it becomes evident that many instances of 
polygamy, and not a single instance of incest, will be permissible under the social family account. 
For instance, Stephen Macedo argues that polygamy as a social form is inherently prone to a 
variety of abuses and tends to produce general social harms (Macedo 2015, 187). Aside from the 
fact that polygamy, as practiced in the United States, problematically produces a gendered 
hierarchy by reducing the status of women, children in polygamist arrangements are more likely 
to confront higher levels of jealously and rivalry, emotional stress, tension and violence than their 
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peers in monogamous arrangements (Macedo 2015, 171). This is because the children of different 
wives, like the wives themselves, are treated unequally and often have to compete more fiercely 
for family resources. As a result, they tend to suffer from more emotional stress and have 
significantly higher rates of behavioral and physical problems. Polygamy also tends to reduce to 
average parental investment per child, and grants the husband the ability to use much needed 
resources to procure more wives instead of using those resources to care for those already involved 
in the relationship (Macedo 2015, 172). While it is not necessarily the case that these outcomes 
will materialize, polygamist arrangements are much more precarious for their members and would 
more often than not be considered inappropriate familial arrangements by the social family 
account.  
More starkly, incestuous relationships also produce a variety of harms for participants, 
many of them egregiously so. Macedo notes that an obvious harm of incest is that the distinctive 
goods of family life – love, trust, care, and mutual support – depend upon strong norms that 
prohibit sexual relations among immediate family members (Macedo 2015, 195). Macedo 
continues,  
For siblings or parents and children to consider each other as eligible sexual partners 
prospectively is inherently corrupting of norms that sustain healthy and valuable family 
relations … If we were to announce permission for adult siblings, or parents and their adult 
children, past a certain age to have sexual relations, this would reshape the way that siblings 
and parents and children regard one another generally, including from the time children are 
very young (Macedo 2015, 195).  
 
The detrimental outcomes associated with incestuous relationships would detract from the primary 
purpose of the family and negate the effectiveness of caring activities in the face of corrupting 
forces. The social family account recognizes that these types of arrangements are not beneficial to 
family members and would therefore not permit such relations because of how they negatively 
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impact caring relations. Although the social family account does not promote one kind of 
arrangement over other, nor claim that caring relations may only develop between certain persons 
in particular situations, the account still uses a set of criteria that promote caring relations as 
defining the primary purpose of the family and hence, as defining the family. In the case of incest, 
siblings and parents and children threaten those caring relations and, hence, threaten their ability 
to remain a family by introducing amorous relations between themselves. This is especially the 
case because the role of consent is often absent or coerced in such relations, which means there is 
a lack of mutual respect among family members and a hindrance on certain family members’ 
ability to flourish.  
 
*  *  * 
Now that I have answered the general objections to certain elements of the social family, 
especially those involving the practices that will govern family-state relationship, we are in a good 
position to turn to the alternative views of the family and the family-state relationship that I have 
briefly outlined up to this point. With the larger framework of the social family account in mind, I 
will examine the traditionalist view, the liberal view, and the abolitionist view and compare each 
of them to the social family account. I will argue that my own account more adequately defines 
the primary purpose of the family and discerns what makes families so significant both for persons 
and for the state. Ultimately, I will conclude that the social family account better addresses the 
needs of families and the state. 
For the sake of brevity, I have chosen to include only the most representative individual 
accounts that I will associate with each view I present here. That being said, the guiding principles 
of each view will be presented as thoroughly as possible to demonstrate how they differ from the 
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social family. It is also important to remind readers that I will continue to use Judith Stacey’s 
terminology to identify the different periods of time that these views have culturally aligned with 
in the United States. By doing so, I hope to provide a clearer picture as to what kinds of familial 
arrangements each view best represents.  
 
3. The Traditionalist View 
The traditionalist view of the family has spanned many centuries, manifesting itself in 
stages from the end of the Medieval family period through the modern family period.168 Although 
there are some variations between these stages as the family transitioned from a premodern to a 
modern model, there are several key elements that have remained staples of the traditionalist view. 
The first is a strong adherence to a hierarchical model of familial relations that privileges the male 
head-of-household. The second is a strict separation of productive and reproductive labor with a 
particular emphasis on the “naturalness” of reproductive labor. Third, the consignment of 
productive and reproductive roles based upon gender enforces the hierarchical nature of family 
relations and supports the persistent separation of these kinds of labor. Together these three tenets 
influenced the structure of familial relations in ways that denied political identities to women and 
children, enabled oppressive and abusive familial relations to thrive, and depreciated the practice 
of care as a necessary human good.169  
																																																						
168 As the family moved away from Medieval conceptions, it began to take shape as a particular entity with 
its own defining characteristics and ways. Prior to this time the family was not considered to be valuable in 
its own right (cf. Ariès 1962, 364-400). 
169 Phillipe Ariès notes that after the Medieval period, the wife’s position in the household slowly 
deteriorated. By the 16th century, the wife’s position had deteriorated so much that she could no longer 
perform any acts without the authority of her husband. Any acts performed without this permission would 
be null and void under the law. (Ariès 1962, 356). 
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Early instantiations of the traditionalist family did not maintain a strict separation between 
the public life of politics and the private life of the family. While the patriarchal doctrine was 
indeed the guiding doctrine for familial relations after the Medieval period, it was also used to 
justify the power of the King over his subjects, creating a social and political system where power, 
authority, and obedience are fused together under a Godly grant of dominion that stems from the 
first patriarch, Adam (Elshtain 2014, 33). For instance, Robert Filmer claimed that gendered, 
hierarchical rule within the family is natural; there is a “Natural Right of a Supreme Father over 
every Multitude” (Filmer 1680, 12). The father has power and right of Sovereign Authority over 
his children and wife, by which he rules over them according to no law other than by his own will 
(Filmer 1680, 12, 29).170 Filmer further claimed that this natural right of the father over the family 
extends first to the natural authority of the father over his entire kinship network (including 
subsequent generations), and then to the natural authority of the King over his subjects (Filmer, 
1680, 13). The King is the father over many families – inferior (house-hold) fathers included – and 
is tasked with preserving, feeding, clothing, and defending a commonwealth as a father would do 
the same for his own children (Filmer 1680, 13). So, for Filmer, the family-state relationship is 
one of a continual reaffirmation of power to both fathers in their homes and to the father on the 
throne by promoting patriarchalism as the guiding doctrine for the family and the state.  
Although Filmer’s Patriarcha had a substantial influence on the structure of intrafamilial 
relations, many subsequent philosophers within the traditionalist view supported a withdrawal of 
the family into privacy – a move that adhered more closely to the Aristotelean approach to the 
family-state relationship, which promoted a more definitive separation between the family and the 
economy on one side, and the state on the other, as unique realms with their own guiding doctrines 
																																																						
170 Filmer also claims that the father is bound by the law of nature to do his best for the preservation of his 
family (Filmer 1680, 29). 
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and purposes. That being said, there are still significant points of overlap between Filmer’s and 
Aristotle’s views, making them both equally important foundations for the traditionalist view. For 
both philosophers, the family is an institution that serves an integral function for the state: for 
Aristotle, the reproduction and maintenance of citizens and the genesis of the state insofar as 
reproduction of bodies is a necessity; and for Filmer, as an ideological foundation for the natural 
authority of kings over their subjects as fathers are over their wives and children. Further, for both 
philosophers the structure of the family shields any intervention attempts against abuse, neglect, 
or domination by stipulating that a patriarchal system of rule is not only permissible but 
encouraged, and the rights of fathers give them the utmost protection against state interference 
(whereas wives and children do not possess any rights against the father). The difference in their 
views lies within the relationship between the family and the state, but also with respect to how 
the family ought to be regulated.  
 Aristotle’s explicit divide between public and private life – a divide that stipulates that the 
family remain a non-political entity within the composition of the state – was intended as a 
rejection of Plato’s “family state” that called for private households and families to be abolished 
in favor of complete social and political hegemony (cf. Plato 1992, 543a-b; Engster and Metz 
2014, 3; Gutmann 1987, 22-28). For Aristotle, the ideal state is divided into two distinct but 
complementary realms, the family and the state, and each realm is based on the type of associations 
that take place within it (Aristotle 1998, 1252b20). The realm of the state is the realm of political 
activity, the center of civic life, where issues of governance and moral development are central 
concerns. The family realm, by contrast, is the realm of necessity: the “natural” functions of 
reproduction and kinship are deemed a necessary part of populating the polis, but those activities 
are more “animalistic” in nature and hence of a lesser good than political activities (Aristotle 1998, 
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1252a27-30, Engster and Metz 2014, 4). Aristotle argues that the family, as a natural unit, naturally 
gives rise to small villages, and then ultimately the formation of the state (although Aristotle notes 
that the city-state is prior in nature to the family) (Aristotle 1998, 1252b16-30, 1253a20-25; 
Engster and Metz 2014, 4).171  
Another characteristic of the naturalness of families lies in the natural structure of familial 
dominance – the family is hierarchically organized with women, children, and slaves subordinate 
to the dominant male (Aristotle 1998, 1260a13).172 This natural ordering is thought to be ideal for 
the maintenance of material, physical, and emotional care to all family members (although the 
details of this care are not specified, other than that the care provided to those in families is better 
than the care provided in common) (Aristotle 1998, 1262a0-15). What is significant to note here 
is that Aristotle, through his discussion of the family-state relationship, has stipulated the tenets of 
the traditionalist account: an emphasis on the naturalness of reproductive labor and a consignment 
of productive and reproductive roles based upon gender that holds that women are more suited to 
reproductive tasks.173 
What’s more, Aristotle allows the state to impose a small yet significant set of regulations 
upon familial relations: the encouragement of coupling during a woman and man’s most fertile 
period of life, prescriptions for pregnant women on how to be as healthy as possible to ensure a 
healthy fetus, the abandonment of any disabled children, and prescriptions for the kinds of 
education parents can give to their children (Aristotle 1998, 1335a25-40, 1335b0-40; cf. Engster 
																																																						
171 However, despite its crucial part in the creation of the state, it is ultimately a less perfect association than 
the political association, for it aims at sustaining life only, rather that examining and promoting the good 
life for all human beings (Aristotle 1998, 1253a30-35; Engster and Metz, 4). 
172 Aristotle writes that women are naturally inferior to men because the deliberative part of their souls lacks 
authority over the other parts of the soul (Aristotle 1998, 1260a13).  
173 It can also be noted that Aristotle’s inclusion of economic activities in the private realm is distinct from 
the liberal theories I will discuss in the next section that maintain that economic activities are only 
appropriate for the public realm, outside of the home. 
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and Mets 2014, 5). The small (yet significant) number of family relations that are regulated by the 
state are not intended to improve those familial relations for members, nor are they regulated to 
protect members of the family from abuse, domination, or neglect. Rather, the regulations aimed 
at families are meant to address how Aristotle identifies the purpose of the family: the reproduction 
and sustenance of healthy (able)bodies, of which a select few will participate in public civic life. 
So for Aristotle, the family is a natural, patriarchal realm with an ultimate (external) purpose of 
producing ideal citizens for the state. 
Although Aristotle’s account has provided the foundation for the traditionalist view, it has 
also been used to build and defend certain aspects of the liberal view of the family, most notably, 
the notion that the family and the state are two distinct realms (with the family occupying the 
private realm), and the notion that the state has some power to intervene in familial affairs 
(although the doctrine of protective intervention is significantly less intrusive that Aristotle’s 
directives for familial relations).174 Because of this, contemporary philosophers within the 
traditionalist view have sought to reject the liberal elements of Aristotle’s account and continue to 
advance the notion of naturalism within the family while maintaining a strict family-state divide. 
These theorists typically hold that the family ought not to be defined or regulated by the state so 
as not to disturb the unique features of family life or alter the spontaneity of familial relations.  
For instance, Christina Hoff Sommers argues that philosophers must have respect for moral 
traditions as they relate to the family, for the customs and opinions of the community with respect 
to the family must be taken into account. Marriage and child-rearing within marriage are customs 
that have stood the test of time and must be respected by the state; these customs must not be 
altered by the state else the state will render them unrecognizable. She believes that the traditional 
																																																						
174 I will discuss the liberal view of the family in the subsequent section. 
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family is under attack from two sources: first, feminists who have critiqued traditional family 
relationships and roles, and second, liberal moral philosophers who accept a purely voluntaristic 
theory of moral obligation (cf. Sommers 1996, 42-49).175 Against this second point, she argues 
that family members have special obligations to one another in virtue of the fact that they are 
biologically related (mother to child, especially), and these obligations should inform other issues 
that affect families such as abortion, infanticide, and a child’s right to divorce their parents 
(Sommers 1996, 55-57). This response restricts the freedom of women to make meaningful choices 
about their own bodies, and promotes the traditionalist tenet of the naturalness of reproductive 
labor by excluding appeals to universal rights (such as the right to control one’s own body) from 
familial decision making. Her response to feminist challenges of the gendered division of labor 
within the family is to defend the characteristics of femininity as warranting a distinct place for 
women within the family to be the primary reproductive laborer (Sommers 1996, 50). These 
features of her account uphold the distinction between productive and reproductive labor and 
maintain the gendered identity of those who labor in each realm. 
Additionally, Sommers appeals to a more conservative approach of doing philosophy to 
defend what she sees as “radical” attacks on the family: 
…responsible moral philosophers are liberal or conservative but not radical. They respect 
human relationships and traditions and the social environment in which they live as much 
as they respect the natural environment and its ecology. They respect the family. … A 
moral philosophy that does not give proper weight to the customs and opinions of the 
community is presumptuous in its attitude and pernicious in its consequences (Sommers 
1996, 62).  
 
																																																						
175 Specifically, those in the liberal tradition more generally who ascribe to the “volunteer theory of 
obligation,” which claims that all moral obligations are voluntarily assumed (Sommers 1996, 43). 
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Despite her insistence that we identify the family by its naturalness and preserve the modern family 
by not politicizing it, Sommers’ final appeal here seems to place significant weight upon the state’s 
interest in promoting and defending a particular form of family life. By claiming that the opinions 
of the community must be given proper weight, Sommers seeks to prevent the state from changing 
the structure of familial arrangements to permit more postmodern and modern liberal 
characteristics, such as divorce, reproductive choice, and same-sex marriage. Instead, her 
argument appears to demand that the state use its political power to protect an idealized notion the 
family from those changes that actually reflect the opinions of the community.176 In this respect, 
Sommers’ account actually calls for state intervention into familial arrangements through the 
preservation of a particular, idealized notion of the family. So, her account does little to address 
what is good for families and family members by restricting the options for familial arrangements, 
even if those alternative options would make the family more just (for instance, to allow family 
members to escape from abusive and oppressive relationships, to enable more equitable child-
rearing arrangements, to increase respect for female autonomy, and so on). As such, her account 
upholds the tenets of the traditionalist view.177  
 A different approach to preserving a specific kind of moral foundation for the family comes 
from John Finnis, who argues that heterosexual, monogamous marriage is a morally transformative 
																																																						
176 As Sommers wrote this piece, the postmodern family movement was already well underway, with 
increasing instances of divorce, family planning, same-sex couplings, single-parent households, and the 
like.  
177 Similarly, Michael Sandel argues that bringing justice into the family will erode the natural “spontaneity” 
and affection between family members. For Sandel, the ideal family is one where generosity, not justice, is 
the driving force behind familial attachment and obligation, and this generosity renders individual rights 
within the family that the state would observe unnecessary (Sandel 1982, 33). He argues that the point of 
familial relations is not to focus on questions of ‘what I get and what I am due.’ Rather, generosity within 
the family will generate responsibility for family members to do their parts and avoid discordant situations. 
If discord arises within the family, Sandel argues that it is not the place for justice, or the procedures 
associated with producing justice, to enter the picture, as those procedures don’t do as good as job at 
restoring the situation to its moral conclusion (Sandel 1982, 33). 
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element of creating the right kind of conditions for familial relations. He claims that the marital 
union between two opposite-sex persons is a basic human good and produces conditions for marital 
acts (i.e. sexual intercourse) and their effects to fully resolve in communion (Finnis 1997, 32). 
Finnis further argues that “Natural Law” requires that sex must always aim at the marital good of 
procreation, and can only be ethical so long as it takes place within a marriage with procreation as 
a goal.178 A good marriage and, consequently, good familial relations, may only occur when the 
condition of marriage has been satisfied (Finnis 1997, 38). As such, Finnis’ account grants the 
institution of heterosexual, monogamous marriage the power to transform certain acts and relations 
into moral familial acts and moral familial relations.  
 Finnis’ account uses the premise of morally transformative marriage to highlight the 
naturalness of reproductive processes and the “moral correctness” of heterosexual, monogamous 
marital relations (that is, the experience of heterosexual, monogamous marital relations elucidates 
the good of procreation). In doing so, Finnis, like Sommers, promotes the hierarchical model of 
familial relations that problematize female sexuality, reproductive choice, and the diversity of 
familial arrangements that may better serve family members. While this approach may seem to 
privilege family life as something morally rich and transformative, it actually disadvantages many 
individuals within families, and excludes many others from becoming families because of how 
narrowly it stipulates the conditions for creating families.  
																																																						
178 John Finnis’s account of natural law involves notions of practical reason and basic goods. Practical 
reason is concerned with what is good for human nature (in the case mentioned above, procreation), and 
infers what is good for human nature through direct experiences (Haakonssen 2001, 1210). According to 
Knud Haakonssen, practical reason, “imposes a set of methodological requirements on itself, such as the 
necessity for a coherent plan of life, the avoidance of arbitrary preferences among values and among 
persons, etc., and it grasps the full variety of human goods … This combination of goods and 
methodological requirements … enables us to distinguish objectively between good and bad, just and 
unjust” (1210). 
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 Despite variations between the different stages of the traditionalist view, the philosophers 
who espouse the traditionalist view have all upheld hierarchical models of familial relations that 
privilege dominant males and subordinate women and children by stipulating that reproductive 
labor is naturally feminine and, likewise, that reproductive acts are naturally good and therefore 
warrant little intervention. This stance perpetuates inequality between the sexes and 
disenfranchises women and children, especially with respect to the lack of authority they have over 
their own bodies and over the structure of their relationships. Further, by claiming that 
reproductive labor is both feminine and in accordance with natural law, the traditionalist view 
diminishes the value of care by treating care as less theoretically significant than other productive 
activities.179  
Challenges to this view, from feminists and from those who argue for more varied familial 
arrangements, have been met with refutations that defend the gendered nature of reproductive labor 
and the significance of heterosexual relationships for familial relations, especially with respect to 
rearing children. As such, those who adhere to the traditionalist view see women’s rights as threats 
to marriage, child rearing, and the stability of familial relations. Additionally, the insistence upon 
heterosexual relationships and their connection to reproduction ignores and wrongly discourages 
the diverse kinds of familial arrangements that have become more commonplace with the 
postmodern family movement. Lastly, the refusal to treat reproductive labor as a significant part 
of life beyond the creation of future citizens depreciates the practice of care as a necessary human 
good. As I argued in Chapter Three, any social or political theory, especially ones that focuses on 
particular institutions such as the family, must take seriously the needs that persons have because 
all persons have needs. Likewise, care, and the caring activities that meet the needs of persons, 
																																																						
179 This way of thinking about reproductive labor also denies caring roles to men, precluding the possibility 
of genuine equality.  
KANE - DISSERTATION 
	
166	
must be taken equally seriously because all persons require care throughout their lives to meet 
their needs when they are unable to do so themselves. The traditionalist view of the family either 
ignores or undertheorizes the needs that all persons have and depreciates caring activities. Hence, 
the traditionalist view does not meet the needs of citizens and perpetuates harms that arise from 
hierarchical, gendered familial arrangements.  
 
4. The Liberal View 
Many of the problematic aspects of the traditionalist view of the family were recognized 
by liberal theorists who sought to improve the relations among family members by appealing to 
women’s rights, consent, and a model of the family-state relationship that granted the state the 
power of protective intervention into familial affairs. Like the traditionalist view, the liberal view 
of the family has also transitioned through several distinct stages, with each stage attempting to 
incorporate these theoretical solutions to different degrees. Liberal theorists, following Aristotle, 
upheld the notion that the family and the state were two distinct realms, yet they deviated from 
Aristotle by arguing that the family remain a completely private realm warranting little state 
intervention or regulation (the state would not be given the power to dictate procreative practices, 
nor determine what kind of nutritional regiment certain family members would follow, and so on). 
Although liberal theorists sought to protect family members in positions of vulnerability through 
the doctrine of protective intervention, I will demonstrate below that many liberal thinkers, 
especially Early Modern thinkers such as John Locke and John Stuart Mill, either stipulate a 
hierarchical model for familial arrangements or do little to challenge such arrangements, even 
when they are detrimental to women and children. Likewise, the liberal view mandates that 
conjugal relations be entered into only with the consent of both parties – effectively granting 
women the right to create and sign contracts, and giving them some authority over how their 
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particular marital arrangement will transpire – yet it either stipulates, or does little to challenge, a 
gendered division of labor within families that places the burden of reproductive labor upon the 
woman. Later liberal thinkers like John Rawls, David Archard, and Elizabeth Brake focus heavily 
on familial privacy or rigid contracts in a way that limits the ability to fully overcome gendered 
roles within the family or to develop an appropriate framework for covering all kinds of familial 
arrangements. As such, the liberal view, although a positive departure from the traditionalist view, 
retains several of the problematic aspects of traditionalist thought. This also extends to the limited 
kinds of familial arrangements that are deemed permissible on liberal accounts. 
The key elements that have remained constant for the liberal view thus include some 
elements of the traditional view as well as some responses to the problems created by the 
traditionalist view. First, as noted above, the liberal view divides the family and the state into 
different realms – the state into the public realm and the family into the private realm – and grants 
the family a significant amount of privacy over the intimate relations within. Second, the liberal 
view retains the division of labor between the family and the state, maintaining that the family is 
the center for reproductive labor. While different stages of the liberal view treat the question of 
whether or not reproductive labor is gendered (i.e. feminine) in disparate ways, they all uphold 
that it is the family’s responsibility to provide a majority of the care that a person requires. Third, 
the liberal view mandates consent for conjugal relations, ensuring that all persons who enter into 
familial relations are equals (for instance, the contractualist model in particular tries to replicate 
the consensual nature of political contract in the marriage contract) (cf. Elshtain 2014, 33).180 
Lastly, the boundary between the family and the state is drawn upon a political understanding of 
																																																						
180 Jean Bethke Elshtian notes that liberal contractarians were often cautious in carrying their political 
principles into domestic life; many opted to keep contractarian politics public while maintaining a 
traditional family, while others softened the patriarchal authoritative claims of males in the family and 
allowed more contractual relations within the family, such as John Stuart Mill (cf. Elshtain 2014, 33-34).  
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the way that the family as an institution fits into the realm of individual rights and liberties. This 
understanding supports the doctrine of protective intervention, yet does not take into consideration 
the qualitative characteristics of familial relations that are created and maintained by the way 
rights, powers, and responsibilities are assigned through different familial roles (Olsen 2014, 171). 
For instance, parents are given rights over their children that, when used negatively as a means of 
compelling the children to adopt the parent’s belief system (even if it is oppressive), may harm a 
child’s ability to develop an independent sense of self (or worse, feel ashamed about themselves 
or think of themselves as inferior). So, because the boundary is drawn to protect the liberty of 
adults (and even then, mainly male adults) as citizens, and not to ensure that familial relationships 
are healthy and non-oppressive, liberal accounts are typically plagued by scenarios where 
intervention and/or social assistance is needed but not warranted on the part of the state. 
For instance, John Locke, who famously rejected Filmer’s use of the patriarchal family to 
justify political patriarchy, argued that marriage and the state are both voluntary: one can only 
enter marriage through consent, just as one can only enter into political compact through consent 
(Locke 1946, Section 78). However, Locke is not consistent in his reasoning. He grants that women 
are in full and free possession of what is in their right by contract, including their life and their 
ability to leave a marriage (Locke 1946, Section 82).181 However, Lockean marriage retains a 
hierarchical structure similar to Filmer’s patriarchal family because the family, despite being a 
state institution, is also governed by natural law, which grounds this hierarchical structure in divine 
will.182 So, on matters of common interest or ownership, the woman must always defer to the man 
																																																						
181 Even still, as Carole Pateman notes, since women were (and still often are) mostly unable to earn as 
much as men, only professional and wealthier women are in the position to negotiate an intimate contract 
and survive a divorce without being adversely affected (Pateman 1988, 155).  
182 Locke’s understanding of natural law is derived from Hugo Grotius and the voluntarists, and holds that 
natural law is meant to limit our inclinations and behaviors so that they are in accordance with divine laws 
that must be obeyed for the benefit of all (for instance, restraining our self-love to be more cooperative) 
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and is subordinate to his will (Locke 1946, Section 82, Section 86; cf. Pateman, 1988, 53). This is 
because, as Mary Shanley argues, Locke defaults to defining the family in private “naturalistic” 
terms, stipulating that men are permitted to rule in the home because they are by nature “abler and 
stronger” than women and children (Shanley 1982, 94). Still, Locke does grant both men and 
women divorce and property rights, and contends that a magistrate may be called upon to settle 
disputes related to procreation and mutual support during the course of marriage (Locke 1946, 
Section 83; Shanley 1982, 94). He also insists that both parents have a duty to care for and educate 
their children (possessing a shared parental right to them), which places some of the burden of 
reproductive labor upon men (Locke 1946, Section 58). However, by placing the sole burden of 
care and procurement of education in the hands of parents – claiming that it is a parent’s duty for 
the good of the commonwealth – Locke makes the home the center for all reproductive tasks 
(Locke 1925, 8; cf. Guttmann 1987, 28).183 
While many of these features are improvements over traditionalist accounts, Locke still 
maintains problematic notions of the traditionalist account within his view. His separation of the 
family and the state, his emphasis on the gendered division of productive and reproductive labor, 
and his insistence that the family be governed by natural law (in that the hierarchical structure of 
the family complies with divine directive), enables him to deny certain rights to women while, at 
the same time, granting other rights to them. Lastly, his inclusion of a protective interventionist 
clause within conjugal relations is refreshing, but he leaves too much to be determined by the 
“abler and stronger” male with respect to important decisions and behaviors that fall within the 
																																																						
(Haakonssen 2001, 1209).  
183 Locke writes, “The well educating of their children is so much the duty and concern of parents, and the 
welfare and prosperity of the nation so much depends on it, that I would have everyone lay it seriously to 
heart; and after having well examined and distinguished what fancy, custom or reason advises in the case, 
set his helping hand to promote everywhere that way of training up the youth…” (Locke 1925, 3-4).  
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realm of common interests or ownership. Such deferment leaves women in a vulnerable position 
to be oppressed, dominated, or abused by a spouse inasmuch as they cannot appeal to an arbitrator 
to contest such harmful treatment. Thus, Locke’s view, while a move in the right direction, still 
maintains some elements of more traditionalist thought.  
In what seemingly strikes a more equitable tone, John Stuart Mill proposes that we view 
the family-state relationship as being more in sync with one another, claiming that the institutions 
of marriage and the family are not to be cast off into a private non-political realm. He argues that 
marriage and the family are intrinsically political institutions (insofar as they are arenas of power, 
rule, and authority) and crucial spaces for moral and political education (cf. Krouse 1982, 160, 324 
n.54).184 Recognizing that the current laws around marriage allow for the mistreatment of women 
in various forms, Mill argues that power within marriage and the family ought to be equitably 
distributed according to capacities and suitability; the law ought not declare one person the ruler 
over another (Mill 2009, 71).185 He does maintain that the family is distinct from the state, but only 
because of its hierarchical structure: the state must have a ruler, yet a voluntary association between 
two persons need not create one ruler and one subordinate; like other economic partnerships, it is 
not necessary for one family member to rule over others (Mill 2009, 70). Further, Mill claims that 
when the equality of married persons is ascribed by the law, the family will be a school of moral 
																																																						
184 In The Subjection of Women Mill writes, “…because men in general do not inflict, nor women suffer, 
all the misery which could be inflicted and suffered if the full power of tyranny with which the man is 
legally invested were acted on; the defenders of the existing form of [marriage] think that all its iniquity is 
justified, and that any complaint is merely quarrelling with the evil which is the price paid for every great 
good. …Not a word can be said for despotism in the family which cannot be said for political despotism. 
Every absolute king does not sit at his window to enjoy the groans of his tortured subjects, nor strips them 
of their last rag and turns them out to shiver in the road” (Mill 2009, 60). As a result of this observation, 
Mill calls for marriage law to be reformed to bring the marriage contract in line with other more equitable 
contracts (Pateman 1988, 162). 
185 Mill’s Statement on Marriage is a direct refusal to accept a subordinate place for women in marriage. 
Mill claims that his marriage to Harriet Taylor should not deprive her of any rights (Mill 1984, 99). 
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cultivation, for genuine moral sentiment can only be cultivated in a society between equals (Mill 
2009, 77).186 
Despite these substantial theoretical gestures toward the equality of women both inside and 
outside of the home, Mill’s strong assertions in favor of women’s autonomy are limited. He later 
argues that women, though they might be capable, should not exercise their labor outside the home, 
but should only work toward the management of the household and the bringing up of a family 
(Mill 2009, 86; Krouse 1982, 164). Mill writes,  
When the support of the family depends, not on property, but on earnings, the common 
arrangement, by which the man earns the income and the wife superintends the domestic 
expenditure, seems to me in general the most suitable division of labour between the two 
persons. If, in addition to the physical suffering of bearing children, and the whole 
responsibility of their care and education in early years, the wife undertakes the careful and 
economical application of the husband's earnings to the general comfort of the family; she 
takes not only her fair share, but usually the larger share, of the bodily and mental exertion 
required by their joint existence. If she undertakes any additional portion, it seldom relieves 
her from this, but only prevents her from performing it properly (Mill 2009, 85). 
Mill did not see his affirmation of the traditional division of labor within the family as a threat to 
the ideal marriage he earlier defined; he merely thought it prudent and in the best interest of 
familial needs. However, this more ‘pragmatic’ outlook on the ideal familial arrangement creates 
the same difficulty for his view as we saw in the case of Locke. By refusing to challenge both the 
divide between the productive and reproductive realms and the gendered nature of reproductive 
work, Mill denies the very equal rights to women that he sought. Further, his insistence upon the 
moral cultivation of citizens occurring within (ideal) families not only places the majority of care 
and education on the family, but also dictates that the purpose for family life is to serve external 
																																																						
186 Mill argues that a school of sympathy in equality, and of living together in love, is preferred over a 
school that emphasizes power on one side and obedience on the other (Mill 2009, 79).  
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means (to rear and educate future citizens to be morally upright). As such, Mill’s account does not 
do enough to challenge many aspects of the traditionalist account despite his belief in the equal 
capabilities of women. For the sake of brevity, I turn now to consider a more contemporary 
approach to defining the family-state relationship.  
John Rawls stipulates that the family has a place in the basic structure of society, along 
with the political constitution and the primary economic arrangements, because it is one of many 
institutions that shapes the rights and duties of persons and influences life prospects (Rawls 1971, 
7; Rawls 1999, 157). However, Rawls does not initially provide much analysis of the family or of 
family relations, and, keeping in line with his predecessors, assumes that the family is a private 
institution concerned with the reproductive tasks that are necessary to perpetuate society (Rawls 
1999, 157). Further, Rawls assumes that the family as an institution is more or less a just institution, 
precluding the need to consider whether there is justice in the family – something Susan Moller 
Okin criticizes as preventing the family from undergoing the same critical evaluation exercised on 
other institutions, which do not start with a similar assumption (Okin 1989, 95). Okin continues, 
claiming that Rawls’ characterization of the family is limited: he alludes to a nuclear family when 
arguing that members in the original position are “heads of families” (Rawls 1971, 128; cf. Okin 
1989). She argues that it is safe to assume, based on historical and philosophical trends, that the 
heads of families specified by Rawls are males, while the dependent members of the family are 
wives and children, preserving the gendered, hierarchical nature of familial arrangements.187  
Rawls counters these assertions in his later work, claiming that the principles of political 
justice apply directly to the basic structure of society, but apply indirectly to the internal life of the 
																																																						
187 Ruth Abbey argues that, despite his claim that political liberalism does not presume a heterosexual 
family, Rawls’ often takes the heterosexual family structure to be the norm. Hence, the family is a 
heterosexual family (Abbey 2007, 10).  
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associations within the basic structure – familial associations included (Rawls 1999, 158). For 
Rawls, this means that political principles impose essential constraints on the family as an 
institution (guaranteeing basic rights and liberties, freedom and opportunities for all members) 
through something that resembles a protective interventionist scheme. However, because the 
family is to remain a private institution, Rawls claims that we must, “rely on the natural affection 
and goodwill of the mature family members,” to ensure justice within the family (Rawls 1999, 
160). As such, Rawls indeed maintains separate “domains” of the family and of the state that arise 
directly from how the principles of justice are applied to each: the former indirectly, and the latter 
directly (Rawls 1999, 161). Although he clarifies that the state ought to invest in supporting and 
regulating institutions like the family that are needed to reproduce political society over time 
(because it has a legitimate interest in doing so), these regulations are sparse.  
For instance, Rawls signals that the state ought to have no interest in a particular form of 
family life save how permissible forms affect the orderly reproduction of society over time (Rawls 
1999, 147).188 Yet, he also does not challenge a gendered division of labor – or how it may 
detrimentally impact women especially – that arises as the result of a religious doctrine (Rawls 
1999, 162). Given the history of oppressive, abusive, and domineering treatment of women, 
Rawls’ lack of direct justice within the family may serve to perpetuate these problematic 
arrangements. So, for Rawls as well, a problematic adherence to a productive / reproductive split, 
where a significant amount of reproductive labor is tasked within the family or directed by the 
family, perpetuates the problematic trend that impinges upon women. Further, by upholding the 
split between the public and private domains, Rawls prevents families from achieving the 
necessary equality between members within the family that would grant more than mere formal 
																																																						
188 Rawls notes that this condition still does not specify one form of family life over other, but it may 
influence political arguments that promote monogamous heterosexual relations (Rawls 1999, 147). 
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equality outside of the family (specifically, to be granted equal wages for equal work, 
comprehensive family leave packages, and raises to higher-level positions within companies). 
Failure to implement supportive policies and regulations that prevent such hierarchies hurts the 
family’s chance to develop all of the caring activities necessary to ensure the cooperative well-
being of all family members, especially if those caring activities are being carried out primary by 
women. 
Liberal theorists after Rawls have approached the family-state relationship with a narrower 
theoretical scope and in more concrete terms. A substantial portion of liberal scholarship about the 
family in the past fifteen years has concerned issues that arise around the institution of marriage 
and its relationship to parenting models and the state, especially with respect to expanding 
marriage rights to same-sex couples. These most recent theories aim to expand the definition of 
marriage to be more inclusive, yet they each fall short of overcoming the major problems that have 
plagued the liberal view.189 
 Mary Lyndon Shanley proposes an “equal status view” of marriage, claiming that marriage 
requires the equal status of consenting partners and ought to be viewed as a special bond deserving 
of a public status (Shanley 2004, 6). To expand marriage to same-sex couples, Shanley argues that, 
instead of abolishing marriage law in favor of contractual relationships, marriage law itself ought 
to be altered (Shanley 2004, 15). This is because marriage law reflects the fact that the public has 
a legitimate interest in marriage as an institution because of how it transforms the lives and 
responsibilities of those within committed relationships (Shanley 2004, 27). Although Shanley 
gestures toward the recognition that public protection and support for associational and affective 
ties need not be limited to spouses and parent-children relationships, she does not indicate how the 
																																																						
189 I have discussed the views of several of these philosophers earlier in this chapter (see Section Two), so 
some liberal accounts will not be presented here, or will not be presented in full. 
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state would recognize or confer benefits upon these alternative arrangements.190 Those who 
challenge upholding marriage law, such as Martha Fineman, argue that abolishing marriage as a 
legal category is the only way to achieve gender equality for it removes all traditional notions of 
the public/private split, as well as the productive/reproductive labor split, that have historically 
complicated the equal agency of marriage partners (Fineman 2004, 47).191 By upholding marriage 
as an institution with a special status, Shanley problematically limits the kinds of groups that may 
call themselves families and preserves a system that has historically contributed to the oppression 
of women and the devaluation of care. 
David Archard, in The Family: A Liberal Defense, defines the family as, “a 
multigenerational group, normally stably co-habiting, whose adults take primary custodial 
responsibility for the dependent children” (Archard 2010, 26). This functional definition 
emphasizes the defining role of the family as the custodial care of dependent children and allows 
for an appraisal of how well (or poorly) families are fulfilling this purpose, especially as it relates 
to preparing children to become citizens (Archard 2010, 62-64). Archard claims that a plurality of 
family forms (including same-sex partnerships) is not undesirable so long as whatever familial 
form is taken serves the important end of bringing up children (Archard 2010, xv). That being said, 
Archard makes the case that, in general, the best scenario for the upbringing of children is with 
their own biological parents. He claims that two factors are important in making this determination: 
1) biological parents (usually) have demonstrated a commitment to care for a child and are 
																																																						
190 Similarly, Stephen Macedo notes that the law ought to do more to recognize and support a variety of 
forms of non-marital caring and non-marital caregiving relationships. However, he offers little indication 
of how to provide such caregiving relationships with the same social significance and benefits as marriage 
(Macedo 2015, 9).  
191 Fineman argues that marriage is the way that the United States privatizes dependency and care. The state 
has a responsibility to provide social services that it cannot do so long as marriage as an institution stands 
(Fineman 2004, 47).  
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disposed to love that child, and 2) kinship matters culturally, and is of significance to children 
looking to trace their roots (Archard 2010, 61). This stance privileges biological relatedness over 
other considerations and seems to support the worrying assumption that biology undergirds a 
disposition to care and show affection.  
Further, Archard maintains the split between the public (state) and private (family) realms 
of society, claiming that the state determines the scope of ‘public authority’ and then determines 
what falls outside of that scope (Archard 2010, 19). Since the family falls mostly outside of that 
scope and, as Archer argues, the family works best and flourishes if it is left to its own devices, it 
is not subject to public regulation unless a “reasonable” measure detects that a wrong has occurred 
(Archard 2010, 22-25). Archard writes, “We may be unable to determine that a wrong has been 
done, or is very likely to be done, in private – a child abused, a wife assaulted – unless police 
officers can ‘pry’ into our private lives, and even ‘search the sacred precincts’ of our domestic 
domain. The point is that official agencies must have just cause to ‘snoop’ rather than simply be 
exercising a general right to patrol the private (Archard 2010, 25). Despite the known prevalence 
of abuse, oppression, and dominance that have already been discussed throughout this chapter, 
Archard’s defense of the privacy of the family preserves the same protective interventionist 
policies that create unsafe conditions for family members. As such, Archard’s view preserves 
several problematic aspects of the liberal view despite his functionalist-appraisal account of the 
family’s inner workings. 
Another distinct approach within the liberal view comes from Elizabeth Brake who, 
building her account upon on Rawlsian framework of public reason, proposes the idea of “minimal 
marriage” as a way to expand marriage beyond its current restriction to what she calls 
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“amatonormative” relationships only.192 Brake claims that all citizens should be able to accept the 
idea that caring relationships are intrinsically good, and in virtue of that fact, the state should 
support such relationships (Brake 2012, 158). As such, marriage should be extended to cover 
different kinds of caring relationships – even beyond same-sex couplings – because any other 
restrictions on marriage would be illiberal and unjust since they could only be justified through 
appeal to non-public reasons.193 
 For Brake, Minimal marriage would support “adult care networks” or “caring 
relationships” comprised of any number of persons, with or without a romantic component (Brake 
2012, 161). Marriage should not restrict either the gender or the number of people who are involved 
in a marriage, nor should there be any restrictions on the kinds of spousal obligations that people 
exchange with one another in marriage (Brake 2012, 161).194 Those who form minimal marriages 
might choose to exchange all of their marital rights reciprocally with one person, or distribute them 
throughout an adult care network, ensuring that married persons are only responsible for the 
obligations that they voluntarily choose – so long as those obligations work toward caring 
relationships (Brake 2012, 161). Minimal marriage would also entitle married persons to a range 
of benefits that, Brake argues, form the social bases of caring relationships, such as insurance 
benefits, immigration benefits, prison and hospital visits, and so on (Brake 2012, 182).  
 While Brake’s proposal sounds extremely promising, she still problematically emphasizes 
the importance of marriage for defining what a family is. Although her definition of marriage does 
not conform to amatonormative relationships, it privileges adult-only relationships (instead of 
																																																						
192 Amatonormativity concerns marital and amorous love relationships that are seen as a special site of 
value, as opposed to other kinds of caring relationships like friendships (cf. Brake 2012, 4). 
193 Brake argues that marriage should not draw respect or meaning from comprehensive expressive 
meanings of marriage, for these cannot be shared by all persons (Brake 2012, 187). 
194 Brake envisions this as a kind of pre-marital contract where parties check off boxes to determine what 
obligations they will take on.  
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relationships that also involve children) and relationships between those who are cognitively able 
to consent to marital relations and negotiate a set of obligations with one another (Brake 2012, 
161).195 In fact, to deal with objections related to such complicated relations, Brake asserts that 
parenting frameworks should be kept separate from minimal marriage (Brake 2012, 145-150). This 
response does not take into account the fact that parenting (or co-parenting, or “othermothering”) 
is often not a choice for all parties involved, and an emphasis on contracting over specific rights 
and duties for care may leave some children without willing guardians.196  
Brake writes, “Unlike current marriage, minimal marriage does not require that individuals 
exchange marital rights reciprocally and in complete bundles: It allows their disaggregation to 
support the numerous relationships, or adult care networks, that people may have” (Brake 2012, 
161). Her account supposes that those who are contracting to marry one another have the ability 
to see what their futures might hold, and only exchange the rights and duties that support certain 
lifestyles (namely, lifestyles without children). Brake claims that minimal marriage consists in 
rights that recognize and support caring relationships (Brake 2012, 162). However, one cannot 
know in advance what kinds of caring relationships may materialize over time, so prematurely 
agreeing only to certain rights and responsibilities while abstaining from others (most notably 
parenting responsibilities) may lead to higher instances of “divorce” or dissolved marriages when, 
for instance, an unexpected pregnancy occurs. 
The liberal view of the family, in all of its stages, retains some problematic characteristics 
that make it a difficult view to promote as meeting the needs of citizens. By dividing the family 
																																																						
195 Brake stipulates that minimal marriage would not require that individuals exchange marital rights 
reciprocally and in complete bundles; persons could negotiate how their obligations are distributed among 
family members (Brake 2012, 161). 
196 Additionally, it is not clear how those who are cognitively disabled would be able to marry into a family 
or join a family through other means, especially since separate parenting frameworks does not ensure 
inclusion into a family. 
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and the state into different realms and granting the family (in most cases) a significant amount of 
privacy over the intimate relations within, the liberal view continues the dangerous trend of 
ignoring many instances of abuse, oppression, domination, and neglect that may arise from such 
unregulated relationships. Further, by maintaining the distinction between productive and 
reproductive labor, the liberal view devalues the importance of care and privatizes the needs of 
persons by neglecting to specify how the state will support caring relations (either through policy 
or regulation), making it more difficult for family members to adequately care for one another and 
to assess how well families are taking care of their members. The doctrine of protective 
intervention certainly helps to alleviate problems that may arise because of these arrangements; 
however, it has been shown that protective intervention is not a sufficient means for preventing 
abuse, oppression, and the like from familial relations because it only warrants intervention in 
egregious situations – and even then, intervention often comes after harmful behaviors have 
occurred. Lastly, the contemporary liberal accounts of the family, when not plagued by these 
structural issues, still encounter problems because they place too much emphasis upon marriage 
as a contract (to the detriment of other kinds of caring relations that arise without contracts) or 
neglect the needs of certain persons (particularly, children and those who cannot contract as 
specified). As such, the liberal view of the family does not meet the needs of persons as 
successfully as the social family account.  
 
5. The Abolitionist View 
Recognizing the problems attached to the traditionalist and liberal views – hierarchical 
familial structures that privilege men over women, the segregation of rights and benefits for 
married persons versus unmarried persons, privatized familial relations and the neglect of care 
outside of the family that comes from such a privatized notion of family life – abolitionists call for 
KANE - DISSERTATION 
	
180	
certain aspects of the family structure to be completely abolished. While some proponents of the 
abolitionist view call for the abolition of the private or well-defined family as we know it, others 
call for the abolition of marriage or any public status that sets those with certain benefit-conferring 
relations apart from those without such relations.  
In The Republic, Plato argues for the creation of a just state that relies on a very particular 
understanding of kinship, love, and harmony and, as such, requires a very different kind of family-
state relationship than what has been discussed thus far. Plato calls for private households and 
families in the Guardian class to be abolished in favor of a complete social and political hegemony 
that prohibits the development of relationships between particular parents and children or within 
private spaces (cf. Plato 1992, 543a-b; Engster and Metz 2014, 3; Gutmann 1987, 22-28). Michael 
Walzer notes that for Plato, political community must override traditional kinship ties because 
they produce divisive interests and claims to private property that keep individuals and small 
family units in conflict with one another (Walzer 1983, 230).197 Overriding kinship ties requires 
more than merely abolishing familial structures; it also involves diffusing the tasks associated with 
reproductive labor to the greatest number of persons to obscure kinship ties. As such, Plato 
stipulates that, for the guardian class in particular, social and reproductive roles not be divided by 
gender: parenting is handled by the community at large, producing conditions where no parent 
recognizes a child as their own, and no child knows their biological parents. This kind of 
arrangement meant that women were no longer associated solely with motherhood and were 
defined as being equally as capable as men to carry out the various tasks required of them (with 
																																																						
197 In a similar vein, Susan Moller Okin notes that Plato recognized the need for private homes and “private 
wives” to be abolished because communal ownership of (non-guardian) women and children would produce 
the greatest amount of unity (Okin 1982, 34). Okin argues that, for Plato, women were an important 
subsection of property, and could be made public or private as necessary. When women are made “private,” 
they are depicted as hastening the decline of the state because of their “exclusive concern with the particular 
interests of their families,” (Okin 1982, 35). 
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the exception for brute strength) (Okin 1982, 39). It also meant that private kinship relations were 
impossible to observe, and a much wider kinship network developed among the guardian class. 
So, Plato’s guardians were a class of equal persons that formed a large kinship network similar to 
the traditional family in sentiment but with a more universal scope akin to something like political 
friendship (Okin 1982, 38; Walzer 1983, 229).  
The force of the Platonic argument for the abolition of the traditional family and the 
extension of the kinship network was to create a sense of social harmony amongst those who would 
normally be tied to separate smaller kinship networks. This social harmony would produce the 
kind of camaraderie between a large network of citizens that would typically arise only between 
those members of a traditionally defined family, and would educate the youngest members of the 
state to believe that they cannot realize their own good except by contributing to the social good 
(Gutmann 1987, 23).  
Although Plato’s theory of the family has an exceptional stance on the equality of women, 
objections have been raised over how feasible and desirable such an arrangement would be. For 
instance, Walzer argues that men and women feel a loss when deprived of the special affections 
that come with smaller families. Despite our attempts to treat our community members with love, 
we still treat our kinfolk more specially, and prefer to be in their company (Walzer 1983, 231). 
Similarly, Amy Gutmann argues that family members want to share their specific values and way 
of life with their progeny; denying them this opportunity challenges the notion that parents ought 
to be able to do what they think is best for their children (Gutmann 1987, 27).198 Thus, there seems 
to be something significant about particular familial relationships that warrants a level of privacy 
																																																						
198 Likewise, Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift argue that sharing values with children lies at the heart of 
the parent-child relationship because such interactions contribute to ‘familial relationship goods’(Brighouse 
and Swift 2014, 152).  
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necessary for developing intimate connections and caring sentiments. The social family account 
recognizes that intimacy plays an integral role in developing and maintaining caring relations 
between family members. It seems as though Plato’s view is unable to produce the conditions 
necessary for intimate caring relations, despite his push for extended caring networks.  
Plato’s motivation for abolishing the family is very different from the motivations of other 
abolitionists like Emma Goldman and Claudia Card. For instance, Goldman espouses the free love 
view, which holds that it is immoral to make long-term commitments to other persons, such as a 
marriage commitment, because it may require those individuals who have made the commitment 
to stay in the relationship at times for reasons other than spontaneous love (Goldman 1914). She 
argues that love cannot arise within a marriage (if it does, it is only because the spouses have 
adjusted to the inevitable), and that marriage is in fact detrimental to the raising of children (it 
replaces sentiment with obligation) (Goldman 1914). Love between partners and between parents 
and children can only thrive if there is freedom from continued obligation because love is stronger 
than legal commitment. Legal commitment stifles the intimacy and spontaneity between those who 
love each other and replaces it with the gesture of a safe investment (Goldman 1914).  
Goldman’s view is extremely romantic, but it is certainly not practical. While one cannot 
be obligated to love another, there does seem to be an intuitive desire, especially in contemporary 
social relationships, for long-term commitment between family members, especially in the face of 
hardship or periods of disenchantment. This intuition has been evinced in several places within 
this dissertation, including the traditionalist and liberal accounts of the family in this chapter, the 
discussion about needs and caring activities in Chapter Three, and the idea of group identity and 
group commitments in Chapter Two. Spontaneous love does not take into account dependency, 
disability, or reciprocity, nor does it seem to apply to non-amorous relations, save parent-child 
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relationships. As such, Goldman’s view is extremely narrow – discounting long-term caring 
relations that are necessary for the sustenance of human life and the variety of relationships that 
persons create and maintain that have little to do with spontaneous romantic love.199 Further, the 
lack of obligation between lovers may certainly lead to unequal provisions of care and concern, 
especially if the amorous relationship becomes unrequited.200 As such, Goldman’s account fails to 
capture the significance of long-term commitments for maintaining healthy family members over 
time. 
In a different take on the abolitionist stance, Claudia Card seeks to reject state 
legitimization of relationships because they privilege certain relationships while discriminating 
against others. Card compares the removal of legally regulated marriage from the basic structure 
of society to the removal of “legitimate” birth from it. She argues that babies born to unwed 
mothers are no longer stamped “illegitimate” and, mostly importantly, are not stamped 
“legitimate” either (Card 2007, 27). In terms of marriage, Card clarifies that this does not mean 
that all kinds of intimate unions (no matter how bizarre) would suddenly be legitimate; rather, it 
would mean that marital status, like legitimate birth, would disappear as a legal status (Card 2007, 
27).201 As a result, the privilege of being “legitimate” would disappear in tandem, as would all of 
the benefits that come with legally regulated marriage. 
Card finds the benefits that come with marriage discriminatory against those who are not 
able to enter such relationships. She argues that a more inclusive strategy would work to separate 
																																																						
199 For instance, relationships between siblings, cousins, and best friends. 
200 In contrast, a joint commitment to the goal of maintaining the well-being of all family members and the 
family unit as a whole would not permit unequal relationships. 
201 This argument follows a similar proposal made by Carol Gould, who claims that marriage should be 
abolished as a state and legally defined institution. However, she maintains that childraising should not be 
completely left to the private sphere, arguing that, “legal protections for children are required in which 
responsibilities for childraising are specified” (Gould 1984, 10) 
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marriage and the supplementary benefits that are currently attached to it – benefits such as 
healthcare, visitation rights, property transfers, and so forth (Card 2007, 29). More pointedly, 
though, she argues that the legal and economic incentives of marriage are actually unjust for all 
persons married or unmarried. These incentives actually reduce the ability for a fair assessment of 
the choice to marry and to make a long-term commitment, and provide disincentives for abused 
spouses to exit relationships (Card, 2007, 31).  
Card is right to reject current marriage law as it stands; it still discriminates against certain 
kinds of familial arrangements (those that are not amatonormative) and determines the recipients 
of benefits purely on legal grounds as opposed to the assessment of needs. That being said, two 
objections can be raised against her view. First, the importance of the family having a certain status 
within the state enables the family to receive social benefits, which in turn make it more feasible 
for family members to care for one another. While this may not necessarily translate into marriage 
having this special status,202 there ought to be some public recognition of the intimate ties that 
certain persons have to one another (whether or not they are amorous or parent-child ties) so that 
supportive policies and regulations can be created to help those relationships thrive. Part of that 
thriving is expressed as the ‘we’ that family members identify themselves as that make caring 
relations more intimate.203  
For instance, Joan Tronto argues that, “the family not only provides material support for 
its members … but is also a source of an individual’s sense of identity” (Tronto 2004, 39). Tamara 
Metz similarly argues that, “the extra value attached to the marital title is the community’s 
																																																						
202 Tamara Metz notes that same-sex couples seeking marriage over civil unions seems to suggest that 
“marriage” adds something extra to the instrumental status of the relationship (Metz 2014, 196). 
203 As per the discussion in Chapter Two, Section Two about what it means to be a ‘we’, a joint commitment 
delineates who the members of a social group are, but it is the feeling of having a shared commitment – the 
knowledge of a group commitment – that gives meaning to the social group qua social group for each of 
its members (cf. Gilbert, 1989). 
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constitutive recognition, the weighty moral approval and the complex normative account of the 
relationship it names and that is intended to reconstitute the most intimate aspects of self-
understanding” (Metz 2014, 200). Although Metz calls for the disestablishment of marriage, she 
argues that the constitutive status of intimate relationships can be preserved through Intimate Care 
Giving Unions (ICGUs), although she ultimately concedes that the instrumental purpose would 
guide the creation of these units (Metz 2014, 204).204 The sense of identity – the constitutive status 
– is what gives families the foundation for intimacy that contributes to mutually beneficial caring 
relations between family members. Family members who jointly commit to form a ‘we’ have a 
particular understanding of who they are as a group and form special, intimate relationships as a 
result.205 The recognition of the family by the state leads to the conferral of social benefits that 
help family members to maintain these intimate relationships with one another, thus contributing 
to the identity family members built in relation to their family unit. Downplaying the significance 
of this identity reduces relationships to purely instrumental partnerships rather than intimate places 
for care.  
Second, while it is problematic to tie all social benefits to a particular legal status (such as 
marriage, for example), certain benefits just simply are more useful to particular familial 
arrangements (such as subsidized child care, home health aides, or visitation rights in hospitals) 
than others, and these benefits ought to be conferred to families qua families. This does not mean 
that benefits like Social Security, unemployment insurance, or healthcare are tied to familial status. 
Rather, it means that certain families have greater needs than others (either because of membership 
																																																						
204 Metz problematically upholds the ability for ICGUs to be created with gendered hierarchical structures 
or polygamous structures with little oversight or challenge, claiming that we ought to respect both liberty 
and equality with respect to forming these unions. However, as Metz clearly notes, this leaves her account 
open to some potentially problematic outcomes (Metz 2014, 206). 
205 This feeling of being a ‘we’ may also foster feelings of trust between family members; these trusting 
feelings may also be grounded by the mutual obligation to uphold the joint commitment. 
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constitution or socio-economic status) and the state ought to assess the needs of those particular 
families and confer the corresponding social benefits upon them, even if other families do not 
receive those same benefits. 
Although the abolitionist view makes greater strides toward elevating the importance of 
care within families and tries to reduce the problematic outcomes of restricted relationship 
structures, it nonetheless possesses its own set of shortcomings. Most notably, as I have argued 
above, the abolitionist view fails to appreciate the significance of particular familial relationships, 
especially with respect to creating the kind of intimacy between family members that leads to 
better caring outcomes. As such, the social family account is better able to meet the needs of 
families because of its emphasis on preserving intimacy within families. 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
The traditionalist view, the liberal view, and the abolitionist view are each plagued by their 
own unique shortcomings that neglect certain fundamental aspects of the family-state relationship 
that make families beneficial for all family members and for the state. One last problem that all 
three views face is a notable exclusion of any meaningful responsibilities assigned to the state to 
either care for, or help take care of, its members. By omitting the state’s responsibility to help take 
care of its members, the traditionalist view, the liberal view, and the abolitionist view ignore the 
fact that governmental policy and regulatory practices create and perpetuate secondary needs 
(those things that persons require to secure the resources necessary to meet their primary needs), 
which often hinders a family’s abilities to meet their primary needs.206  
																																																						
206 For a thorough discussion of primary and secondary needs, see Chapter Three, Section Three in this 
dissertation. 
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The state has an obligation to take care of the secondary needs of families that arise as a 
direct result of policies, regulations, and procedures. As I have argued in Chapter Three, this 
obligation is both morally and socially grounded; the moral grounding is based in the principle of 
consistent dependency, and the social grounding is based in the recognition that the cause and 
perpetuation of secondary needs is inherent in the conventions upheld by social, political, and 
cultural structures.207 This recognition puts the state in a particular position to assess its own 
governmental policies toward supporting caring relations, and to make changes to these policies 
and to regulatory procedures when necessary.  
 The social family account recognizes that the family and state have a symbiotic 
relationship that extends the moral and social obligation to care for persons to both institutions for 
their mutual benefit: the family as the most effective and efficient primary caregiver cannot 
function optimally without secondary care and support from the state, and the state cannot function 
optimally (if at all) without the primary caregiving of families. As such, a shared value of care and 
caring activities guides the purpose and activities of the family and the state: the family expresses 
the value of care by engaging in primary caring activities for the mutual benefit of all family 
members, and the state expresses the value of care by promoting policies and engaging in 
secondary caring activities that serve to benefit families as well as the state. A shared value of care 
is most beneficial to both family members and the state because all persons are adequately cared 
for, granting as many persons as possible the ability to participate as active citizens within the 




207 For more thorough analyses of the principle of consistent dependency and conventionality, see Chapter 
Three, Sections Four and Seven. 
















At the beginning of this dissertation I claimed that the way we define the family has profound 
effects on the political and social practices within an organized state. How we define the family 
affects the composition of family membership, the basis for relationships among family members 
and between families and other institutions, and the guiding principles that shape the relationship 
between the family and the state. As I hope to have shown throughout this dissertation, defining 
the family by appealing to the qualitative aspect of familial relationships through the notion of the 
social family account produces the most beneficial outcomes for family members and, 
consequently, for the state. 
The social family account recognizes the sociality inherent in familial relations. The 
recognition that the family is a unique kind of social group emphasizes the relational aspect of 
family life and informs discussions about the relational characteristics between the family and 
other institutions, as well as the family and the state. These relational characteristics highlight the 
interdependency among family members, the pervasive ways that family members affect one 
another, the ways that a family’s ability to thrive is affected by other institutions and the state, and 
the ways in which a state either thrives or falters depending upon the quality of familial care. The 
arguments presented in this dissertation defend these salient points, while also grounding a robust 
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notion of obligation that underpins a normative account of the family-state relationship based upon 
valuing care.  
In Chapter One, I claimed that the primary purpose of a social group is what forms the 
identity of the social group and, hence, what distinguishes it from other social groups. I argued 
that a family is a social group and, as such, should be recognized as having a particular primary 
purpose that originates from the family and for the sake of the family.208 In proposing a clear 
criterion – purpose – to distinguish social groups from one another, my approach also provided a 
way to evaluate the qualitative aspects of relationships within social groups that shaped discussions 
in Chapters Two and Three.  
In Chapter Two, I argued that Margaret Gilbert’s theory of joint commitment best explains 
our understanding of obligation with respect to social group membership. However, joint 
commitments only underlie the concept of obligation, not the content of obligation. To flesh out 
an account of the family as a distinct kind of social group, it is necessary to identify the primary 
purpose that the family serves for its members by identifying the normative criteria for members 
of a family to commit to certain kinds of goals and activities. I proposed that the family is a unique 
social group with a particular primary purpose – to provide care in intimate settings for the mutual 
flourishing of all family members – that determines the kinds of behaviors that are required for 
member flourishing. This proposal called for us to conceptualize the family in the following way: 
1) the family is a social group created by a joint commitment to the goal of maintaining the well-
being of all family members and the family unit as a whole, 2) the family is maintained by joint 
activity that works toward the shared goal of mutual well-being, and 3) this joint activity is 
																																																						
208 By this I mean that the primary purpose of the family ought to be something that only pertains to the 
functioning of the family as a social group independent of all other purposes that the family might serve in 
different contexts. 
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comprised of the practice of active care that family members are obligated to perform for one 
another by virtue of their joint commitment. As such, the social family account holds that the 
family is a unique social group with a particular primary purpose – to provide care in intimate 
settings for the mutual flourishing of all family members. 
The social family account conceives of the family as a kind of social group whose primary 
purpose is based upon a commitment to interdependent caring relations, and the fulfillment of 
mutual wellbeing through corresponding caring activities, because it is an ideal arrangement for 
persons to care for and receive care from one another. A joint commitment to form, join, or 
maintain a family obligates family members to actively care for one another by virtue of the shared 
goal of interdependent caring relations.  
In Chapter Three, I argued that this active care is comprised mainly of primary caring 
activities which respond to the primary needs that all persons have. Families are in a unique 
position to provide primary care for one another because of the intimate knowledge that families 
members have about one another. The special circumstances that enable family members to 
possess such knowledge makes the family a more efficient and effective setting for primary 
caregiving than other institutions and the state. However, I also noted that primary needs may be 
met through organized forms of social and economic life that have existed, in different forms, 
alongside families both before and after the advent of the modern state (Gould 2004, 98-99). These 
organized forms of social and economic life are regulated by modern states, yet they are not 
entirely conventional in character and may be thought to straddle the processes for meeting both 
primary and secondary needs. With respect to meeting primary needs, family members are not 
always able to care for one another’s primary needs for a variety of reasons; most centrally, a lack 
of resources that prevents them from participating in organized forms of social and economic life. 
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In response to this observation, I argued that contemporary political, social, and economic systems 
each have a hand in creating and perpetuating a variety of secondary needs that must also be met 
to ensure that families are able to meet their primary needs adequately.  
I drew a comparison between my conception of secondary needs and David Braybrooke’s 
conception of conventionality.209 Conventions (be they social cultural, or political) have the power 
to create and perpetuate additional needs that must be met for persons to subsist. Because economic 
and social arrangements are typically regulated by governments in present day, political structures 
(specifically, governments) are in a unique position to create, maintain, alter, and alleviate the 
secondary needs of persons living within the state in a number of ways, including the creation or 
revision of policies that pertain to citizenship, wages, healthcare, and the like, or by insufficiently 
regulating harmful market practices. Since many of our primary needs cannot be met unless our 
secondary needs are also met, I argued that the state has both a moral and a social obligation to 
take care of the secondary needs of families. Since governmental policy and regulatory practices 
create and perpetuate secondary needs, often hindering families’ abilities to meet their primary 
needs, the state has an obligation to take care of the secondary needs of families that arise as a 
direct result of policies, regulations, and procedures. This social obligation has roots in the moral 
obligation to meet the secondary needs of families, but its true force comes from the recognition 
that the cause and perpetuation of secondary needs is inherent in the conventions upheld by social, 
political, and cultural structures.  
As a result of these arguments, I proposed in Chapter Four that we consider the symbiotic 
relationship that exists between the family and the state, especially with respect to the moral 
																																																						
209 Braybrooke writes, “At the very heart of the concept [of need], as close to a firm footing for it as it ever 
gets in ordinary use, conventionality takes the place, without renouncing the claims of biological necessity: 
What people are held to need for subsistence is always considerably more than the biological minimum 
required to sustain life” (Braybrooke 1987, 19-20). 
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obligations that both institutions have to persons: the family as the most effective and efficient 
primary caregiver cannot function optimally without secondary care and support from the state, 
and the state cannot function optimally (if at all) without the primary caregiving of families. The 
symbiotic nature of the family-state relationship stems from a shared value of care and caring 
activities: the family expresses the value of care by engaging in primary caring activities for the 
mutual benefit of all family members, and the state expresses the value of care by promoting 
policies and engaging in secondary caring activities that serve to benefit families as well as the 
state. A shared and promoted value of care sets the social family apart from other theories of the 
family-state relationship, most notably the Traditionalist View, the Liberal View, and the 
Abolitionist View. I critiqued these alternative conceptions of the family and the claims they make 
about the characteristics of the family-state relationship to demonstrate that the social family 
account offers a more comprehensive and advantageous picture of the family-state relationship 
that better meets the needs of persons, families, and the state. 
 Having presented my argument in full, I wish to point to some similarities between my 
own view and the views presented by G. W. F. Hegel and Axel Honneth that I believe support the 
approach I have taken in this dissertation. Although I will not discuss these accounts in full, the 
similarities noted may help to situate my account within this tradition going forward.    
 
*  *  * 
The social family account relates in some ways to recognitional accounts of persons, 
groups, institutions, and states. Recognition theory, particularly as found in G. W. F. Hegel and 
Axel Honneth, posits that sociality is inherent in all types of interactions as well as in the formation 
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of the self.210 The recognition of this inherent sociality is akin to the recognition in relational 
accounts (such as Jennifer Nedelsky’s relational account discussed in Chapter Four) that all 
persons, institutions, markets, and states are shaped by one another, and these shaping forces 
change or reinforce the relationships that constitute each. As such, recognition theory posits a 
framework that corresponds well to the kind of relational thinking I have highlighted here.  
For Hegel, as well as for the social family account, the family is the formative institution 
of the state, meaning the family is the place where values are shaped and where our notions of the 
qualitative aspects of relationships are acquired. While the social family account maintains that 
the purpose of the family is to provide care in intimate settings for the mutual flourishing of all 
family members, Hegel’s view of the purpose of the family is based more centrally on an external 
end for familial relations: to provide a state’s youngest members with a mind open to ethical 
thought. Although the members of the family focus only on what is immediately beneficial to the 
family (that is, they attend more to particularity than universality), the family provides the 
foundation for the development of empathy toward others outside of the family: the loving aspect 
of familial relations serves to educate children to adopt more universal ethical principles in both 
civil society and the state (1991, §158, §163). So, for Hegel, the family has a logically 
indispensable function in the reproduction and early cultivation of empathetic, ethical citizens. 
This primary purpose for the family differs from the primary purpose identified in the social family 
account, yet it still draws on the significance of familial relationships for the creation of 
empathetic, ethical citizens.  
Hegel claims that the family is the birth of the citizen and the first place that we learn to 
care for and value others. The ethical development of an individual is first shaped by the dynamic 
																																																						
210 I will only focus on the non-psychological aspects of recognition theory here. 
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of the family, especially the feelings associated with particular relationships that exist between 
family members (1991, §158). As such, Hegel’s theory of the family emphasizes the importance 
of love, care, membership in a collective, and ethical education (1991, §177).  
However, given the indispensable significance of the family in ethical life, it is troubling 
that Hegel divides reproductive labor in the family along gender lines (1991, §165-166, §171, 
§177).211 Honneth claims that Hegel’s version of the family adheres to something similar to the 
modern notion of the family that was discussed in Chapter Four:212  
“Each member's specific activity would supplement that of the others, such that they could only 
realize the individual aims deriving from their respective natural determination together. 
Therefore, the disclosure of the element of freedom within the modern family relied on strongly 
naturalistic assumptions according to which the father seeks to satisfy his claims to authority, 
the mother seeks to fulfill her maternal instinct and the child seeks to gain support and 
orientation” (Honneth 2013, 168).  
Honneth notes this this way of looking at the family is now unacceptable. He argues that 
the levelling of the division of labor within the family – mothers in the workforce, fathers 
increasingly helping out in the home - has caused a shift in the self-understanding of parents, who 
now see themselves as equally responsible for the development of a child's autonomy, instead of 
fulfilling gendered roles (Honneth 2013, 161). Parents no longer primarily regard themselves as 
caretakers of dependents (children) who eventually leave the family to form families of their 
																																																						
211 I have argued elsewhere that Hegel’s family need not be divided along gender lines, and this is in fact 
an arbitrary choice on Hegel’s part to maintain the status quo. That does not make his choice any less 
problematic, but it must be considered that Hegel’s resistance to traditional marriage contracts demonstrates 
his insistence that the family be an institution of affection and good will where roles can be differentiated 
not on the basis of gender, but on the social needs of the family to establish itself as a strong foundation for 
ethical life (cf. Kane 2014).  
212 Judith Stacey defines the modern family with the following criteria: 1) The separation of family work 
and productive work; 2) Love and companionship as the ideal purposes of marriages that are freely 
contracted in to; 3) Familial privacy; 4) Women devoted increased attention to nurturing their children 
(Stacey 2014, 18).  
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own.213 Instead, the parent-child relationship now represents the ’we’ of a life-long form of 
primary community, since parents live long enough to know their adult children, and these adult 
children often become primary caretakers of their parents.214 Honneth claims that, “families now 
understand themselves in their diverse forms … as a relationship involving three equal members 
[mother, father, and child] whose roles and tasks change in accordance with the phases of their 
time spent together” (Honneth 2013, 163).  
This understanding of the family gives way to new norms that govern family life and, for 
Honneth, provides an alternative way to view Hegel’s ideal version of the family. Honneth claims 
that Hegel was trying to grasp the mutual symbolization of past and future stages of life when he 
claimed that children were the ‘objectification’ of the love between their parents. This mutual 
symbolization means more than just the idea that children are reflections of their parents; it also 
means that children come to mirror their parents as they become the primary caretakers within 
their families, taking over the role(s) that their parents once filled (Honneth 2013, 169-171).  
. 
 This view reinforces the claim made in the social family account that familial care is most 
effectively carried out over the long term, especially since the roles of caregiver and care receiver 
change with respect to the different needs that arise over time for each family member. Although 
Hegel and Honneth discuss families as necessarily involving parents and children (foreclosing the 
status of family to more diverse groupings), both accounts highlight the significance of familial 
relations and familial care over the long term. 
																																																						
213 Hegel argues that the family is dissolved naturally once children completely grow up and forms families 
of their own (1991 §177). 
214 Honneth writes that, “the tendency toward multi-locational cross-generational families, which are a 
consequence of the significant rise of average life expectancy for both men and women, has led to the 
formation of a temporally expanded pattern of reciprocity between parents and children, representing areal 
historical novelty. Because parents do not generally die until their children are between the ages of forty-
five and sixty, their children can provide the care and affection to their parents in old age that they once 
received from them as children” (Honneth 2013, 165).  
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 Additionally, Honneth call attention to the symbiotic relationship between the family and 
the state, arguing that, “… all these new normative [familial] practices … can only take hold and 
prosper if the corresponding preconditions in the socioeconomic environment are given. And at 
present, government family and labour policies are in no way formulated so as to guarantee the 
special kind of social freedom in the democratized families of our time” (Honneth 2013, 172). 
He argues that there are several elements needed for families to function well in the world today 
without disadvantaging themselves economically at the same time: “plenty of time to interact with 
the children, the freedom to equally distribute duties over the entire duration of the family's life 
together, and reliable prospects of stable careers that provide a sufficient livelihood” (Honneth 
2013, 172-173). These elements can only be achieved without financially burdening families if 
supportive governmental family and labor policies are in place that provide persons the freedom 
and capability to fulfill their familial obligations. Akin to the social family account, Honneth 
argues that the state has a responsibility to provide supportive conditions for families so that they 
may fulfill their caring obligations to one another: “every democratic community must have a vital 
interest in creating the socioeconomic relations under which all families can truly adopt the 
practices that are already institutionally available” (Honneth 2013, 175).  
 The social family account also tries to make the case that we ought to be looking at the 
family-state relationship through the lens of responsibility, especially the relational notion of 
responsibility that family members have toward meeting the primary needs of one another and that 
the state has toward meeting the secondary needs of families. As such, the social family account 
makes claims that are similar to those made by Honneth, as well as those made by Hegel, that may 
situate it within this tradition. Going forward, my hope for the social family account is for it to 
serve as a foundation, as well as a springboard, for the development of socially progressive policies 
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aimed at providing better opportunities and resources to establish and maintain caring relations 
between family members and between citizens.  
Governmental and institutional policies aimed at improving the lives of citizens ought to 
follow the model presented in the social family account of facilitating intimate caring relations 
among family members while also aiming to extend those caring relations beyond the family, to 
relations between citizens, and between persons and institutions. By this I have in mind the 
implementation of a caring infrastructure through the adoption of more robust social benefits: 
subsidized and/or universal childcare, subsidized and/or universal eldercare, universal healthcare, 
and the expansion of social insurance policies such as universal basic income, or at the very least, 
more robust versions of Social Security, Unemployment Insurance, Disability Insurance, and so 
on. The blueprint provided by the social family account for supporting caring activities within the 
family and the state can be incorporated into our current social and political landscape through 
incremental changes in social policy. Striving to implement these incremental changes by 
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